Generals in the Labyrinth

Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the site of "low-level conflicts" since April 1992. It was once acclaimed as being multi-cultural, but now has barely half of its former 4.5 million population. The rest have been displaced either as defenders of their homes or refugees, in at least four territories that have the right to be called states by others.

That is why the commanders of the international peacekeeping force that was deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were all expected to bring peace, at least as far as ordinary people are concerned. The leaders of local states and self-proclaimed states greeted them as the commanders of the troops that would keep the status quo in place, or even better, fight to improve it.

Local warlords and businessmen counted on robbery at worst, or mutually satisfactory business relations, at best.

All those expectations fell through.

Primarily because the UNPROFOR mandate is to keep the peace, not impose it. This terminological difference produces a large number of practical limitations which no one, not even a knight of the realm like Sir Michael Rose (who got his knighthood for his role in the Falklands war not, as the Bosnian Serbs said, role against "us") could do anything to combat.

The first UNPROFOR commander was Canadian General Louis Mckenzie. He was declared a Fried of the Serbs (mainly by the Serbs) after the massacre in Vase Miskina street on May 27, 1992 when a mortar shell exploded. The Serbs accused the enemy, Muslim side, of staging the massacre to cause the unjust and genocidal sanctions against what is now called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Two months later, proof was found in an alleged statement by McKenzie to the London daily The Independent. McKenzie said that at best, the statement could have read that even bombing your own side in Bosnia would not surprise him since all sides were ready to do just that if someone decided they could profit from it.

It's a little known fact that McKenzie started smoking again in Bosnia after abstaining for 12 years.

As for his biography, he was born in Canada on April 30, 1940 in Nova Scotia to a World War II veteran. Before Bosnia he was involved in UN military missions in Vietnam, Cyprus and Greece. After Bosnia he went home and retired. He lectured on the situation in the former Yugoslavia for a while and made some statements. Some of them deserve to be remembered: Asked how he became "the Serbs' favorite UN general he replied: "I presented things the way I saw them personally. Some people saw that as objectivity which I consider a compliment... We, soldiers, are not diplomats or politicians. We have to describe things the way we see them."

He also made an assessment that a cease-fire in Sarajevo could not be organized because "I am not prepared to prevent both sides from firing on their own positions to satisfy CNN". This statement earned him an invitation to see his UN commander Indian General Satish Nambiar in Belgrade, for consultations. McKenzie asked whether he should bring his things with him and Nambiar said "I'm afraid so".

Newspaper archives have almost nothing on Belgian General Francis Briquemont who took over from McKenzie for a while.

Even the London Times didn't have much to say about him recently when Rupert Smith took over from Rose. It just repeated Briquemont's assessment that the job was impossible from the start, not only because of local difficulties but because of his frustration as a commander. Briquemont said categorically that frustration was a direct result of the limiting influence of the UN. Perhaps that's why he's not remembered outside the former Yugoslavia.

General Francois Morillon got a cold reception, as cold as his blue eyes seem behind his glasses. He is also short and gave the impression of a soldier who is about to retire. Informed sources weren't surprised by him, they knew the French approach to the former Yugoslavia: a number of serious people are convinced France has the strongest team on the ground.

The Bosnian Serbs were customarily reserved towards the French general until he walked through their defence lines into Srebrenica. The hatred this produced, turned into a kind of respect after he took part in the funeral of Serbs whose bodies were found near Bratunac. The entire Serbs press started quoting him in earnest then. "I would be happy to see Sarajevans out on the streets, demanding peace like in Srebrenica", he said after visiting the Muslim enclave. "That would give us a mandate to preserve Sarajevo". This second part of the statement was quoted much less than the statement that "Muslim leaders do not want the blockade of Sarajevo lifted. Matters culminated when he said that "the establishment of a Muslim state in the heart of Europe has to be prevented at any cost because that will give Islamic fundamentalists an opportunity to create a Gaza strip in Europe".

"Rose should go. We can't accept the behavior of an UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia.. who did everything to stop the determination of the free world to punish crimes and fascism". That statement was signed by eight Muslim parties represented in the government headed by Haris Silajdzic. Despite the support he got from UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali, criticism against Michael Rose poured in from all sides, which the British Knight can count as a success. "Rose is pro-Serb," George Soros said, while Silajdzic toned his assessment with claims that "Rose is doing his job well, the mistake lies with Zagreb or New York". Definite proof that these were compliments came from Radovan Karadzic after the first air strikes on Serb positions around Gorazde: "Rose is dangerous to Europe".

"Of course I'm biased, I'm on the side of the civilians," Rose said.

His mandate was in jeopardy when he said: "The Muslim leadership wants to force NATO to wage war for them". The rest of the statement didn't help: "The Muslims are trying to create images of war for the world, to force us to respond with air power".

The less publicized demand for US personnel to vacate offices above his headquarters in the UNPROFOR building (NATO?) drew quick orders for Rose to evacuate his command post.

We don't know whether the length of his mission (he's the first to have completed his mandate) was affected more by his ferocity (he called Ratko Mladic an asshole in front of one of the Serb generals), professionalism (he walked through Argentine lines to accept their surrender), prophecies ("Instinct tells me that the Balkan war won't spread.") or his feeling of military responsibility, absolutely incompatible with what is considered honorable in the Balkans. Finally, someone took him seriously when he said he would not be ousted from Sarajevo before his mandate is up.

Sir Michael Rose left without pomp. No one liked him for different reasons.

The circumstances that turned three out of every four UN generals into Serb Friends boils down to the banal fact that the professional soldiers on the ground see who is stronger immediately, but can't strike out or solve anything.

Live and Dead

From mid-April 1992, when the UNPROFOR mission began in the former Yugoslavia, to mid-August 1994, the peacekeepers suffered 109 dead and 1007 wounded. Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed 55 dead and 514 wounded, Croatia 43 and 381, one soldier died in Macedonia, 10 others in the rest of the former Yugoslavia.

Of the dead, 50 lost their lives in combat zones, 22 in traffic accidents and 37 due to other circumstances.

In mid-1994 UNPROFOR had a force of 41,656 in the former Yugoslavia with 36,545 of them soldiers from 24 countries along with 619 military observers, 675 civilian police and 3817 civilian staff.