Handling The Opposition

When the elimination of Babic was nearing completion, his allies tried to defend him with the weapon of his "older brother" Milosevic - they organized a support rally in Knin where there were at least seven times more people than dr Borisav Jovic (a Presidency member) estimated (800), but it had no effect. The only common denominator was the misery of the gathered masses. The opposition parties were feeling the pulse of the people: if this meeting of the most militant fraction goes without problem, they could decide

to openly challenge Milosevic. Could Milosevic's opponents successfully use the method which he has already used up? Milosevic did not invent Serbian meetings - he only skillfully adjusted them to suit his own needs.

Milosevic said in his interview to "Nin": "Unity has always been a problem for Serbia". The government in Novi Sad was sacrificed for that unity in September 1988.

Milosevic led a massive and well orchestrated movement, supported by powerful propaganda, which was helped by the opposition in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Ljubljana. The entire power apparatus was activated - from the police to the activists of the Socialist Party who were welcoming the Serbs from Kosovo. The reserve officer staff organizations were actively involved along with some parts of the army.

The meeting at Usce, held on November 19, 1988 (with around 1 500 000 people) was a turning point which opened the door for conflict. The mass meeting was taking place in Pristina at the same time, in defence of the national Albanian leaders. A new wave of protests erupted on February 21, 1989 at the time when the Serbian Parliament was adopting amendments to the effect of establishing the Serbian rule in Kosovo. The miners in Trepca entered their pits and remained there for 183 hours. Kosovo was witnessing a general strike, the demonstrations lasted for hours.

Milosevic promised the arrest of Vlasi (the best known nationalist Albanian leader) in front of the Federal Parliament, at one of his numerous meetings, organized in protest of the support of the Slovenian cultural and political elite

for certain Albanian requests. The culmination happened at the meeting in Gazimestan (where the battle of Kosovo took place in 1389) on June 28, 1989, when Milosevic openly mentioned the possibility of war.

In Zagreb and Ljubljana, the resistance to Serbian meetings was reaching its climax. In October 1988 the then Slovenian president Janez Drnovsek warned Milosevic "not to cross the line". At that time a certain BBC commentator used the expression "the bewitched Serbs". Many people were aware that that was a possible preamble to the war. "Wall Street Journal" was even then calling Milosevic a "fanatical nationalist", the BBC was predicting the Balkans will be a scene of another Lebanon, Milosevic was saying in Kragujevac that "petit bourgeois fear strong Serbia".