Karadzic Vs. Everyone Else

His May 31st order (applicable immediately) says "the transfer of information and all kinds of statements is done exclusively through the information ministry", and adds that all statements by state bodies' spokesmen in the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) are subject to checks prior to publication. The public has lost a source of many important thoughts and stands by Bosnian Serb leaders like Momcilo Krajisnik, Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic, and has not been informed about their activities in the latest crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But if we know little about what the RS leaders are doing, we have found out after a long time what the local opposition is getting up to. The independent group of RS parliament deputies, Feral Tribune weekly reported, has had secret contacts with Bosnia-Herzegovina opposition representatives for six months with the support and mediation of Contact Group members and the leaders of some of Europe's largest Social Democrat parties. The Croatian weekly said Milorad Dodik, head of the group, and Sejfudin Tokic, deputy leader of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats Union, made public what they agreed at their latest meeting in Perugia (May 25-27). Tokic says they agreed that "further relations should be built on the unconditional acceptance of the Contact Group plan as the basis for a political solution to the crisis". Dodik added that "Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a union in its internationally recognized borders with several constitutive units, is possible on that basis, if necessary with some kind of internal borders". The opposition negotiators also adopted the conclusion that "all war criminals must be punished under the principles of individual, not collective, responsibility".

Does Dodik's political offensive indicate that things are changing in the RS, or more specifically that his group can, along with Belgrade's support, count on the support of a large part of the Karadzic-Krajisnik monolithical parliamentary machine? Up to now, they had to justify their talks with Slobodan Milosevic and suddenly, with no visible cause, they openly admit to negotiations with the Muslims and acceptance of the Contact Group maps and possible Yugoslav recognition of Bosnia in internationally recognized borders. It's hard to assess the consequences of all that but it is certain that Pale is under great pressure from Belgrade and the international community. That pressure certainly includes various offers to impose a new Bosnian Serb leader instead of Karadzic who is increasingly seen as too uncompromising and apt to take irrational decisions. It's possible that the censorship he imposed (one Banja Luka news desk said there were less reports from the front but otherwise everything else was as usual) is actually aimed at prevention in case some of his powerful and close associates accept the offer and Dodik's stands. Perhaps Dodik's appearance in public, if he doesn't end up like Veljko Dzakula after the Daruvar Agreements (highly unlikely since Dodik spends most of his time in Belgrade) is encouragement for a rebellion against Karadzic.

"Serb soldiers on Ozren and Vozuca call all men with Serb blood to stop the Muslim offensive with rifles in their hands", an appeal said on Radio Pale on May 30 and added that "this is a critical moment for Serbdom". Serb sources said some 4,000 civilians fled Ozren and later reports said the offensive had been stopped with no significant changes in the front lines.

But, if the Serbs across the Drina consolidated their lines on that front, Croat Defence Force (HVO) and Croatian Army (HV) troops made significant advances into Livansko Polje and continued advancing on Bosansko Grahovo. The operation is being commanded by HVO general Ivo Lozancic who told Sarajevo TV (June 7) that his troops are just 12 kilometers from the town and are continuing their offensive. He also reported that Croat troops cut the Bosansko Grahovo-Glamoc road and took dominating heights on Sator mountain. Lozancic added that his troops were coordinating their attacks with the Bosnian army's 5th corps in Bihac and voiced hope that Croat and Muslim troops will join: they're 80 kilometers apart now.

If they manage that (in its 1994 offensive the 5th Corps advanced to Kulen Vakuf and Vrtaca near Bosanski Petrovac) they would cut Lika and Northern Dalmatia from the Banja Luka region which would place the Krajina (RSK) in a militarily untenable situation. The station said Croat positions on the Dinara mountain allowed them to shell Knin, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar and the important Knin-Grahovo road. The RSK villages of Cetina and Civljani have already been shelled. Even if the HVO and 5th Corps do not meet, the operation directly threatens Knin. At the moment the RSK and Bosnian Serbs are on the defensive and have not responded adequately.

The situation on the front lines had to be reflected in political relations among the Serbs west of the Drina, specifically on their announced union. The ousted RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic warned that if the process goes ahead, Croatia will have the arguments it needs continue offensive military action. Also, the hostage crisis in Bosnia is judged by many to have put Croatia's Western Slavonia operation into the background along with everything that happened to civilians there.

In other words, after the humiliation suffered by UN troops in the RS when they were captured and then chained, the international community is prepared to turn a blind eye to all Croat and Muslim offensive action. The Serbs across the Drina do not find consolation in the fact that NATO considered air strikes against Croat forces shelling the Kenyan battalion's base in Civljani.

So it's not surprising that not one RSK politician has spoken out about the hostage crisis. Most probably, it's clear to both RSK President Milan Martic and his Foreign Minister Milan Babic (also head of the strongest political party there) that they can't count on any significant help from Pale if the HV attacks: the latest events in Livansko Polje are the best confirmation of that. Also, if they persist in uniting with the RS, the newly created state will certainly lose Eastern Slavonia and Baranja. Mikelic managed to rally nine of the total of 17 RSK government ministers in Erdut which shows that the union project is facing serious difficulties. Mikelic told Radio B-92 that if the RSK and RS unite into the United Serb Republic, the "Republic of Serb Krajina will be proclaimed" in Eastern Slavonia. The coverage of Mikelic's meeting with his ministers on Serbia's state TV is the best confirmation of whose side Belgrade has taken.

Assessments now are that Karadzic will soon lose his Krajina allies in his opposition to Milosevic. Unofficial sources reported that signals have reached Belgrade from Knin that the ousting of Mikelic is all about internal politics and that policies won't change generally. The sources said Milosevic would be prepared to provide financial aid to the RSK to help form its own professional army units, not recognize Croatia and condition all concessions in negotiations on pressure for Zagreb to stop military pressure on the RSK.