Patient, Determined And Deaf

"The blue helmets will not come until the Serbs and the Croats are convinced that the other side will be worse hit by their arrival. The efforts of world diplomacy were concentrated on ensuring this, and the successful outcome seemed near when it turned out that the war was benefiting neither side. What the United Nations do not seem to understand is that feeding on the misery of the other side has to be carefully administered, which means that the blue helmets, should they arrive, will stay here forever. That is, until Tudjman and Milosevic are in power, or rather their political proteges.

The consent of Milan Babic is the only thing they are waiting for, although he is a man who envisaged a different future for himself and who did everything he could to make the life of Serbs in Croatia impossible. But the UN peace plan offers at least a theoretical possibility that this could be achieved. It was something which had to be offered to Tudjman to make his theoretical borders legitimate. Babic however, is now clear that his prospects for ever becoming a head of state are not even theoretically possible.

The leading Serbian politicians, his sometime allies, were desperately trying to convince him to accept the plan - the further away from Knin the more convincing the arguments. They were all in agreement, save for Babic. All those who were once set on realizing the "all Serbs in one state" ideal, who wanted to save Yugoslavia, defend the Serbs and defeat fascism, came to their senses in the meantime, except for Babic. They were sharing the aims, but not the risk. They will all stay where they were before, only Babic will feel the difference. For him and his rebels the war failure and the peace plan represent a turning point and they have turned from statesmen to sinners.

It is a paradox that Babic has to pay the biggest price, although Krajina has secured some kind of freedom in this war. But it is in Knin that the war started, and the local success means nothing in the global defeat which is the essence of his current conflict with Milosevic. There is no doubt that Milan Babic considers himself to be not only a better, more consistent and more principled Serb than Milosevic, but also his innocent victim, while he is forgetting that it was precisely Milosevic and the Army who made him what he is today.

Since the resistance in Serbia and the world was thwarting the war enthusiasm, the regime in Belgrade started a retreat operation in which the Babic case marks the first stage. Milosevic's attempt to finish him off with a letter did not work, and it only represents a memento from the communist past. Another episode reminiscent of the "democratic centralism" era was to follow. Here the key role was given to the member of the incomplete Presidency Borisav Jovic whose powers of persuasion deserve attention.

Dr. Jovic represents the climax of the evolution of socialist self-management, or rather its main aim. He was invincible in conference sessions where the debating represented the only reality and the most important discipline. Nobody could be so patient and persevering: unwilling to hear a different opinion; eager to devise the most cunning procedure snags; to keep monotonously repeating and toying with the single thought and to present anything else as impossible, illogical and anti-constitutional; to confuse what was clear; he did it all with such unshakable confidence that his opponents would either give in or lose their patience. His efforts in the destruction of the Yugoslav institutions have been grossly underestimated.

The ever so modest doctor Jovic would never allow himself any obvious sign of contentment, or ask for recognition, but it is precisely during his presidency mandate that the idea of the reform of the Yugoslav society was buried and the final process of disintegration started. It is hardly surprising then that he should be the one of all Milosevic's veterans to stay at the top. The notes of the Belgrade session clearly shows that it was Jovic who played the leading role and not Branko Kostic, who formally chaired the meeting. Jovic was explaining Vance's plan to Babic, he was convincing him that he has nothing to worry about, that Goulding gave him firm assurances, that the blame should be put on Tudjman, that the defeat is actually a victory. At a certain point he subtly accused him of siding with Tudjman, to then start threatening him with an open conflict, the retreat of the Army from Krajina and with the withdrawal of help.

From the political viewpoint, Jovic is this time supporting a better and a more rational option, and there is no doubt that it really is a question of war and peace. Serbia can no longer lead a war of this kind, and this is the best peace we could hope for. But this style of political settlement reminds one so much of the political differentiation typical of the old regime that even Tudjman could take pity on Babic.

That style is the very essence of the old regime. It was especially damning for the Presidency when it was used in the international disputes: each Jovic's tactical success at the Presidency session served only to convince others that they should stay away from him. That arrogant, self-imposing creature of the communist regime horrifies anyone who, for any reason, find themselves in minority. It was this that destroyed Yugoslavia, and that isolated Serbia from other republics.

Babic is still bearing up well, but the Army will crush him. Tudjman has not yet realized what he had lost by splitting up with Milosevic. Everyone will now take a closer look at what is happening in Croatia and we should not be surprised if the most disillusioned ones turn out to be his former staunchest allies. Bearing this in mind, it is probably true that Serbia will now win the world's sympathies.

Thus the most efficient peace plan would be the one which would manage to make the Yugoslav republics concentrate on constructive thinking. Discreetness is an important attribute of any modern state which has here always been seen as hypocrisy which serves as a cover up for something much more serious than the raw and brutal force. This of course, is a mistake, since the power is not necessarily more brutal if it is secretive.