The Dawn of Power Holders

When the first Croatian artillery shell exploded in Western Slavonia at 5:30 am on May 1, the infighting began among Krajina (RSK) leaders. The shifting of power which has been ongoing ever since is expected to stop at the RSK parliament session in Borovo Selo.

If RSK president Milan Martic keeps his grip on power, prospects are that the RSK will unite with the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) and the conflict will escalate. Martic himself explained in an interview to the New York Times : "That (Western Slavonia) will open the eyes of those Serbs who thought we could do a deal with the Croats. Now it's clear that our only option is to have our own state(...) We are the ones who'll decide when and where to strike."

If RSK prime minister Borislav Mikelic manages to limit and then marginalize Martic's powers, the RSK leaders would take no more steps unapproved by Belgrade.

The most realistic prediction says that if RSK foreign minister Milan Babic (also head of the strongest local party, the SDS) continues strengthening his powers as he has done over the past year it's clear that he will continue his pragmatic research of Krajina statehood modeled on Cyprus.

Predictions are that the parliament session itself will not see radical personnel changes because of constitutional procedures which prevent them amid the current balance of powers. Changes in the authorities must be sought in specific political fields; in the army and police as well as control of the economy. If things stay as they are the Krajina will most probably sink into total anarchy.

RSK parliament deputies will certainly recall that a large force of RSK soldiers was engaged in the Bosnian Serb attack on the Bihac enclave, that they suffered heavy losses there, that NATO bombed the Udbine airfield because of that help and they will wonder how the favor was repaid. Short of proving that Mikelic commanded the BSA, Martic has just three explanations for the passivity of the Bosnian Serb Army. One, the BSA was too busy with the BiH army offensive, two, general Ratko Mladic has fallen in line with Belgrade and is plotting with the RSK prime minister, and three, Karadzic prevented his army from intervening out of incomprehensible but relevant higher political reasons (cynics say he didn't want to endanger his agreements with the Herzegovina Croats). Any one of those explanations is discouraging enough for any life-or-death union with the Bosnian Serbs and even Martic had to admit the military alliance with the RS failed miserably but he added that things had improved since then.

Mikelic's chance lies in the assumption that Belgrade won't abandon the Krajina without securing some kind of solution acceptable to the RSK Serbs. Probably the Z-4 plan. RSK acceptance of that plan would allow Milosevic to recognize Croatia and protect the Serb people. That would satisfy both the international community and the Serbian public. Mikelic would be Milosevic's main guarantee that the plan can be implemented.

Mikelic is entering the parliament ring without his main trump card; control of supplies from Serbia. He said some 140,000 tons of raw materials and other goods came into the RSK via the highway in a four month period. Now that the highway is lost to the Krajina only the Posavina corridor remains and it is under the firm control of Martic and Karadzic.

Mikelic will do everything to convince deputies that no goods can leave Serbia without his blessing. Since they all know the RS can't help itself, i.e. the role of Krajina companies in supplying it, there is a chance that it would be counterproductive to topple the prime minister. There is no doubt that the decision makers in Belgrade will try to convince them of that.

Babic has complete control of the RSK parliament. Both Martic and Mikelic will try to explain themselves to his party's parliamentary majority. Western Slavonia deputies wanted the session held in Eastern Slavonia ("where the refugees are") but Babic also seems to have favored moving the session out of Knin.

All this shows that the two of them are closer to each other than to Martic. Babic's stands (he doesn't threaten force or retaliation to make the international community stop the Croatian war machine if it wants the peace process renewed) are more or less in line with official Belgrade. He's protecting his political credibility in the RSK and forcing himself in as a tough negotiator who will win concessions.

The RSK supreme defence council accepted general Celeketic's resignation given for moral reasons. Celeketic explained that he followed "our doctrine of striking back at vital enemy targets but help from outside the RSK was not forthcoming". That resignation can be interpreted as a sacrifice by Martic of that doctrine because he wants to be able to count on military help from FR Yugoslavia. The new RSK army commander general Milan Mrksic, a former aide to VJ chief of staff general Momcilo Perisic, has not spoken out in favor of either Martic or Mikelic yet.