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July 31, 1995
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 200
Negotiations About Recognition

Maybe But Perhaps

by Milan Milosevic

At its session in Luxembourg, April 6, 1992, EC Council of ministers adopted unanimously the Resolution on Yugoslavia in which it advised the governments of member states to recognize the independence of the Republic of Bosnia-Hertzegovina starting from April 7, 1992.

More than 1,200 days ago, attempts by many negotiators to persuade President Milosevic to recogonize Bosnia, resumed under the assumption that this would isolate the Bosnian Serbs, as well as represent the "final abandonment of the idea of Greater Serbia".

On June 26, 1995, heads of political sections within ministries of foreign affairs of countries which form the Contact Group, gathered in London to hear the most recent report by the EU envoy Karl Bildt, on the ongoing negotiations with President Milosevic. They concluded that the talks are "heading in a promising direction".

Very good.

This year again, while Milosevic and all kinds of negotiators were trying to outwit each other, arms were at work and the exchange of offensives and counteroffensives continued. For example: 13-14 January-Bosnian Army's Fifth Corps in the Bihac pocket; 2 March- Karadzic's Serbs in Gorazde; 6 March- Izetbegovic's Muslims on Velika Kladusa; 21 March- Muslims on Majevica; 24 March- Serbs on Majevica; 20 March- Muslims on Vlasic; 6 April- Muslims on Doboj; 14 April- Abdic's Muslims on Vrnogorac, 1-2 May- Tudjman's Croats in Western Slavonija; 11 May- Karadzic's Serbs on Orasje; 4 June- Tudjman's Croats and those from Hertzegovina on Dinara; 15 June -4 July - Izetbegovic's Muslims at the Ilijas front around Sarajevo; 19 June- Muslims on Treskavica; 12 July- Karadzic's Serbs in Srebrenica; 19 July- Karadzic's Serbs, Serbs from Krajina and Abdic's Muslims in the Bihac pocket; 20 July- Karadzic's Serbs in Zepa; 25 July- Tudjman's Croats and those from Hertzegovina on Glamoc and Grahovo...

For similar reasons civilians had to get out of Ripac, Western Slavonija, Srebrenica and Zepa.

President Milosevic and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev (accompanied by Zotov and Churkin) ended their cordial talks in Belgrade, July 24, and emphasized the "importance of the efforts put into the search for a political settlement and the cessation of hostilities". It was also repeated that the lifting of sanctions is the most important step which the international community must make. It was then reported in Moscow that Kozyrev also saw General Mladic, whom he advised to exercise restraint towards UN forces and the safe area of Gorazde.

In response to the news that the American Congress voted in favor of lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, an unnamed associate of President Yeltsin announced that Russia will do the same towards the Bosnian Serbs. President of the Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, told " Voice of Russia" that the current UN peace mission in Bosnia "suffered total defeat", "because there was no objectivity and equal dissociation from all parties in the conflict".

Apart from the support offered by the Russians, Milosevic could have been counting on the Bosnian crisis becoming even more complicated. Fikret Abdic, who has been totally ignored by the West, last week inaugurated the so-called "neutral republic" in Western Bosnia. Milosevic also knew for certain that the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman will show a nervous desire to get hold of all the railway stations on the Bihac-Knin railway line. Following a meeting by the Croatian and Bosnian presidents- Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic which was held in Split, July 23, it was announced that Croatia will provide military support to the Bosnian government forces, especially around the Bihac pocket.

The situation at the dividing line between the Krajina Serbs and Tudjman's Croats is usually described in reports as tense. Such a state of affairs actually facilitates Milosevic's position. In the May round of negotiations, American negotiator Frasure could not ask of Milosevic to recognize Croatia while Galbraith paraded through Slavonija, though in the past such things were all part of the same package. Belgrade is quite openly trying to enthrone a new leadership in Krajina which would be prepared to enter flexible negotiations with Tudjman, though it appears that stabilizing Croatia and stirring up its revisionism is hardly one of its priorities.

In the "recognition" game, often some kind of "party breaker" appears, such as Milosevic, a group of Krajina Serbs, Tudjman, Karadzic, Americans or Germans.

Milosevic's opponents who are critical of his appeasement policies reacted to the new indications about the recognition of Bosnia which appeared in July 1995, with the words they have been repeating for more than a year: "recognition- final betrayal of the Serbian people", (Radical Party spokesman, July 22, 1995). General Secretary of the Radical Party, Aleksandar Vucic, judged the agreement about the recognition of Bosnia to be a "crime against the whole of Serbian people", and added that the Radicals "know that Milosevic decided to betray the Krajina Republic and the Srpska Republic.

President of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Vojislav Kostunica, the most persistent critic of the recognition, in a recent statement given to Studio B TV channel said that in fact Milosevic recognized Bosnia and its pre-war borders a long time ago, but that this will make no difference on the ground. "Bosnia has to be recognized by the Republic of Srpska, and she can only recognize two states in Bosnia. Everything else is just a dream"

According to Kostunica, the arrival of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) and the new role taken by Germany are "discouraging and groundless". "Germany is the main culprit for the disintegration of Yugoslavia because at the end of 1991 it insisted on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and achieved it through pure blackmail", he added. General Mladic sent a message to the Germans asking them to come because he has personal reasons for being so eager to "greet" them.

President of the Democratic Party (DS), Zoran Djindjic, said in early July, before the most recent wave of speculations regarding recognition began, that an internationally recognized Bosnia-Hertzegovina would be an "artificial creation which would cease to exist in a year or two". In an interview to the Bosnian Serb weekly "Oslobodjenje", Djindjic also said that the sovereignty and statehood of the Republic of Srpska (RS) must be recognized "even if only as part of a loose Bosnian union or confederation". All that Djindjic said resembles what Momcilo Krajisnik, president of Bosnian Serb Parliament, told "Beta" news agency: "Bosnia does not exist and in spite of the respect we have towards certain people in FR Yugoslavia we think that no one has the right to make a mistake as big as the recognition Bosnia would be. Unified Bosnia would lead to a long war".

Pacifists in Belgrade greeted the hints about recognition with approval. Miladin Zivotic (Belgrade Circle): " The cost of delay in the recognition of Bosnia is loss of human lives, so recognition would certainly contribute to the end of the terrible crime and genocide in Bosnia"

President of the Belgrade Circle, Nebojsa Popov, expressed hope that the recognition will also help bring an end to the destruction of towns and killing of people.

Milan Bozic, member of the Presidency of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), sees the recognition of Bosnia as a "good arrangement" but expressed doubts about the possibility of any such agreement being reached because of the rigid and unyielding position held by the Americans. On the other hand, Milosevic who is under fire from the domestic nationalist public must offer something "concrete and substantial" in return for such an act.

When Carl Bildt informed the contact group, July 22, 1995, that after several weeks of difficult negotiations he managed to reach basic agreement with President Milosevic, the proposed deal was rejected with a reservation that it was a difficult decision to make at the time when Bosnian Serbs are leading an offensive, and told Biltd to carry on with negotiations. In the meantime, Biltd was sent to Belgrade apparently not knowing whether he closed the deal or not. Before this most recent discussion, rumors appeared ("Beta" news agency) that Milosevic "repeated the readiness" to recognize Bosnia and that Milosevic and Kozyrev took a "step forward" on the line of Bildt's proposals. According to the proposal, FRY would recognize Bosnia in return for a nine month long suspension of all UN sanctions. It can not be excluded however that the information obtained by Vreme, about Milosevic increasing the price in order to buy more time, is correct.

It is possible that Milosevic is waiting for the decision by the American Congress about lifting the arms embargo. "Some of the leading Russian parliamentarians, who are not even among the more militant ones, already spoke about the possibility of a unilateral decision to lift the embargo against Belgrade" Professor Sergey Karaganov, deputy director of the European Institute, told British TV Channel 4.

Most political groups in Belgrade see the war crimes charges against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic as a sign of partiality and an attempt to

exclude the Bosnian Serbs from the peace negotiations, though it has to be noted that Switzerland is contemplating guaranteeing immunity if the Serbs return to negotiations. "Politika" reported an article from Italian press about how Karadzic sent Milorad Ekmecic to Rome for secret negotiations with the Pope. The opposition is eager to remind that recently Churkin thought aloud about changes in the proposed map of Bosnia, and that Alain Juppe, in the middle of the crisis on July 25, said that the Contact Group plan must be amended. Dragoljub Micunovic, president of the Democratic Center, in an interview for the Czech newspaper "Rude Pravo" noted that the Serbian president's influence over Karadzic is not as great as most people think, but stated however that "after the break of relations with Serbia, Karadzic realized that without its help he will end up in total isolation and that he must be aware of the fact that all of the Serbian people who, irrespective of where they live, share a common fate, and that he must take into account those within FRY who suffer under sanctions".

Micunovic is of the opinion that "there certainly are better politicians than Milosevic in Serbia" but that "he is the only one who has enough strength to recognize Croatia and Bosnia-Hertzegovina without too many internal disturbances". Maybe Milosevic's aim is to force somebody who will be disturbed by such recognition into something.

Federal Foreign Affairs Minister, Vladislav Jovanovic, in an interview for the German daily "ZDC", in reply to a question about the influence of Belgrade over the Bosnian Serb leadership said that the very fact that Belgrade accepted that Contact Group plan, while Pale has not, speaks for itself. He added that the influence of Belgrade over Pale would be far greater if the sanctions were lifted since the main argument of the Bosnian Serbs is that sanctions will remain no matter what they do. He also repeated that the problems regarding the position of Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia are the main obstacle on the road to stabilization of conditions, and that these problems were largely created by the premature recognition of the new states. "Recognition will come about when these problems are resolved" Jovanovic said. It could be interpreted as evasion but also as an order to Karadzic.

After talking to Kozyrev, Jovanovic only repeated a very general statement about how peace talks ought to resume.

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