Autopsy Report

Zagreb accused Milan Martic and his army chief of staff general Milan Celeketic; there was no mention of Borislav Mikelic. Mikelic said his government has no idea about the attacks and no idea what the army is doing. Does that mean that Mikelic is still following advice from Belgrade to reconcile himself with the situation and continue negotiations while Martic is trying to provoke an armed reaction by Croatia, an escalation of the war and draw FR Yugoslavia into the war? In other words, are the Krajina Serb leaders split among themselves and if they are how is it all going to end?

As far as appearances go now Mikelic seems to have the situation in hand. Martic, if he has plans of that kind, needs Karadzic's full support (which is lacking) to implement them.

To both the Krajina and Croatia, Western Slavonia is a testing ground to pressure each other. The Serbs saw it, because of the highway and railroad, as the third place besides Maslenica and Karlovac to cut Croatia's most vital communication lines and a good bargaining chip. There are some opinions that the JNA Banja Luka corps kept control over the Okucani area only because of that when it withdrew.

To Zagreb, Western Slavonia under Serb control was ideal for reintegration (by force of arms primarily) because of bad communications with the rest of the RSK, small population (15,000 people), its shape which was hard to defend.

In late 1994, the RSK and Croatia signed an economic agreement and the highway was reopened. That came at Belgrade's insisting it seems: Slobodan Milosevic had to find an alternative route to supply the Krajina so it would not fall under Pale's influence after his rift with Karadzic as well as a way to make his new peace mongering real. The immediate problem was the importance of the reopening of the highway.

Zagreb's interpretation said that was the start of peaceful reintegration which would be formulated politically soon while Knin saw it only as a way to ease the pressure on it to join negotiations and preserve the political status quo. The economic interests for both sides were indisputable.

In the belief that the reopening of the highway was a big concession (the Serbs won time) and assessments that existing UN peacekeeping activities prevented the reintegration soon, Zagreb raised a diplomatic fuss just before the UN mandate was due to expire. The Z-4 plan was also in the game. Under the plan the Serbs would be given a level of autonomy which could be interpreted as a federalization of Croatia. That plan required great compromises for both sides but Knin refused to even look at it while waiting for a new UN resolution on the peace force.

The international community, frustrated by the slow progress in resolving the crisis showed that it has understanding for Croat stands. UN Security Council resolution 981 stated clearly that Krajina is part of Croatia, UNPROFOR was renamed UNCRO and the troops numbers were reduced but their activities on the ground were mainly unchanged. Regardless of Serb and Croat interpretations of whether the Vance plan is still alive, a framework was formed in which the situation could be controlled.

All that threatened to destroy the current rules in the war and crisis in former Yugoslavia and that is not acceptable to Zagreb, Belgrade and international mediators.

That's why things happened as they did: Western Slavonia is not that big a loss for the Serbs and it is a big gain for Croatia. There's also the international dimension: under the Z-4 plan Western Slavonia was Croatia's to control. That plan, although it was not accepted is seen as the only possible realistic solution (official Belgrade's silence is seen as acceptance) and the Croatian army's attack could be viewed as the use of "other means". Belgrade could get its compensation on another side.