The Hypocrisy and the Political Reality

The continuing war, the impotence and the highly likely defeat of the world politics in Bosnia cast a new light, or rather a shadow, on the sector South of the regional Balkan crisis, that is, first and foremost, potentially the most explosive question of Kosovo. Constantly shelved and in the absence of any initiative which would help to at least gradually and slowly solve practical problems of everyday life, Kosovo today looks unkempt. In point of

fact, it is still an area with a time-bomb, except that for the time being everyone is happy to keep its clockwork still. The peace in Kosovo is sustained by that paradox. All protagonists of the Kosovo drama still try to avoid sharper confrontation and war, as likely as not because no one can predict its aftermath. All analyses indicate, namely, that a possible Kosovo war cold not be kept under "control" and "dosed" and that it would conduce to a broader regional crisis with unforeseeable consequences which inspire fear in everyone - the Serbs, the Albanians, their immediate neighbors and the world powers. The result of such forced maintenance of peace in Kosovo is that all the developments there take the form of multiple hypocrisy. All protagonists, each in his own way, of course, cannot but be two-faced and contradictory and this boils down to the fact that Serbia tolerates the parallel Albanian system of power with certain state and para-state elements just as the Albanians, on the other hand,

are compelled to 'tolerate' certain, vital, instances of the Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, notably those concerning the nationality, identity cards and passports, and those concerning administrative and economic relations which are, as such, indispensable for the parallel life.

This total hypocrisy often produces tragicomical and grotesque situations. For instance, a story can be heard in Kosovo these days which says how the leader of the Serb Radicals, Vojilav Seselj, arrested again for an attempted rally of Kosovo Radicals in Gnjilane, and serving his term there, received many parcels with food which he then shared with other inmates of whom a vast majority are Albanians. Seselj allegedly told Albanian inmates: "Here we are all equal. But when we come out, we shall fight each other to death... I don't know what you Albanians are waiting for. If you want freedom and separation from Serbia, you must take up arms and fight for it. No one's going to bring you freedom on a salver." The story is probably true because Seselj is known to have made similar statements in public when he was free.

It seems that Milosevic has decided that any form of war-mongering and militaristic organization of Kosovo (with the exception, of course, of those under his command) under present international circumstances and the evolution of the Balkan crisis would be fraught with risk both for the current and the long-term interests of Serbia and the Serb people. That was why he somewhat unexpectedly decided to make a personal appearance in Kosovo which he had not visited since 1989, that is since the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the battle on Kosovo. Milosevic's return to Kosovo is, needless to say, marked by white-hot demagogic hypocrisy. In contrast with his Kosovo Polje address of 1987 which brought him to power, or the Gazimestan one (St. Vid's Day 1989) when he announced the possibility of "new battles", that is an armed denouement of the Yugoslav crisis, last week during his visit to Kosovska Mitrovica and Trepca Mines, Milosevic delivered a speech in which a conciliatory note prevailed and announced a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis.

The Albanians received Milosevic's visit indifferently and with marked irony. How can one trust the peace-making rhetoric of the one who inflicted so much evil on Kosovo and the Albanians? This sudden Milosevic's eloquence was interpreted by the Kosovo press as the Danaian offering, that is 'the announcement of new dangerous forms of violence'. Pristina daily Bujku concludes in its commentary that Milosevic was addressing "some imaginary rather than real Albanians". Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo and the 'Republic of Kosovo', said that it was the "old vocabulary and empty oratory" and then somewhat imprudently concluded that Milosevic had "said less than we expected" which was in some unofficial speculations seen as Rugova's inadvertent admission that he must have been - through some diplomatic channels presumably, informed in advance about Milosevic's visit as the first step towards a change of policy and opening of a way to the Albanian-Serb dialogue. Be that as it may, mutual hypocrisy and deep mistrust which is difficult to overcome aside, more objective and rational analyses of Milosevic's visit to Kosovo and the modified tone of his speech indicate that there could be a turning point in the Kosovo crisis. Milosevic's optimistic statement to Time magazine, that the Balkan crisis could be resolved within the next six months if certain longer-lasting political package deals were made, may not be just political oratory but an indication of a basic agreement achieved in intensive diplomatic consultations with international factors over the past several months including the commencement of the solution of the Kosovo question. On the other hand, Rugova and other Albanian leaders in Kosovo today assess much more realistically the framework defined by the international community for the solution of the Kosovo question and the inevitability and necessity of a dialogue with Milosevic, clear as it may be that no one is unduly optimistic about the outcome of the Serbo-Albanian dialogue or expecting a rapid and easy solution. The talks will, in all likelihood, be long and tortuous: two paces forward, one backward. In his own way, Milosevic made his two paces forward. Rugova, too, recently corrected his idea of the international protectorate for Kosovo suggesting a milder and more feasible variation of civil administration. One should, therefore, expect new shifts and rapprochements shortly, along with international initiatives bearing upon the formulation of the most difficult condition: the framework of the Serbo-Albanian dialogue and the negotiators' terms of reference - the principal obstacle to the beginning of the dialogue so far.