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August 7, 1995
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 201
Bosnian Thunder

Grahovo and Glamoc

by Milos Vasic

Two statements are still valid after the fall of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc; both illustrate the relationship between the three ethnic groups and warring sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first came from Gojko Susak, Croatia's Defence Minister, who said the establishment of the Federation with the Bosnians is like "swallowing a live frog"; the second came from Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), who said the current Bosnian Croat leaders had stabbed him in the back and that Mate Boban would never have done anything similar (January 1995).

Susak's statement meant giving up the Karadzic-Boban plan (Graz, April 27, 1992) on sharing Bosnia between the Serbs and Croats. Karadzic was speaking about the same thing, expressed in the engagement of the HVO and Croatian army in capturing Kupres and other operations. Zagreb starting cooperating with Sarajevo unwillingly under pressure from the Americans; Sarajevo managed to finally get a wedge in between the RS and Herzeg-Bosna which was its strategic goal ever since the Vance-Owen plan was rejected in 1993. Namely, Milosevic's decision to distance himself from Karadzic and efforts to make him accept political solutions like the Vance-Owen and Contact Group plans threatened to push Karadzic closer to the Susak-Boban western Herzegovina faction. However paradoxical this seems, Milosevic and the US combined to isolate Karadzic and make Susak swallow the proverbial frog.

Whether they liked it or not, The Croats had to help the Bosnians at Bihac, Grahovo and Glamoc. The reasons are pragmatic and very simple. First, time is running out: the quick fall of Western Slavonija caused panic among the Krajina Serbs and the drafting of reserves in Serbia; General Mile Mrksic, the new commander of the Krajina army, had demands and ideas on how to strengthen his army; the Croatians had to use the momentum and elation following Western Slavonija. Also, Bihac was endangered by a new combined RS and Krajina army offensive and Bihac simply couldn't be lost; not because of the almost 200,000 civilians in the pocket, not because of the Muslim 5th Corps (which could become the kind of problem to the Croats as it is to the Serbs), certainly not to strengthen the federation. Bihac is important to the Croats because of the railway that runs through it and because it is strategically necessary for future operations to take RSK territory. So the Croat offensive to the north relieved the pressure on Bihac.

Now, as President Milosevic would say, everyone can see clearly that Croatia intends to finally end the Krajina issue. To do that quickly and successfully, they had to conduct operations in Bosnia to separate the Krajina from the RS and Serbia. And the Krajina's nightmare began, the nightmare that has haunted it since the start of the Bosnia war in 1992. The Krajina went to war in 1991 with promises from former SFR Yugoslavia that existed at the time and its armed forces that the army would deploy in the hills above Strmica and make sure the Croats don't try to take any part of the Krajina; the last of those promises came from former Yugoslavia officials in 1992 ("The army will stay in Bosnia for at least another five years.")

Last week, the Croatian army was in those hills, shelling Strmica with no intention of stopping.

The Croatian army captured positions above Strmica in a short but fierce offensive from the direction of Livansko Polje and Kupres which included taking Grahovo and Glamoc seemingly with little resistance.

The confrontation lines now look like this: from the RSK-Bosnia border north of Strmica across heights north of Glamoc, east to the positions of the BiH Army 7th Corps, between Bugojno and Donji Vakuf.

Just like during the 5th Corps offensive last winter, an unexpectedly large number of refugees left their homes in endangered areas and headed for regional centers; some 20,000 headed for Drvar, Jajce and Knin; on Thursday reports said new columns were heading from Mrkonjic Grad for Banja Luka (3-4,000 people from the Grahovo-Glamoc area) which is a new and disturbing development since the people know how much faith they have in their army. The RS 2nd Krajina Corps fell apart for the second time in a year (not counting the loss of Kupres); when General Atif Dudakovic advanced on Bosanski Petrovac and Krupa last winter and now. In the meantime, the Croatian army advanced far enough to the north to shell Drvar.

Generals Mladic and Milovanovic (sometimes called the 2nd Corps' commander although he's Mladic's chief of staff) headed for the front lines. It seems the moment has come for them to prove their skills against an opponent of equal or superior strength for the first time in this war. The latest reports on Croat advances show movement to the northeast towards Sipovo, Mrkonjic Grad, Jajce and Donji Vakuf, which might be an effort to join up with the well supplied and rested BiH Army 7th Corps which is waiting northeast of Bugojno under the command of General Mehmed Alagic.

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