Fall of Srebrenica

Srebrenica was obviously indefencible since it was defended neither by the few remaining Bosnian soldiers or the Dutch battalion of UN soldiers; Srebrenica was defended only by the persuasion of the UN, great powers and the "international community". The persuasion was based on two arguments: Radovan Karadzic's and Ratko Mladic's good manners and the threat of force. There is no point in discussing the first argument; the argument about force is more interesting. The UN's and NATO's threat of force was from the very start the proverbial empty gun feared by both the one who points it and the one it is being pointed at. During the first Srebrenica crisis in January 1993, when this Eastern Bosnian town was declared a UN protected safe area, and during the Sarajevo crisis in February 1994 when the UN resolution which established a heavy weapon exclusion zone around Sarajevo was passed, Karadzic and Mladic feared the empty guns of NATO. Meanwhile they have realized that the gun is empty, that is, that great powers lack the will required for a significant military operation. Since they are in a hurry and are running out of time, Mladic and Karadzic decided to grab the initiative.

After a careful analysis of the behavior of the great powers and their mutual relations the Bosnian Serbs quietly and without any nervousness entered last Sunday the safe area of Srebrenica, chased off or captured the Dutch soldiers and surrounded the town, placing their tanks on the nearby hills and other strategic positions. The UN let out a few panic-striken cries, UNHCR warned of a desperate situation created by thousands of refugees being crammed into the center of the town and tried (with no success) to bring in aid, while statesmen expressed their concern and reminded that the only solution to the Bosnian crisis is the peaceful one.

Before the war, Srebrenica and the surrounding villages had a population of around 37,000 ( 72.5% Muslim, 25.2% Serbs); the town itself, a poor Eastern Bosnian "kasaba" (Turkish word for a small town) had around 8,000 inhabitants. The bloody Spring of 1992 and the ethnic cleansing of the Drina's eastern bank drove over 30,000 refugees into the Srebrenica enclave. Serbian forces were not able to take Srebrenica immediately due largely to the organizational skills of Naser Orlic, the commander of the enclave's defence (who used to be a policeman in Serbia, and Milosevic's bodyguard). During the Autumn and Winter of 1992, Eastern Bosnia became the scene of systematic guerrilla activities by the local units of the Bosnian army operating mainly from Srebrenica, but also from Zepa; for a while it was dangerous to travel between Pale and Zvornik without escort. When Ratko Mladic became tired of this situation at the beginning of 1993, he carried out a serious offensive in Eastern Bosnia, cramming around 40,000 refugees into the center of the Srebrenica enclave, an area about 8 by 14 kilometers in size. This led to a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions, because the Serbian army tried to break into the town. French General Philip Morillion, then commander of UN forces in Bosnia, intervened personally on the spot, and the whole affair ended by Srebrenica becoming the first UN safe area, and the main street being renamed after the French General. The agreement with the Serbian army was that UN soldiers will be allowed into the town on condition that Srebrenica is also declared a demilitarized zone. As is usually the case in the Balkans, what happened was a bit different from what had been agreed: the town's defence surrendered its heavy weapons but not the small arms because UNPROFOR could not guarantee absolute safety. In April 1993, the first UNPROFOR unit of 150 Canadian soldiers marched into Srebrenica.

Everything was relatively peaceful until about a month ago when soldiers from Srebrenica attacked a nearby Serbian village and killed a number of people they considered to be soldiers and which the Serbs claim to have been civilians. The provocation was appropriately used and ever since Karadzic talks of the "terrorists" from Srebrenica.

Since they were already only about two kilometers away from the town center, Bosnian Serbs decided to attack. Observation posts belonging to the Dutch UNPROFOR battalion fell one by one, which resulted in 40 or so Dutch soldiers ending up in Bratunac as "guests" of the Bosnian Serb Army.

Majority of the civilians from the Srebrenica enclave, around 20-30,000 of them according to UNHCR sources, retreated towards Potocari, north of the town and half way between Srebrenica and Bratunac (held by the Serbs), where the Dutch battalion was stationed. A unit of the Serbian Army, led by General Mladic himself entered Potocari on Wednesday, July 12. Everything was peaceful and civilized: after the soldiers checked if there were any Bosnian troops among the refugees, General Mladic held a speech advising them to board the coaches and trucks which he brought in and make their way to the nearest border with the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina. On the following day, Thursday July 13, 6,000 refugees were delivered across the front line near Kladanj. The Bosnian government protested against this new wave of ethnic cleansing and even threatened to refuse to admit new refugees, though it is not clear how it intended to so. Mladic's soldiers separated all men over the age of 16 from the rest and took them to Bratunac in order, they explained, to check whether there were any war criminals among them.

The Bosnian side, aware of the delicate position of the Eastern Bosnian enclaves, made the expectedly loud diplomatic noise: Dr. Silajdzic asked the UN to give Karadzic an ultimatum and lift the arms embargo.

The Council of NATO condemned the capture of Srebrenica and announced that it is "waiting for decisions by the UN". Unwillingly, they added that NATO had been prepared for more air-strikes but any such idea was abandoned after General Mladic threatened to kill 30 Dutch soldiers, destroy their base in Potocari, and flatten Srebrenica to the ground.

What is left? Zepa and Gorazde; Tuzla and Sarajevo are defended too well, Bihac is also a hard nut to crack. Zepa was shelled on Thursday July 13, and the Serbian side said that will not touch again it if it is disarmed and evacuated to the Republic of B-H. Zepa is an awkward place: the only access to it is through an easily defensible, narrow and steep canyon where the Serbs had already been defeated once by the Bosnian defenders in 1992. They say that during World War II the Germans never even entered Zepa: they had no need to do so as it is not on the way to anywhere. Serbian cleansing of Eastern Bosnia drove some 28-30,000 refugees into Zepa, but it is thought that there are fewer of them there now. From a purely military standpoint, taking Zepa could cost more than the town is worth, but adoption of rational standpoints have so far been rare occurrences. The aim of the Bosnian Serbs, according to some well-informed sources, is to cleanse pedantically the whole

of Eastern Bosnia and turn the dividing line between Serbia and Bosnia formed by the river Drina into the "backbone of Serbianhood".

Gorazde is a different case: this industrial town on the bank of the Drina is of considerable significance to both the Serbian and Bosnian sides for two reasons. First, it is too close to Sarajevo and controls the communication down the Drina valley; secondly, in it is the factory "Pobeda"("Victory"), one of the key components of the military industry (the only factory in this region which produces all kinds of detonators as well some types of explosives). Taking Gorazde in such a way that the factory is left undamaged seems almost impossible. It is buried inside a mountain, mined and will never be surrendered.

The initiative is now in the hands of Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic. If they can successfully cleanse the Srebrenica area without any casualties or scandals - something they are trying very hard to do - they will score an important point in the eyes of the "international community": they will show that they have learnt to do things in a courteous manner.

An alternative to such a position is difficult, expensive and risky: that is, any attempt to enforce an existing UN resolution - even only if its gist if not its every word- means war. Ratko Mladic feels encouraged, while Radovan Karadzic was desperate for a military success of any kind, even as lousy as the one in Srebrenica, now that Milosevic is promising peace within the next six months (which also means the end of Radovan Karadzic). UN and NATO together, and great powers especially will have to redefine their strategy in the Balkans: time has come for them to define a common political aim - or go home disgraced.