Without A Good Ending

According to official Serbian science, the war in Bosnia broke out because the Western countries recognized it prematurely, not waiting for an agreement between the three nations, with a poorly concealed intention of tricking the Bosnian Serbs and leaving them to live with the other Bosnians, apart from the other Serbs. This is how it came about that war was enforced on the Serbs, and surprisingly, they were not unprepared. They seemed to hope that it would be enforced on them, and they immediately knew what had to be done. It has also turned out that war was enforced on the Croats in the same way, and they too destroyed, persecuted and cleansed as much as they could.

Many countries worldwide admitted subsequently that the recognition of Bosnia had been a mistake, even though it had been made with the intention of preventing the war and not starting it. It was obvious that negotiations would not come to anything and that war was in the offing, while recognition was an unsuccessful bluff based on their earlier experience with Croatia where the war had ended with its international recognition. But few believe that this was the cause of the war, and that the course of events would have differed much without it. The mistake lay primarily in the fact that the international community took on obligations towards Bosnia in the naive hope that it wouldn't be forced to fulfill them. The Serbian national truth says further, logically and consistently, that sanctions against Serbia are unjust because the guilty are punishing the blameless. And if justice and force were properly distributed, and force were on the side of justice, the rest of the world would now be groaning under Serbia's sanctions and fulling Serbia's conditions and begging for them to be eased.

It is said that Slobodan Milosevic is now ready to recognize Bosnia, or at least he's close to doing so. He has embarked on protracted and persistent haggling directly with America, more seriously than ever. It is said that he could recognize Bosnia's external borders, but not the Government in Sarajevo. He would recognize Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, but not Croatia's borders. Therefore, according to this scenario, as far as Milosevic is concerned, there is a Bosnia over which no one rules and Tudjman who doesn't know what it is he rules over. This could probably mean that the Bosnian Serbs are being left with the possibility of taking part of the authority in Bosnia and of Milosevic taking part of Croatia. Or at least of postponing the winning back of Western Slavonija. The Americans would allegedly corroborate this step in the direction of abandoning the all-Serb state with a significant easing of the sanctions. We don't know when and if he will do so, but I think it would be a good thing for all of us if Milosevic were to recognize as much as possible and the sooner the better. Not because all the bits and pieces of the former Yugoslavia are worthy of recognition and consideration, but because there is no better way out. The world would take this as a sign that the main author has seen reason and that he is signing the defeat of Serbian expansionism; in Serbia, however, we would get a very different explanation, one more in keeping with the national spirit and the needs of the regime.

We will be told that this is the right moment to recognize Bosnia. Milosevic was the only one who knew it all along, and didn't hurry like the rest of the world, while the easing of sanctions is final evidence that he was right. This is not a reducing of the punishment, but an award. It's better if sanctions are eased than never to have had them or not have deserved them. Therefore, no matter how much Milosevic might be behaving realistically, officially it cannot be admitted that Serbia has seen reason. I'd say, that from the Serbian point of view, this is the most important part of the story. On the one hand, the regime is not capable of admitting to guilt and defeat, and Milosevic has taken on himself the role of infallibility which proves that he intends to rule unhindered for a very long time. He is right when waging war and when making peace and when winning and when losing. And naturally, he is consistent in all this, like all of Orwell's best students, so that the latest twist in the story erases from memory the earlier policy.

All changes immediately become "since ever and ever" and "from the beginning".

On the other hand, the national-fascist opposition is nurturing an even more insane version of reality, proving that defeat is only Milosevic's defeat, that he, whom they stoutly supported in the war, is no Serb at all, but a Communist and traitor, and if it were up to them, they would easily win and unite the Serbs. Milosevic has learned, albeit by force, a lesson in political realism, and the domestic opposition, at least verbally and in their propaganda still use the style of national romanticism without wondering about the price. If they weren't what they are, the real question for them would not be how to continue with the war, but if a better capitulation could be signed. Namely, a certain Serbian argument, and if you like, national interest did really exist and was hard hit by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, but the belief prevailed that this was best articulated by tanks and artillery. This is how the world came to see only an outburst of aggression and lost patience with subsequent explanations and reasons which might have been taken into consideration. And today, after all that has happened, practically no one is capable of putting forth this argument reasonably and by taking into consideration all other sides and interests. The national opposition believes for some reason that this would be political suicide, but it seems to me that it is precisely this stand of their's that is prolonging Milosevic's life.

Nothing in Serbia is so shopworn and boring as the story of national betrayal. This country is ready to rest a bit from big undertakings and sacrifices and weep a little over its misfortune, so that it won't jump to its feet on hearing that Bosnia has been recognized. Crossing the Drina River has always been more the dream of a fanatical elite, rather than the majority's vital interest. The expansion of the country was acceptable before the price became known, and while it was claimed that the whole thing was free and that the war would last two weeks, but I'd say that Serbia is more preoccupied with the costs now.

Since America obviously cannot be ignored, Milosevic has finally made the right decision in not fooling himself any longer by seeking support from Russia, Greece and various, allegedly influential private persons. To all intents and purposes, his rating in America can only continue to fall, and if he has to trade then it would best be done as soon a possible. Clinton wishes to put an end to the Bosnian question somehow, and once the election campaign starts he won't dare make concessions and will prefer to forget the whole issue. Of course, it will be worse if the Republican candidate wins, which seems very likely.

As far as Bosnia is concerned, Milosevic's recognition wouldn't perhaps bring an end to the war, but it could inspire Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to be content with an "entity", especially when his other option is The Hague Court. On top of everything his army is being beaten. In talks with the US representative, Milosevic allegedly asked for guarantees that the Bosnian army wouldn't overrun the Serbs after recognition, since this would bring him new problems.

Finally, there is talk that Milosevic has shown an interest in sitting down to a cup of coffee with Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, which strikes me as an important detail, since he prefers whiskey. This would be bad news for Tudjman. If we take in consideration the influence exerted by Mira Markovic (Mrs. Slobodan Milosevic) and her love of peace, brotherhood and Yugoslavia, Milosevic might try to persuade Izetbegovic of his friendly feelings and offer some kind of an alliance - like the one between the Muslims and the Croats. Yes, this would be reminiscent of going back to the beginning and with the same protagonists too, without too much washing of hands, remorse and excuses. Once again, this would be a strategy of oblivion, but then, Izetbegovic hasn't much to look forward to in an alliance with the Croats.

Those who can't think of a better end, had best go back to the beginning. In this story it was known in advance that there could not be a good end and the beginning seems lost in the sea of Bosnian blood, suffering and misfortune. But this has been ignored before, here and elsewhere. Sometimes, more quickly than expected, in fact indecently quickly, people start running away from bad memories, as from the unbearable terror of history.