The War That Would Never Come

All's well that ends well was the loud opinion of diplomats and the press when Croatian president Franjo Tudjman said UNPROFOR would not be kicked out the former Yugoslav republic last week in Copenhagen. Ecstasy prevailed because a huge all out war in the Balkans scheduled for April 1 was avoided: the destruction of Croatian cities by renowned Serb long-range missiles and the bombing of Belgrade was avoided. So everything ended up never better, but what really happened?

First of all Tudjman had to appear dynamic in a not so favorable political mood at home (his problem isn't so much the opposition but his own HDZ party. The public opinion that the Vance plan and UNPROFOR are a historic defeat which has to be put right has become an unpleasant dogma.

In Croatia, the fact that the state is missing a third of its territory has become an excuse to trip up the competition with in the fight for power but no one in their right mind intends to do anything about it.

Tudjman played on of his strongest aces in that political game: he threatened to throw UNPROFOR out. The basic outline of the operation can be seen now: first he proclaimed that he intends to throw the UN Protection Force out on March 31, then the regime media, all political parties and other public figures started competing in praising the president, then all state officials toured the world with orders to proclaim that the decision was irrevocable. Later, Tudjman backed down graciously and agreed to allow UNPROFOR another three months to pack and that was when the real panic broke out: the whole world believed a new big war in the Balkans was inevitable next spring.

The war in Bosnia took a back seat and commentators, analysts and diplomats voiced grave concern, drew up scenarios, counted tanks and artillery and went about their jobs. As usual in those situations, the shallow stereotypical models prevailed. No one knows what was taken more seriously: the Krajina and Bosnian Serb joint defence council; Karadzic's 17 new weapons or Sime Djodan's (a Croatian political hawk) threats to bomb Belgrade; or even the nationalist bragging on both sides.Scenarios of US, German and Russian support for traditional allies were drawn up (the Americans like the Bosnian Muslims, Germany likes the Croats, and the Russians like the Serbs). In short, Karadzic's threat of World War III seemed to be coming true.

The customarily few voices of reason were just barely audible. For example: two analyses of the threat of war appeared simultaneously around February 20: on in Croatia's Feral Tribune and one in Vecernje Novosti. Feral's was written by retired general Karlo Gorinsek (perhaps Croatia's most capable soldier) a man know for his independent thinking. The article in Novosti was written by Bora Maric, correspondent from Banja Luka and a man know as a well informed source. Their assessments of the firepower on either side differed which is logical since the assessments are mainly free interpretations and often biased. The one thing in common to both authors is the final assessment that a new war pitting Muslims and Croats against the Serbs suits no one.

The delivery differed according to the environment it was intended for: Gorinsek's article very efficiently cooled off Croatian army chief Janko Bobetko and general Djura Decak as well as other extremist "patriots". Maric wrote about a war of five armies which will end in heavy losses on all sides with everyone ending up at the same negotiating table.

To put things in perspective: Feral is a dissident newspaper and Gorinsek is a dissident while Vecernje Novosti is close to the regime and says what Serbia ruling SPS thinks. The fact that Maric concludes his article with the sobering negotiating table gains in weight. It's even more important that he didn't include the Yugoslav Army among his five armies. He wrote only about the Bosnian Muslim army, Bosnian Serb army, Krajina Serb army, Croatian army and Croat Defence Council.

Vecernje Novosti sent a very clear message in the middle of the crisis: go to war if you want to but don't count on Yugoslavia. Others in Zagreb (besides Gorinsek) also voiced sober stands, the most important among them Zlatko Canjuga, general secretary of the HDZ, who warned that there could be problems if Serbia was provoked and joined the hypothetical future war.

Once Tudjman changed his decision and the noise died down, Banja Luka official Rajko Kasagic spoke up: he told the public that the development did not surprise him at all because Slobodan Milosevic told him that Tudjman's decision was nonsense and would amount to nothing.

Even Tudjman has to have seen what would have happened if he attacked the Krajina (notwithstanding military consequences): the Krajina Serbs would jump into Karadzic's arms and Tudjman would have achieved what Karadzic has been trying and failing to do for three years.

Belgrade's role in all that is very important: the stories of a union of all Serbs were systematically discouraged in Knin by Belgrade. The reason is obvious: first Milosevic doesn't want to take over Karadzic's moral, military, economic and political obligations and has no intention of upsetting the electoral balance at home in that way. Croatia's attack on Krajina would push things in that direction and that's something Tudjman just couldn't do to his partner without a previous agreement. The first sober thoughts on the expulsion of UNPROFOR was along those lines: Tudjman and Milosevic must think they don't need the peacekeepers any longer.

There are some interesting coincidences in opposition reactions in both Croatia and Yugoslavia. Tudjman's decision to keep the peacekeepers in place but with a changed mandate was condemned by the extreme nationalists in both states. That outcome was expected considering the ambitions of opposition parties on both sides.

The main interested party (the Krajina Serbs) kept their cool: Prime Minister Mikelic and Foreign Minister Babic just voiced protocolary statements; Krajina President Martic made noises which have more to do with his clash with Mikelic and relations with Pale.

The first visible consequence is interesting: the Krajina Serbs seem to want Belgrade to take over the negotiations on their future. That gives them more maneuvering space and a wide range of excuses.

Anyhow, now the new interpretations of the Vance plan, UN mandate and other diplomatic fun come into play.

Tudjman claims that "there are no more UNPA zones" but that won't mean anything until they sit down to talk.

So the great Serb-Croat war probably won't happen but the war in Bosnia probably will continue. The only thing that could stop the war in Bosnia from flaring up again are Milosevic's efforts to get Karadzic to accept the Contact Group plan. Some results in that direction have been achieved and if things continue they way they're going Karadzic could see his signature on the plan as the better option. The Bosnian Muslims don't care either way: they're used to the war, they're buying arms and being encouraged. If there's a cease-fire so much the better.

Dancing

There's a traditional dance on the Croatian island of Korcula which spread from Spain throughout Europe and depicts the fight of Christians against the Moors. Soldiers dressed in red and blue dance around threatening each other but never actually fighting. Tudjman did something similar when he foamed at the mouth over the inefficiency of UNPROFOR and loudly leaving the impression that he was so angry that he would throw the blue berets out of his state.

The agile retired general left Westerners with the impression that his intentions are dangerous and the relief was huge once the Americans said they had calmed him down. Two days passed before a Washington Post editorial explained what had happened. It said Washington was only prepared to send a few marines to Croatia as part of a NATO communications unit but left the Western allies to do the job the US had thought up: guarding Croatia's borders. The essence of the latest US move is buying time and postponing the "mother of all wars" in the Balkans which would "motivate Serbia to convince its Serb protégés in Croatia and Bosnia to give up their dreams of independence and accept autonomy as a compromise", the Post said.

The US administration immediately asked Russia to control its client Milosevic. Robert Frazier, the US man in the Contact Group, said "Russia has ... a lot of influence in the region" and added that he would be wrong in saying that the Contact Group is functioning well. He said this was test to see if they could count on Russian government cooperation in regional crises.

The latest American construction in the Balkans has one basic element: the role of clients. Russia is expected to direct Milosevic and the US and Germany are expected to control Tudjman and Izetbegovic. The plan is simple: If Milosevic recognizes Croatia and Bosnia and presses Martic and Karadzic to accept autonomy, a solution is in sight.

Milosevic won't lose much by accepting international observers on the border with Croatia and Washington would immediately agree to ease more sanctions. But we all know that would not bring the conflicts any closer to a solution.