Dire Straits for Martic

The report said Martic "prevented the work of the supreme defence council", prevented Home Affairs Minister Slobodan Peric from performing his duties and added that "the shelling of Zagreb and other towns just damaged the Serb units which were surrounded". Also the RSK president along with then army commander General Milan Celeketic announced vast military support from the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) at rallies from April 25 to 27 saying that "even some 15 villages under Croatian occupation would be liberated" which created a "false sense of security among the people".

One thing seems important: commission members, at the request of Western Slavonija parliament deputies, spoke of their findings for the first time at meeting of Eastern Slavonija leaders in Vukovar on July 14. Just two days earlier, Peric and other officials from western parts of the Krajina were prevented by police from crossing into Eastern Slavonija at the Tovarnik border crossing, preventing a session of the RSK parliament which was due to appoint a new government.

A new government wasn't formed but the old one met in Vukovar on July 18. Radio Vukovar said the session was chaired by Prime Minister Borisav Mikelic and was attended by almost all ministers except for Mikelic's Foreign Minister Milan Babic who is forming the new government.

Does that mean that the process of disciplining the disobedient Knin leaders is underway via Eastern Slavonija?

Martic does not seem to be needed by anyone after a five year military and political career in which he never suffered a defeat.

His rapprochement with RS president Radovan Karadzic, insisting that the Krajina unite with the Bosnian Serbs at any cost, lack of any kind of nicety in negotiations with Croatia and closeness with currently imprisoned Serbian Radial Party leader, Vojislav Seselj, have made him a problem for the Belgrade regime's interests. Also, the Belgrade authorities don't want a new RSK-Croatia war, and Zagreb doesn't want to negotiate with Martic. There are some who feel that the removal of Martic from politics, which Zagreb would see as a concession, would bring further concessions from Croatia. There is speculation that there could be guarantees that armed reintegration would be abandoned and negotiations on economic issues and traffic lines renewed.

Karadzic also probably does not need Martic. The Bosnian Serb leader is currently busy strangling the eastern Bosnia enclaves and forcing the start of negotiations and Martic is the least of his concerns. Both of them have already profited from the effects of their union.

Finally, there is the Krajina political factor. Many believe Martic and Babic, after toppling Mikelic together, have no common political interests. So if a campaign against one starts, few people expect the other to stand in his defence. Threats from Belgrade that the RSK headed by Martic will be as isolated as the RS are not unimportant, and there's also the question of the secession of Eastern Slavonija. If that happens, incidents like Western Slavonija will happen.

Still, the Krajina president might survive even after charges that he is to blame for the fall of Western Slavonija. This isn't the first time that he's been directly blamed for military defeat. Others, like Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan hold him responsible for the defeat on the Miljevacki plateau in 1992, Maslenica and the Medak pocket in 1993 but he always got stronger after political clashes. But he had Belgrade's unreserved support then.