What is to be Done?

Most of the contributions to Vreme's Forum - "Yugoslavia and Europe" claim that the gap between Serbia (Yugoslavia) and Europe is enormous, that it is much bigger than it ever was, since the days of Prince Milos. And not only has an objective relation between Europe and Yugoslavia been reduced to an insignificant part of what it once used to be, but the state of the national spirit is, naturally, in the function of supporting a national-bureaucratic program which is anti-European in its orientation.

Mirko Tepavac believes that the "anti-European spirit will weaken more or less, faster or slower, depending on when violence and war in the former Yugoslavia are finally curbed." Several other contributors follow this general view that the act of ending the war in these areas will open the road to an arduous and slow return towards integration with Europe.

Sasa Nenadovic believes that the turning point lies in economic interests, articulated through economic subjects. He said: "It is probably not unreasonable to assume that as time passes, the number of sobering influences on people and institutions will grow, especially in the economy, who cannot be dismissed with (official) propaganda assurances that Serbia is sincerely oriented towards Europe as set down in Maastricht". The caution expressed by "probably" and "eventual" is worth noting.

In a paragraph which precedes the one we have cited, Nenadovic is cautious again: "If hopes of gradually blunting the anti-European edge are realistic, their growth will be in proportion to the untenable political isolation which threatens to exterminate the minimal possibilities of developing a national economy". It is clear that he is criticizing Serbia's (self)isolation which resulted from the means Serbia opted for in achieving a national program. It is equally clear that he sees a turnabout in an awakening of economic interests which would then start undermining the national ones, reducing them to a realistic measure. In the following I will offer an aspect, a dimension of the question: what is to be done?

This aspect boils down to the following proposal: the civic option and the opposition must be much more active and more vociferous in urging the lifting of economic sanctions, without political stipulations! And this is not mentioned in any of the 14 contributions to the Forum "Yugoslavia and Europe". I believe it is a big illusion to think that the further presence of sanctions will resolve the problem of democratization in Serbia, i.e. the transition from a national-authoritative to a democratic and civil society. The opposite is true. I believe that the prolongation of economic sanctions will prolong the life of the national-bureaucratic option and thus further remove the transformation to a civic, Europe-oriented society in Serbia. It is my impression that the whole civic non-nationalist opposition is afraid of underscoring this proposal clearly and loudly in order that it might not sound like the current authorities which are making enormous political capital out of the "unjust sanctions". At first glance, such fears seem justified. But, if things are looked at more closely, a different conclusion could be reached (though not necessarily).

Let us take a look at what recent history has taught us. During the period prior to the introduction of sanctions, the civic-liberal opposition embodied in Federal Prime Minister Milan Panic could count on more than a third of the votes in Serbia. The "anti-European" spirit had not yet reached its peak. Today, after three years of sanctions, things have not changed in the direction that the European Union and the USA expected them to. There has been no change of regime or policy. The national and not the civic view on Serbia's present and future dominate among the establishment and a large part of the opposition. Nationalism has consolidated its position and evolved from populism to an all present factor even under conditions of political pluralism. Sanctions suit those who see the future exclusively from the point of a glorious past brimming over with injustice. I have propounded this thesis in public since May 1992, urging against sanctions, when the matter was debated by the European Union, believing that the effect would give the opposite results.

Secondly: let us consider some questions of principle and strategy, such as: who stands to gain from an opening towards Europe and the world: the establishment or the civic opposition? Who can build long-lasting and meaningful connections, contacts, relations and institutional arrangements with Europe: the current establishment or the civic opposition? All contributions in the special supplement "Europe and Yugoslavia" without exception, either speak openly of, or lean towards the fact that long-term and quality relations with Europe can be built only on a civic, i.e. non-nationalist basis. But none of them point to the fact that the presence of sanctions narrows down this basis, instead of broadening and strengthening it.

Thirdly: there is no serious strengthening of interests for integration with Europe and there won't be any until sanctions are lifted. Without the strengthening of this economic interest there is no strengthening of the civic option and therefore the civic opposition. In this respect, I believe that Nenadovic is absolutely right. The matter concerns an important asymmetry which is often overlooked. Nationalism is often born as the result of non-economic reasons. But it is economic reasons which have "diluted" it through history, reducing it to an acceptable measure.

Finally, even though it is true that with the end of war and violence conditions will be met for a weakening of the anti-European spirit, it is also true that war and violence remain in the game as possible trump-cards whenever the national-bureaucratic elite is directing the will of the people in the former Yugoslavia. This means that a realistic possibility of setting up a delicate balance, ensured through a series of signatures on "peace plans", can be disturbed once again. In this war which neither side declared, in which some officially allegedly never took part, and in which there are no victors and no losers, just a general lot of losers, the only sure thing is that political tactics have won the day against strategy. If the "war that never was" does stop and if sanctions are lifted, the official position will once again win a tactical victory, capitalizing on the fact that they urged the lifting of sanctions, and not the opposition, claiming that the lifting of sanctions resulted from the establishment's peace policy.

For these reasons I believe that it would be worthwhile to give the above mentioned proposal serious consideration.