Oberkommando

While fathers in FR Yugoslavia don't want their sons to become officers ("I don't want some thieving general to teach my boy"; letters to the editor in Nasa Borba), the Serbs in Bosnia and Krajina are forming a new military body; a joint supreme defence council of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) and Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK).

The first example shows how low the reputation of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) has dropped (and that is usually linked to combat readiness) while the second shows that the "western Serb states" don't have that problem.

The Serbs across the Drina river are so glad to be soldiers that they need another command, or as Austro-Hungarian officers in the Krajina used to say; an "oberkommando".

The RS-RSK defence council includes their presidents, parliament speakers and prime ministers, two chiefs of staff, defence and internal affairs ministers. Specifically: Radovan Karadzic and Milan Martic; Momcilo Krajisnik and Rajko Lezajic; Dusan Kozic and Borislav Mikelic; generals Ratko Mladic and Milan Celeketic; Milan Ninkovic and Rade Tanjga; Zivko Rakic and Nebojsa Pavkovic.

The defence council is a command and advisory body.

Karadzic said the decision to form it is based on a joint defence declaration (Prijedor, October 1992) and RS parliaments documents. He added that the joint defence wasn't aimed against anyone while Martic said it is "a normal process in continuing the two young Serb states' cooperation".

The council was formed in Banja Luka on February 19. Four days earlier, the Yugoslav defence council met in Belgrade but there was no statement on what was discussed.

Indicatively, the traditionally short statement from the Yugoslav president's military cabinet said the meeting "also discussed the military and political situation in the territory of the previous Yugoslavia".

Did that meeting and Martic's most recent political tour (talks with Milosevic and a press conference in Belgrade; a meeting with Karadzic and their joint appearance on Pale TV) result in the RS-RSK defence council?

Assessments have been made that the Serbian president wants to preserve the fighting power of the RS and RSK armies for at least two reasons: first, so he can demonstrate that he's still the most "important element in seeking peace in the former Yugoslavia" and holds the keys to war once UNPROFOR leaves; and second, because possible military defeats could cost him his negotiating position and would draw "patriotic" dissatisfaction in Serbia.

There are increasingly frequent signs that the Serb armies across the Drina face a deteriorating situation (morale is low, equipment is getting antiquated, soldiers are leaving for Serbia and abroad and the population has been exhausted by years of war) and perhaps the new council is one of the characteristic, informal ways Belgrade has of helping organization and rationalization. The supreme command could take over the functions of local military structures (volunteers for example) and elegantly allow the VJ to avoid the obligations RS and RSK politicians keep invoking.

Informed sources said the specific military effectives of the council are small. They said it had a media effect primarily: frightening Croatia, Bosnia and the international community and sending a signal to Belgrade. They added that if the Serbs have really decided to conduct the war from a single center they would not make the decision public.

So this is just another attempt at confusing the issue by national leaders, regardless of whether it's a form of pressure by Belgrade on the international community or pressure by the RS and RSK on Belgrade.

Many people see confirmation of that in the fact that general Mladic did not attend the first council session while RS vice-president Biljana Plavsic did. The RS army commander keeps away from political involvement at any cost and the political initiatives that Plavsic takes part in, usually don't end well.