They Kicked Out the Drummer Boy

"The sovereign is irresponsible" a Balkan constitution from the last century says and that, lawyers say, is the clearest definition of sovereignty. In that sense, last week's letter from colonel Ljubodrag Stojadinovic to his supreme commander and sovereign of us all Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, seemed like a dignified and pointless gesture. A retired high-ranking officer said the gesture could have been even more dignified: "If Ljubodrag Stojadinovic wanted to do the right thing he would have, without asking Lilic and his cabinet for advice, released the information about the pardon and early promotion of Bora Ivanovic as soon as he was asked for it" (VREME sent a fax to the general staff information service asking for the information but never got a reply). "Now his request for Lilic to speak out on the affair is interpreted as a provocation." VREME's source does not feel that was reason enough to dismiss him but does believe it was one of the reasons.

The context of the whole thing is extremely important: that context is the position and role of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) in the new state; the fate of figures like Bora Ivanovic, Ljubodrag Stojadinovic or Momcilo Perisic chief of staff, are just posts and a reflection of the role of the armed forces. That role is obviously unclear considering the financing and equipment which points to the conclusion that this regime is not going to join another war soon or that it won't rely on the VJ in a future war. The position is adequate: the structure of the army has been systematically upset through deliberate mismanagement in war, intentional sudden changes in strategy and repeated purges and pogroms; the army is poorer than ever; its reputation is dropping proportionately.

No one gave any thought to the reputation of the army from the start of the crisis in 1991. It seems the goal of this regime was to compromise both the former JNA and the VJ and weaken it to eliminate a source of possible trouble and competition in the future state, as general Veljko Kadijevic put it in his memoirs. The final blow came with the division of the JNA in Bosnia on May 19, 1992 (with a hypocritical offer to the ethnic communities to share the JNA equipment equally). The management team, chosen for their "patriotic adeptness", was thrown out in 1993 after it completed ethnic and "patriotic" purges. The series of purges followed a logical path: first under "anti-fascist", then national, "patriotic" and finally "peace" criteria. By the way, Stojadinovic, as a commentator in the press, approved, advocated and explained away the purges., He is remembered for his fierce attacks against general Vlada Trifunovic.

The logical consequences include the anxiety that surfaced in the case of Stojadinovic. So let's ask the key question that the Serbian opposition never asked (which says a lot about it: to the opposition the authorities are to blame for everything including crime and corruption in the army): why did president Lilic pardon and then promote general Bora Ivanovic despite the regrettable and embarrassing criminal proceedings against him?

The most important reason for the anxiety and the reason Stojadinovic listed as one of the reasons for his dismissal is a TV serial called "The Camera Remembers". It seems the concept of that serial differed somewhat from the regime's political strategy or that the serial was aired without adequate editorial control by Milorad Vucelic which is hard to believe.

Sources close to the general staff said the problem was a sound tape of phone conversation between Radmilo Bogdanovic and general Blagoje Adzic on the evening of March 9, 1991. The conversation is not compromising to anyone unless you bear in mind that the police in Belgrade was broken up and in chaos which everyone knows and was the goal of the police tactics. It seems the problem was something else: some key political figures found out that calls from the operative centers of the state presidency, general staff and other command posts were routinely taped (which is the rule with official communications, as every policeman knows). Look out for next Monday's episode which covers the war in Slovenia.

What could that mean? It could mean a new and different insight into relations between the political authorities and JNA in critical moments in our history. For example: what was decided at a meeting of the former Yugoslav state presidency and general staff in the underground operations center on March 12 and 14 1991; who voted for who against the introduction of special measures and how they were never imposed; what happened at a meeting of the rump presidency during the war in Slovenia and how the JNA left that republic: as a defeated army or the victim of politics which declaratively urged the preservation of Yugoslavia but in fact wanted Slovenia out at any cost?

The knowledge could shed a different light on the role of the army in that period and on stereotypes of "an indecisive army leadership" which sent raw recruits to Slovenia "without any ammunition". It seems things were different and the current regime could find itself embarrassed if those circumstances were revealed. The first victim of all that would be Borisav Jovic, the key executive figure. In other words, the TV serial is now starting on its more delicate episodes which could recall some things which are better left unmentioned: we're on the brink of a lasting peace and the lifting of the sanctions and we have to prove that we were always in favor of peace.

There were hardly any public reactions to the Stojadinovic letter: the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) mentioned him in passing; the ever ready Vecernje Novosti attacked him in a comment, later carried by Tanjug, as a dissident.

Colonel Stojadinovic never mentioned his immediate superior general Momcilo Perisic and the general is keeping quiet although he spoke up on previous occasions commenting less important topics. The chief of staff chooses his own team and takes responsibility for it. The question is how close are Perisic's ideological beliefs to that of Stojadinovic in the way the army treats history and army traditions; visible in the calendar that some say has become a symbol of resistance in the VJ. Everything is not in order there and that is shown by the recent guest appearance on Studio B by the Yugoslav airforce commander's assistant for moral education: he said the anti-fascist fight should not be overlooked in W.W.II (which the calendar did). It seems a different wind is blowing through the air force, the first of the armed forces to be taken over in 1991 by Serb nationalist career officers.

Stojadinovic and Perisic haven't said anything similar: the colonel's dismissal seems to be a warning to the general. Perisic was expected to say something and we're still waiting. "His silence is the best indication of his position," a ranking VJ officer said. "Earlier, they commented everything, even the elections in Serbia. Where's all their personal courage and initiative now? It was easy to criticize an "indecisive" army leadership and launch artillery attacks from a distance; now let's hear them say something about the political leadership which is stomping on them like it never stomped on the previous army leadership. Chief of Staff Blagoje Adzic resigned in May 1992 when 38 generals were dismissed without his approval."

Now, Stojadinovic is facing disciplinary action for violating discipline when he wrote to Lilic, general Jevrem Cokic has been retired (he was general Ivanovic's commander and filed the criminal charges) and Perisic is keeping quiet while NIN weekly quotes an anonymous officer who said Perisic will be replaced soon.

"This is a serious warning," VREME's source said. "They're pushing Perisic out and he should say something."

If communist regimes ever achieved anything then it was slapping the army into place and suppressing any political ambitions among generals. From that point of view things are clear: nothing has changed. History will show whether the JNA could have done anything in the Balkan crisis; probably it would have been smartest if it had disbanded.