Switched Places

In your weekly (16 January, 1995) I read what General Trifunovic's lawyer Mr Milan Stanic had to say in the article Punishment for a Persistent Defence, and wish to answer his appeal. I feel called upon to voice my opinion as a military expert. I feel I have the right, because I spent my entire working life in the Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA), because I was a teacher to most of the accused Varazdin men, because I have followed this trial from the start and am writing a book about it.

In his testimony, General Trifunovic said that on the critical day (September 22) when they were preparing to leave the garrison, he telephoned General Avramovic to tell him his decision. His army commander answered: "Vlado, do what your conscience tells you, I'll call you back in half an hour." But he never called back. That kind of behavior by an army commander has not been recorded in military practice, nor in military history, avoiding to issue orders to a unit that is in a hopeless situation. It's an old truth that an officer is not an officer if he allows events to lead him and he doesn't take charge of events. This is an example to point. Here the army commander acted like an old woman; he went with the flow. And the flow took the boat away but he wasn't the steersman because he jumped out and took the oars with him and left his subordinate in the boat. Logically, not to mention military rules, the army commander once he received the report and listened to his subordinate's decision had to issue one of two clear orders: (1) "I approve your decision. Implement it." or (2) "I order you to continue fighting and hold onto the facilities and positions."

If he had issued those orders, and he shouldn't have done otherwise, and if General Trifunovic had disobeyed them, then the trial would have been the right thing to do. But since that wasn't the case, the people who left the corps in a hopeless situation should be the ones on trial and General Trifunovic could appear only as a witness for the prosecution to confirm that they had left him in that situation.

Obviously things have been turned upside down. Why?

If this nation asks why the Varazdin corps was doomed, the question should be put to the former Yugoslav presidency which included a representative of the JNA; the army chief of staff who had a subordinate in the field - the army commander. Those are the officers most responsible for the fate of the army. Without their decision, or their approval, a single bullet must not be fired, let alone a position abandoned or facilities or garrisons. There are two facts relevant to this:

(1) General Trifunovic's statement at the court martial that General Raseta often called him from Zagreb and criticized him for using artillery in Varazdin. This means that the immediate superior controls the use of artillery.

(2) General Andrija Biorcevic's statement in Argument: "I was forced to obey the commands of General Veljko Kadijevic and abandon the idea of entering Osijek." Therefore, the subordinate officer can't enter Osijek even though the town's defenders have agreed to surrender.

All this shows that general Trifunovic received tacit approval from his army commander to leave Varazdin. And he did just that. So, it's clear who should be on trial!

The behavior of the experts on whose testimony the sentence was based, shows that those officers should not be court experts. In cases like this, an officer from the Center of Military Schools can't testify as an expert witness. Expert witnesses can only be officers who have commanded troops or armies. Based on their own experiences, they can help the court establish the facts and reach the right decision.

As a former court expert, I would criticize these experts for their sloppy and unprincipled work. As experienced teachers, they had to start from military rules, in this case the land forces regulations, and compare what those regulations demand with regard to the situation in the field, which would allow them to establish the facts. Their findings obviously run counter to such an approach. And let me quote Biorcevic again: "The policies were established by the state Presidency, the strategy by the federal defence secretary, and I dealt with operations and in that decision-making scope, I adhered strictly to existing subordination".

And why should Trifunovic's case now differ from all other events, such as the case of the Tuzla corps, Sarajevo army and others. General Trifunovic took a decision which was in his competence, in a situation when units had no commanders and when he was abandoned by his superiors.

He did what he did because his superiors did not forbid him to do it.

The experts had to start from the higher command's obligation to issue orders and instructions and only then turn to the corps and establish what it did or did not do. When defence preparations were complete, the army commander inspected them and he had no objections, except the one about leaving the barracks. To speak of leaving the barracks and grouping of units after this, is pointless.

I won't list anything else because it's obvious that the experts did not do their job well and in a principled way. Obviously, they did the job to order and this has been the court's practice for years, I experienced this when I was an expert witness.

The conclusion I have reached is: The wolf still has a right to the sheep!