Involuntary Suicide

James Gow, 32, from the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College London, was a frequent guest in British programmes dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and the federal army. His book "Legitimacy and the Army-the Yugoslav crisis" has just come out. In it he examines in detail the relationship between civilian and army legitimacy in Yugoslavia.

* What will happen with the Army now that Yugoslavia is no more?

There is no more Yugoslavia, and soon, there will be no army either. I think it will disappear in two years at the most. We have witnessed the recent resignation of Kadijevic who was replaced by Adzic. He, along with others who have been actively involved in this war, will have to step down from power. The only future for the Army would be either to disintegrate and to be replaced by the army which would be Serbian, or to become the army of "new Yugoslavia" e.i. "Greater Serbia", which means accepting Milosevic's politics. I think that there are only a few people in the army who would want to join Milosevic's army.

* Was that the predominant attitude in the top Army circles or within the rank and file?

I think that the army has been divided for the past few years. There were obviously people even at the top who were supporting the Serbian cause. Among the lower officers, especially among the colonels, there was a considerable Serbian segment. However, it is equally true that many officers who commanded the units in Croatia and Bosnia at the beginning of last year, even when the war began, believed that they were preserving peace, but there were also those who were there to fight. These divisions were present, but, considering the later developments, I think it would be difficult to find a single officer within the army who thinks he fought for peace.

* If the army becomes Serbian, will the present general staff become the foundation of that system, or will they, in that case, have to go?

They will have to go whatever happens and regardless of their attitude towards Serbian politics. Neither are generals Milosevic's supporters, nor could they form an army to fit Serbian needs. That is why in the next few years an entirely new team would take the lead and connect the army with Serbia or the incomplete Yugoslavia, if Milosevic forms it.

* What was the reason the army was employed in Slovenia and Croatia: to maintain privileges, to further the "Greater Serbia" cause or to implement its constitutional role of preserving the Yugoslav borders?

There is no doubt that the army thought it was exercising its constitutional duty which Markovic authorized, and which they overstepped. I doubt that it did this at the beginning, or even later, for "Great Serbia", although it worked in cooperation with Serbia on something which was basically the same. They were both after the same thing, but they had different motives.

With regards to Slovenia, the army was surprised, since it did not accept to contend with the resistance of "pacifists" and "anti- militarists". Its forces were hardly sufficient, and when the resistance started, it did not know what to do. That is why it retreated so quickly and resigned itself to the fact that Slovenia was lost for good. The Croatian case was entirely different. Although no one stated it publicly, I think that the war lasted for so long in order to keep Croatia within Yugoslavia. They army wanted to make Tudjman and his government unpopular with the Croats and make them disregard their referendum results, so they would return to the bosom of Yugoslavia.

A clear interest of the army was behind this, since it wanted to keep the Croatian coast at any cost where four out of five big maritime ports are situated there. Once the army resigned itself to the fact that a part of Croatia would have to go, it in effect, started fighting for Seselj's (Serbian right wing extremist) borders where three of the four mentioned ports are situated. *What, in your opinion, the army should have done on June 25? It shouldn't have done a thing. Yugoslavia should have been fought for only by peaceful means. Whoever wanted to preserve Yugoslavia should not have resorted to force, since that was a sure way to see it disintegrated.

The army should have kept a low profile and supported the central legitimate authority long before June 25. The army is to blame for criticizing constitutional changes in certain regions, but not for criticizing them in Serbia. If they could not leave politics to the politicians they should either criticize everyone, or even better, no one. I was wrong to think they could have behaved differently. They had no choice but to do what they did. Everything else is mere intellectual speculation.

* How did the army lose its legitimacy?

The basis of political legitimacy has changed markedly in Yugoslavia during the eighties, while the army was clinging desperately to the old political system. It hasn't managed to adapt, despite numerous attempts - the idea of communism was disappearing fast in the entire Eastern Europe. The republics had real legitimacy in Yugoslavia, and, instead of accepting this state of affairs, the army tried to confront it. That is how, in actual fact, it came close to Milosevic.

It would be theoretically possible that the army would accept Slovenian and Croatian ideas concerning the creation of national armies within the republics, whereby it could gain new legitimacy by accepting the new reality. The irony is that it had to accept it at last, since it fought in Croatia by relying on the national army - the local Serbian volunteers. Had it consented to that earlier, it would probably have saved both itself and Yugoslavia.

* You mention in your book that the army was decisive in destroying Yugoslavia?

Yes, although I do not think that was its aim. No one doubts Milosevic's role in the break-up of Yugoslavia, but had the army behaved differently that would have been made more difficult. The army, without doubt, was responsible for the way it conducted the trial of Jansa and others in 1988. Until then, the ordinary people in Slovenia were not interested in independence. The clumsy and relentless way in which it had been carried out aroused fear in the Slovenes that the army would proclaim a state of emergency. That, of course, was totally unfounded, but people believed it. If the army is protecting the interests of Serbia in Kosovo in that way, why would it not do the same in Slovenia. Towards the end of 1988, Kucan started talking of the constitutionally guaranteed sovereignty of Slovenia.

The Slovenes have always wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, but in Yugoslavia of a different kind, and that is why I think it had been possible to preserve it until the end of the eighties. Only after Milosevic towards the end of 1990 literally robbed the National Bank did the Slovenes start talking seriously about the cessation. The Slovenian public could no longer distinguish between the army and Serbia, since their interests coincided much too frequently.

* To what do you attribute the causes of army inefficiency; we were brought up with the illusion that we can sleep peacefully while the army is watching over us?

The army was inefficient in Slovenia because it found itself in an awkward position, and in Croatia because it was already in the process of disintegration and with no legitimacy. It was paralyzed since it had no socio-political support, which points to mass desertion. Everybody agrees that the crucial factor in any military operation has to do with moral standards and cohesion. That is the secret of partisans' victory. On the technical side, the army has proved to be completely incompetent. It proved to be sterile in choosing its strategy.

No one with any imagination would have spent three months bombarding Vukovar until it was left in shambles. This is a very primitive way of military reasoning which stems from the lack of motive of the army. So, the army was bombarding it from a safe distance, hoping that its defenders will get tired of it and give up, which is what actually happened. I can not think of a single example where the army exhibited any kind of skillful strategic reasoning. We should not forget the functional side of military legitimacy. Such a complete collapse can only be attributed to the lack of motivation and basic military skills.