Slow Reaction Forces

The time has come to carefully reread the relevant resolutions the Security Council keeps invoking, especially the fine print. It's dull and tedious reading; the question is whether we should devote time to it since the situation on the ground, far from New York, dictates other solutions. There was no argument from the start about UNPROFOR taking the necessary measures to protect its personnel from capture - except for two stubbornly maintained misinterpretations: the first is the theory on "agreement by all three sides" on the UN mandate in Bosnia; the second is the illusion on the "neutrality" of the UN forces and staff. As for the agreement of the warring sides that we know: they'll agree on any cease-fire that allows them to rest and bring in more men and equipment and regroup for a new offensive.

The neutrality of the UN in Bosnia was a self-delusion from the start. That stemmed from the failure to grasp the strategic political and war goals of Karadzic's Serb Republic (RS) (and Boban's Herceg-Bosna). Namely, if someone lays siege to and bombards cities, trying to starve them to the point of surrender and kills or expels innocent civilians of other nationalities as Karadzic is doing (and Boban did) anyone who tries to feed and supply the besieged cities and save the civilians from persecution appears as the enemy, as someone who isn't neutral.

It took Radovan Karadzic chaining UN personnel to bridges, posts and trucks for someone to notice what is going on. The TV scandal seems to have tipped the balance; at least among the French and British who have the largest numbers of troops in UNPROFOR. The speed with which the decision to form the RRF is comparable only to the reaction following the Markale massacre on February 9, 1994.

All this recalls the announced French Doctrine for Bosnia: if UNPROFOR wants to save itself from more humiliation it has to regroup so that it hasn't got a single unit under battalion strength anywhere in Bosnia, units supplied and equipped to withstand attacks until the RRF shows up. That boils down to air mobility; the fact that the Americans have offered air transport, Global Positioning Systems, night operations systems, the latest in intelligence teams (successfully used in the Gulf War) and some 100 combat helicopters in an effort to avoid sending their men there shows how serious the idea is. Add to that promises of British and French troops on the ground (elite units, Sagaie and Warrior armored cars, logistic and artillery support) and you get a potentially very dangerous military concentration . That's something President Milosevic realized before Karadzic; last week he voiced "deep concern" over the RRF.

At first glance, things are just what they seem. Politically, nothing is that simple. First of all, someone has to pay the 400 million dollars in transport, development and deployment costs for the RRF; the UN financing system is based on the assumption that 31% of the costs come from the US but the presidential campaign has just begun there.

The US press, already fascinated by the coming elections, has started watering things down which caused an unusually hostile reaction from British Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind. On Wednesday he said he "won't listen to stories of UNPROFOR's inefficiency in Bosnia from someone who doesn't have troops there". That backs up theories of a British-French alliance based on desperation over the inability of the US to formulate any kind of consistent foreign policy.

The relevant Security Council resolutions provide satisfactory answers for all the warring sides; their texts are flexible. These are political issues: we have a mandate, but we'll implement it or not depending on whether it suits the political situation or not.

French sources spoke of depression and mental exhaustion among their officers in Sarajevo; frustration is prevailing feeling among UNPROFOR personnel. When they were tied to posts and other strategic facilities the joke was over: the UN's main problem became it's people; they can't evacuate them from Bosnia or protect them from humiliation; the RRF is supposed to be some kind of consolation is nothing else.

All that won't mean a thing until the great powers finally define their political goals in Bosnia and the Balkans. Considering the turbulence within the customarily confused Americans, it'll take at least another 18 months since a strategy can't be formulated without the Americans.

In other words, don't be surprised if the RRF become a slow presence force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.