Long-Distance Runners

It sounds like an excerpt from a socialist history textbook: "In the night between 24 and 25 January 1992, the referendum of the citizens of B&H will be held: "Are you for the sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, the state where all nationalities living in B&H will have equal rights - Moslems, Serbs, Croats and other".

It sounds fair enough now, but it was far from smooth. At the beginning of the session of the Bosnian Parliament, it was confirmed that there are internal conflicts within the Croatian Democratic Union and that Bosnian Serbs are "not for the sovereignty of Bosnia" as has been a commonly held view until recently. Still, it could be heard that the referendum of citizens would only be acceptable if the 200 000 reservists left, since their arrival has significantly altered the national balance. This, however, was not heard in Parliament, and the hitherto obvious rapport between the Party of Democratic Action (Moslem) and the Croatian Democratic Union was seriously threatened. Karadzic has, all of a sudden, started expressing deep concern for the Croats, and one of the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) MPs went to great pains to explain that Serbs and Croats were never happy living together and that they could only be happy living in separate states. He, unfortunately, forgot that his party is, at least formally, still committed to Yugoslavia.

After the tempers cooled down, it was obvious that the division of Bosnia was somewhat unrealistic. Firstly, that idea is not unanimously supported either by the Croats in Bosnia or in Croatia. Judging by their public appearances, almost all the significant parties in Croatia were actually flirting with the division of Bosnia. Another significant reason which confirms that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a bad idea is the international factor which has a very significant influence on the solution of the Bosnian crisis. From Brussels, USA and other parts of the world "good news" concerning the recognition of Bosnia are coming in. In the meantime, the president of the two assemblies (Serbian and Bosnian) Momcilo Krajisnik was doing everything he could to prevent the question of referendum from featuring on the agenda.

So the (citizens') referendum was scheduled at which most of the population will not appear. That would, considering the propaganda machinery, refer to the considerable part of the Serbian population, and may be a part of the Croatian population as well (western Herzegovina). Despite this, one could safely assume that the referendum will succeed. Many in Bosnia have been asking the following question: "Yes, but what next?" The actual state of affairs, however, will not change at all. Izetbegovic is probably governed by the idea that the referendum would lift the last remaining obstacle to the recognition of Bosnia, whereby he would get the authority to "start clearing things up in his own house", which is what Karadzic (the "Serbian people") actually fears. Izetbegovic has found himself in the absurd situation that, by defending the civilian interest, he is in effect defending the national interest. It is said that, from the civilian standpoint, the division of B&H would be disastrous for all the "national minorities" who would find themselves in the divided regions. The reciprocal measure to the rights of minorities offered by Koljevic, is "the direct promotion of the revenge principle".

Bearing all this in mind, the only chance for Bosnia would be a citizens' republic; the time will come when it will be democratically transformed and its present promoters like Karadzic, Koljevic, Izetbegovic and others should fear it the most, since he will hardly be forgiven for having formed the first national party in B&H, regardless of the fact that the climate in Yugoslavia in that period was steering him in that direction.

Still, there are many who agree that the present politics of Alija Izetbegovic qualify him for a long distance runner. Karadzic is already at the end of his tether.