Offensive at Sarajevo

We misinterpreted their dynamics, a high ranking UNPROFOR officer said last week. The Bosnians are planning in the long term; they're planning to the year 2001.

Bosnian officials (President Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Silajdzic, General Delic) called the Sarajevo offensive a limited operation to open tactical possibilities for coming operations. That's how it turned out: BiH army forces captured then lost the Lukavica-Pale road and now they're in a position to control it through artillery and sniper fire; their advances from Vogosca and Breza brought them close enough to endanger Ilijas and Rajlovac; they've kept up their pressure on Hadzici (from Pazarica and Hrasnica) and Ilidza; earlier, they captured Treskavica mountain from the south and endangered Trnovo and threatened the Kalinovik-Miljevina-Foca road. At the same time, they stepped up their pressure on Majevica and the combined Croat-Bosnian offensive on Bosansko Grahovo continued.

UN observers and officers think all that is just a reinforcement of their strategy of drawing Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces thin along a 1,500 kilometer front; this is a war of exhaustion with large human resources being used to waste away the enemy's critically low resources (manpower, fuel and equipment).

Notably the BiH is saving its forces for decisive battles; they prefer to withdraw from captured territory into hills and forests than risk being outflanked or exposed to artillery. The strategy is well known: quick infantry attacks on enemy infantry since that is the only way to avoid artillery fire. If it works, it works, if it doesn't they pull back.

The other recognizable characteristic are constant efforts to take strategic heights. it worked on Treskavica: the BiH took the entire Treskavica plateau last week included heights and lakes and Pasina mountain (2,000 meters). On Majevica, the BiH 2 Corps took several strategic heights early in June and is now just eight kilometers from Lopari. Vlasic was taken earlier and now the Cemerno mountain over the Semizovac-Olovo road.

The Croat Defence Force (HVO) advanced north after taking Livansko Polje, not towards Knin and cut the Glamoc-Bosansko Grahovo road endangering the Knin-Grahovo road, Grahovo itself and Drvar and Glamoc. On the other side, the HVO around Sarajevo (Kiseljak, Kresevo, Stup) are mainly passive but reports from the area indicate that they provided artillery support to the BiH. An HVO major told the London Times that this is the biggest Federation operation to date; perhaps it was forced but it has to work. Obviously against their will, the Croats continued their engagement against the Serbs which was the Sarajevo government's strategic political goal since last summer.

In January, Radovan Karadzic gave an "important" interview (Javnost, January 6) where he moaned about the Croat betrayal and threatened that the Serbs "will help the Moslems in the next Croat-Moslem war". He finished by saying that he was convinced that the politicians who formed Herceg-Bosna headed by Mate Boban would never have betrayed them. Boban is gone and the new Herceg-Bosna political leaders prefer a small territorial gain rather than a promised division of territory.

UN spokesmen warned that this is the largest concentration of BiH troops since the war began. Perhaps the warnings were the reason why the great BiH offensive never happened around Sarajevo; some sources believe that was never the intention; others said the Bosnians have nothing to lose either way and will profit from the moment. The fact is that the initiative is all theirs now: the BiH is dictating the moves, taking care not to cross the line of no return. The great powers are in a panic with warnings of catastrophe from Washington, Paris and Pale if the siege is broken; there is mention of a new Balkan war.

Then several signals came from the Bosnian side last week indicating that the BiH is prepared to end its operations around Sarajevo if the UN secures normal supplies of food, water, electricity and gas for the city and an end to the bombardment. The goal of the offensive was preventing the "strangulation of Sarajevo" (Alija Izetbegovic). The UN then said negotiations were underway with Karadzic and admitted that the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo no longer exists (20 km around Sarajevo under a Security Council resolution of February 1994). UNPROFOR troops guarding former heavy weapons collection points have been withdrawn including the two French sergeants who resisted being taken hostage in Bare West of Sarajevo for weeks.

UNPROFOR has a new nickname UselfPROFOR (UN Self Protection Forces) and General Janvier refused a NATO demand to bomb the Mahovljani airport because of frequent Bosnian Serb combat flights; the question now is whether a UN resolution banning flights over Bosnia exists.

Seemingly, the whole thing is back where it was on February 9, 1994: as if another bloody massacre in Sarajevo is needed to move things forward. The two mines in Dobrinja last week (13 dead, scores of wounded) seem not to have been enough.

Karadzic's army hasn't struck at Sarajevo as everyone feared which could be a sign that things aren't the same; there's no more arrogant self-confidence: Karadzic even repented for taking hostages on Thursday, the first case of its kind. Karl Bildt came to Belgrade that same day and threatened to withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia if the conflict escalates and the peacekeepers are humiliated again which is just proof that he's new to the job and still has things to learn.