Gentle Hatred

The party was the only Serb party in Croatia registered with the Ministry of Justice until recently when the Independent Serb Party was formed.

The campaign against the SNS and its three leaders (Djukic, Pejinovic and Hinic) has now reached the ferocity and persistence of the earlier campaign against Milorad Pupovac. He got through all the harassment by the media, public and parliament deputies during the bombing of Vukovar, Dubrovnik and Osijek which included almost physical threats.

The SNS attacks come in a period which is not even close to those conditions and the year-long "normalization" of Zagreb-Belgrade relations could even lead to an exchange of diplomatic representatives soon. Add to this the fact that the SNS was formed under the auspices of the Croatian authorities to fill the gap that appeared after contacts were broken off with the Krajina Serbs and the "loyal Serbs" gave up and withdrew. Ever since that happened, Djukic has been Sabor (parliament) deputy speaker, a largely ornamental post.

The attacks coincide with Djukic's ideas on "wide and firm political autonomy" of a federal type for the Krajina Serbs (cultural for the others) but it's hard to say what came before what. Saying the SNS was targeted after its stands became radical has sounded convincing only in the past four months, ever since the bargaining started with the mini Contact Group plan for Croatia which the party actively joined. So, the opposite should not be excluded, i.e. that Djukic, Pejnovic and Hinic became radical after the attacks on them reached campaign levels (last summer an initiative was launched in parliament to oust Djukic), assessing that if the gap with the authorities can't be bridged, then it's better to widen it.

Some interpretations say the SNS was no longer interesting to Croatia's ruling HDZ party and president Tudjman after he realized they have no influence with Knin or Belgrade to which Zagreb has now pinned all its hopes of regaining control over the Krajina Serbs.

Those interpretations say that is what brought Milorad Pupovac forward as the man with connections in Belgrade and Knin. Those rumors seemed to have been confirmed last year when Prosvjeta, a Serb cultural organization in Croatia, with which he is closely connected, got a grant of one million DEM. There isn't any firm proof of that yet, but the grant story was followed by another; Pupovac's meeting top HDZ people and his relatively frequent appearances in the media where he recently announced an upcoming "big agreement" between the Croats and Serbs.

The media don't avoid the SNS.

Djukic, who was to have been living proof of Serb-Croat coexistence has actually turned into an example that Croat-Serb relations can remain bad even if Serbia-Croatia relations improve. The most obedient people in the state media won't even let a shadow cross Tudjman's policy of Serb-Croat normalization, but they do propagate myths of Pupovac as the good guy and Djukic as a Chetnik.

Unlike Pupovac who defended himself from attacks by keeping a dignified silence, Djukic is finding it hard to adapt to the role and is shifting increasingly towards national exclusivity. He said recently that "the Serb people will never allow Croats to choose their representatives".

The only Serb parliamentary party found itself in the middle of the mess. Perhaps there is some hidden sense in it all. It could be that their more radical stands have discrete support from the authorities since Djukic's ideas, especially on a federal Croatia, are preparing the public for the war to end in a compromise with the Serbs giving way as well as Croatia. The constitutional law on national minorities that unsuccessfully offers the Serbs a high level of autonomy in the Glina and Knin areas was adopted under a SNS initiative in 1991. In the meantime, the party raised demands to a new level and now wants Serb autonomy at provincial level which would practically make them equal to Istria and Slavonia. And a miracle happened. Recently, hardline nationalist Vladimir Seks indicated that this possibility could be realized.

So the verbal attacks are much less damaging than they seem to be, moreover, the dominant impression is that the SNS-HDZ argument didn't bring anything new but just ended a cycle in which the "good" Serbs lost trust and new ones are still being sought.