Bye, Bye Boys in Blue

Croatian president Franjo Tudjman decided to cancel UNPROFOR's mandate on January 12 "in accord with his constitutional authority". The decision takes effect on March 31 when the peacekeepers' mandate expires but the Croatian president has left them another three months to complete their withdrawal. Tudjman's decision drew reactions from the entire international community. German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel called the decision "profoundly wrong"; the State Department voiced "profound disagreement", Denmark and France "profound concern"; NATO Secretary General Willi Klaes expressed "regret" and Italian foreign minister Antonio Martino voiced "concern and fears that the decision will lead to an escalation of the conflict". In his report on Croatia, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali voiced fears that the possible withdrawal could lead to "much more destructive conflicts than the ones in 1991-92". Ghali, Washington, Bonn, Paris and states that have troops in UNPROFOR said on several occasions that Zagreb is expected to change its mind. Although everyone voiced understanding for Croatia's position and frustration, the decision gained no support anywhere. The surprise was the late official reaction from the FRY. There have been speculations that Belgrade told Zagreb to scare Knin a little. Croatia's Brussels ambassador Janko Vranicani seemed to be implying just that with statements that his state was "leaving everything up to the Serbian president so he could meet his obligations to the international community" and that "Croatia does not want to put him in a difficult position". Vranicani added that Zagreb is prepared to accept any kind of acceptable deal but wants Belgrade to finally recognize Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. Something similar came from Croatian foreign minister Mate Granic. He said the decision to cancel the peacekeepers' mandate was motivated by Belgrade's failure to recognize Croatia; Zagreb is not prepared to wait for a solution to the Bosnia crisis which would be favorable to Serbia and allow it an easy negotiating position in talks on the territories controlled by Krajina Serbs.

Granic raised tension saying the decision is final and not negotiable. Security Council resolution 970 seems to favor Zagreb's behavior. Article 3 of that resolution says: "imports, exports and transit through UN protected areas (UNPA) in Croatia and parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by the Bosnian Serb forces, except humanitarian deliveries including medication and food distributed by international humanitarian organizations is allowed only with the approval of the Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina governments which includes all transports across the FRY-Bosnia-Herzegovina border". That practically means the international humanitarian team on the border has been given the authority to stop trucks going from Belgrade to Knin and ask for permits from the Zagreb government.Yugoslav customs chief Mihalj Kertes didn't need a UN resolution to stop transports to Krajina after Pale and Belgrade broke up and suspicions arose that the Bosnian Serbs were being supplied via Krajina. The exception was the combined Bosnian and Krajina Serb operation in Bihac when everyone turned a blind eye.

Tudjman's decision on UNPROFOR came before the Security Council adopted the resolution but coincided with a thaw in Zagreb-Knin relations. Late in December the highway was opened. Croatian police said 43,000 vehicles traveled the highway since then with just 500 of them from Krajina. There were no incidents. Interestingly, just a day before the Tudjman decision, Krajina and Croatian negotiators reached an agreement on removing Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK) signposts and flags from the highway. Croatia's chief negotiator Hrvoje Sarinic was especially pleased by that last round of talks with RSK prime minister Borislav Mikelic. "For the first time since the negotiations started we've achieved something," he said and added that if the signposts are removed by January 17, Croatia will deliver parts for the Obrovac electricity plant and reopen the northern branch of the oil pipeline on January 23.

There has been no confirmation that RSK trucks are using the highway but that doesn't mean they won't. Croatia certainly won't allow transports of military equipment but it won't refuse permission for the things the RSK economy needs to survive. All that on condition that the Krajina authorities continue cooperating and allow Sarinic to voice more satisfaction.

So, resolution 970 doesn't seem to be so unfavorable for the FRY. Belgrade's pressure on the Bosnian Serbs would have continued without it and it's a convenient tool to gradually get rid of Knin. RSK president Milan Martic's statement just prior to the resolution, that if it is adopted, it will mean the death of the talks hadn't caused too much excitement, nor his hopes that, like other resolutions, it wouldn't be respected. The Krajina population understands what is happening and that is proved by a Radio Free Europe report. The report said Krajina residents were buying gasoline like crazy from Croatian petrol stations in Okucani and paying 100 DEM for 200 Croatian Kuna although the official rate is 1 DEM - 3.6 Kuna.

In Krajina the reactions to Tudjman's decision were predictably hard-line. "If Croatia decides to solve the problem militarily that's the beginning of its end," Martic said, and added that Krajina has the means to defend itself. He said "there is no reason for the peacekeepers to leave the RSK if they do leave Croatia, because we will give them all the logistical and other help they need". RSK foreign minister Milan Babic said Croatia couldn't cancel UNPROFOR's mandate and that "their departure or stay depends on UN decisions and RSK approval". Prime minister Mikelic said "Croatia would make a big mistake if it threw out the peacekeepers now, when significant progress has been made".

The overall concern is understandable as well as the certainty that the withdrawal of the blue berets means that a total Serb-Croat war will begin again. A poll by the Zagreb weekly Globus said 50% of Croats were convinced of just that. Although Tudjman's statement said he wasn't giving up on reintegrating the occupied territories peacefully without mentioning his famous "but", which means the war option is still open, so that "but" was the focus of attention. Namely, the Zagreb-Knin truce is based on the Zagreb agreement as well as any other deal on economic issues and is implemented thanks to UNPROFOR guarantees. The withdrawal of the blue berets means all that will probably not be achievable any longer and we'd get a situation similar to 1991. The war would become inevitable, whether orchestrated by the state or individually.

Many, like US ambassador Peter Galbraith, warned Croatian leaders that the renewed conflicts would probably draw in Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs and Croatia could be defeated. If that happens because the UNPROFOR mandate is revoked and Croatia starts a military offensive, Zagreb won't be able to count on any kind of international help from the West.

Granic feels a renewal of the war is highly unlikely because that doesn't suit Serbia's interests for economic, political and logistical reasons. It's true that Belgrade isn't sending any signals that could indicate willingness to send troops to Krajina. A while back, Yugoslav foreign minister Vladislav Jovanovic told federal parliament the RSK was quite capable of defending itself.

Interpretations of the Vance plan which gives the FRY the right to protect the Krajina Serbs with force isn't mentioned by officials here any longer, but is being mentioned by Bosnian Serb vice-president Biljana Plavsic: "Tudjman knows the withdrawal of the blue berets would mean a renewal of the war in which he stands no chance against the Serbs. That war would engulf most of the Balkans because the Bosnian Serb Republic and RSK have a treaty on a joint defense of borders and the FRY is obliged under the Vance plan to defend the RSK Serbs.

"If UNPROFOR really withdraws from Croatia, the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs really could unite. Krajina Serb leaders see that as the only way to save their self-made state and the Bosnian Serbs see a union as another weapon against the Serbian president. Both would try to draw him into the war which would almost certainly break out. As in many other things, his stands are unknown. Some feel that Milosevic, thanks to alternative supply routes to Krajina via the highway, would prevent Knin from falling under the influence of Pale. Mikelic's increased cooperation is interpreted by many as his succumbing to pressure from Belgrade which, in turn, is being rushed by Zagreb. Others say Knin can't count on unreserved help from Pale; there are an increasing number of reports from the Bosnian Serb Republic on semi-official offers for territorial deals with Zagreb which include the Krajina.

There are a number of interpretations on why Tudjman decided to cancel the UNPROFOR mandate. Some mention internal political strife caused by rightist pressure in the ruling Croatian Democratic Union, fears of a Cyprus-like situation, since the Krajina issue has been forgotten because of the Bosnia crisis, territorial consolidation before the Bosnian Serbs finish constituting their state and turn to Croatia's borders.

Rijeka's daily Novi List feels Tudjman's optimism can't be justified unless he has an ace up his sleeve in the form of "trade, guarantees or an alliance with Belgrade". That trade might have been agreed while "a new division of Bosnia is in sight". The paper said Croatia is interested only in Krajina territory, not its population. Pressure on the peacekeepers could result in obtaining that territory just as Western Slavonia and the highway were obtained with an increasing marginalization of the RSK authorities' decisions.

It's also possible that Vladimir Seks, Croatian parliament deputy speaker, meant just that when he said Croatia is prepared to extend the mandate if they'll "enable the imposition of peace".

UNPROFOR is "surprised and disappointed" by the decision. It has started preparing for the withdrawal although some UN officials admitted that it will be hard to withdraw from the UNPAs if the local population objects. The 3,000 staff at UN headquarters and 12,000 troops would probably be transferred to Sarajevo (although the Croatian authorities want civilian staff to stay in Zagreb). Interestingly, the UN says UNPROFOR personnel account for 9% of Croatia's national budget income. That includes infrastructure rentals, hotel bills, food deliveries, insurance and vehicle maintenance. The RSK also profits from UNPROFOR but much less.

Although the Croatian authorities seem firmly set in their decision, the prevailing opinion is that the Croatian president will change his mind.