Casino Pale

Those who follow attentively Radio-television Serbia (RTS) programmes and know that since last August Pale has ceased to exist as a geographical, let alone political notion for this institution, were almost flabbergasted when on Friday (June 2) evening they saw on their screens a special programme from Pale and in it saw and heard Foreign Minister of Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) Aleksa Buha addressing a group of 126 hostages, UNPROFOR soldiers (RS Army "prisoners" in "Palian").

It became clear in no time at all that Buha was there only as a prop which could not be avoided and that the real reason behind RTS cameras turning up in Pale again after all these months was Jovica Stanisic, head of the State Security Service in Serbia and the special emissary of the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic. Stanisic arrived in Pale to set free the first group of hostages captured by Bosnian Serbs after NATO aircraft bombed their positions, and to put an end to the prolonged and agonizing uncertainty about their fate. The whole action involving the takeover and release of hostages looked rather spectacular and surprising. Spectacular - because that evening in Pale, in addition to the President's special emissary there were at least a hundred special task force members in red berets arrived from Belgrade in the early hours of that morning (also special was RTS cameraman whose job description says that he is responsible exclusively for filming Milosevic and his visitors). Surprising - because it does not happen all that often that the chief security man of a state visits the territory of another state and goes about his business with so much confidence and freedom.

Through Stanisic, lately nicknamed "Milosevic's Akashi", the President of Serbia wiped that evening the cold sweat off the world's forehead. In front of the RTS cameras (others were not allowed) Stanisic said that he had come to set free the first group of hostages at the initiative of Serbia's President and that he would be returning shortly to get the rest of them. Slobodan Milosevic's initiative was also referred to by Aleksa Buha who added, however, that Pale had received guarantees - through secret diplomatic channels - that there would be no more bombing of the Serbian positions and that without such guarantees the hostages would not have been released. As of that moment Buha fell into oblivion once again. For days on end the Serbian official media transmitted only the refrains praising Milosevic for his initiative and determination demonstrated in the hostage process. It would have simply not been in order to spoil and upset this kind of good fortune and feeling of triumph by stories about the performance of some secret diplomacy. Most media round the world did not devote too much room to Buha's assertions either. The world was, namely, rather ashamed that, in the face of the hostage blackmail, it had to promise the Bosnian Serbs that it would not bomb them any more. It was, therefore, better to pass over the secret promise in silence or at least clumsily deny it. Those in the know claim that that same night Aleksa Buha, Foreign Minister of the Serb Republic in Bosnia headed with the hostage convoy straight for

Belgrade. Once there, he allegedly met with Slobodan Milosevic as well as with diplomatic representatives who confirmed in private interviews that their governments would never admit in public and in writing.

Soon after that the Greek Foreign Affairs Minister Papoulas and Defence Minister Arsenis turned up in Pale. The Greek press claimed afterwards that it was they, and not the special emissary Stanisic, who had prevailed upon Karadzic to release another 111 hostages. Milosevic's cabinet, however, informed the public that the business was proceeding and that the rest of them would head for home in a couple of days. The press release mentioned only "Milosevic's Akashi" and said nothing about Papoulas and Arsenis. The Greek share in Serb-Serb negotiations was glossed over in silence.

Having repeatedly underlined the crucial role of Slobodan Milosevic in releasing the hostages, the world press, unlike the domestic one, started - at long last - to ask some questions. The principal one turned on the dilemma: in what way, how, could a man who for a whole year wiggled in the hands of the international community claiming that he had no say with the Bosnian Serbs, so suddenly persuade (or blackmail) the Pale leadership to begin releasing the hostages. Does it not mean that Milosevic, if he chooses to do so, can bring the pressure to bear on Karadzic and those around him, asked some British papers thinking that Serbia's President had gone too far this time and that much more should be asked of him in the future. The Co-Chairman of the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Lord David Owen, who last week met with Milosevic and Tudjman for the last time in that capacity before immersing himself in his memoirs, defined the whole thing in the following manner: Milosevic can exercise influence on the Bosnian Serbs but he cannot control them. This explanation sounds rather logical if one takes note of a news which leaked from Pale that the downing of the American plane was "the individual act of an unruly local commander" rather than the execution of a superior order. If such things escape Mladic's control, how can Milosevic expect to control them.

Some domestic analysts claim that a part of the answer to the question "what can Serbia's President really do if he wants to can be found, among other things, in the name of Milosevic's special envoy. According to them, Stanisic knows best how the war in Bosnia was "done" because he allegedly had a hand himself in the organization and armament of the "bare-handed" Serb people. And since he knows how something was one, he also ought to know how (what arguments to use) the whole thing can be undone, or better say, safely dismantled.

Unofficially, it is rumoured that one of the reasons why the Pale leadership decided to free the captured UNPROFOR soldiers group by group, is that they've realized that this time they had gone too far and that out of the UNPROFOR frying-pan they got into the fire of the ultinational rapid deployment forces, that is 10 000 well-trained and heavily armed soldiers supported by impressive war technology. Awaiting the release of the hostages, the British Defence Minister Rifkind stated that the Bosnian Serbs had made a gross miscalculation. His American colleague Perry refers to a major strategic flop. The Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic goes even further and (if Rome's "Repubblica"got it right) says that "Karadzic and his folk are stupid"and that the taking of hostages is a "sign of nervousness"inPale. Whatever the case, nothing seems to indicate with any amount of certainty that the Bosnian casino might shut down shortly and the relations between the Pale leadership and the international community will not see again rash moves and new miscalculations on both sides . And this could mean the involvement in a war even worse than the present one. Asked by a foreign correspondent "What if you release all hostages, and the West does not keep its secret promises, a high-ranking Pale official replied recently: "If they go down on their promises, we can still take another action of this kind and make them renounce their intentions."

Meanwhile, in the night between Tuesday and Wednesday, Jovica Stanisic was back in Pale, this time addressing 108 released hostages more and - without Aleksa Buha - repeated the same story: "I am the special emissary of the President of Serbia and I came here to take you to Serbia and deliver you to your commands..." The domestic press extolled the negotiating wisdom and resolution of the President of Serbia again so that it was barely noticed that the American special emissary Frasure departed from Belgrade once again leaving the business regarding the recognition of Bosnia unfinished. He will probably stay put in Washington until it is assessed there how much has Milosevic's negotiating position strengthened due the release of the hostages. The news about Frasure's departure was somewhat overshadowed by the announcement that Jovica Stanisic would have to go back to Pale - very soon and more than once - and utter there the same words.

After the successful completion of Stanisic's second mission one could hear on RTS, among other things, that the release of 108 UNPROFOR soldiers had been preceded by a two-day "operative effort in the field". Those in the know claim that the "operative effort" of Stanisic's men in the field of the Serb Republic in Bosnia has been going on for some time. And that those in Pale who do not see eye to eye with Belgrade are far more afraid of this "operative effort" than of all the NATO planes and rapid deployment forces together. It seems that the Pale nervousness mentioned by Minister Jovanovic who is always very careful about what he is going to say, was not a slip of the tongue.