The View from the Fort

"Don't be afraid, although today Dinara resembles Kosovo", said Metropolitan Atanasije Jeftic, in Knin. He was the second speaker, after Patriarch Pavle, who addressed the assembly on the main square. According to Vecernje Novosti, mainly women and children gathered, "because men are at the front line". The Patriarch and other Serbian Orthodox church dignitaries were greeted on arrival by the highest state officials: President of the Krajina Republic - Milan Martic, Prime Minister - Dr. Milan Martic, President of the Krajina Parliament - Rajko Lezajic, and Mayor of Knin - Drago Kovacevic. The members of the above mentioned church delegation were the only representatives of the "pillars of Serbianhood" from Belgrade who met the newly elected holders of executive power in Krajina.

It was precisely the forming of the new Krajina government that was the essence of all the events that took place in Krajina and changes in relations between Belgrade and Krajina authorities after the events in Western Slavonija. Many things happened as a result of all the clashes between different political factions: first the bombastic announcement of the unification with the Bosnian Serbs, then the sacking of Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic, Belgrade's favorite Krajina official, which in turn led to the announcement that region of eastern Krajina is to secede from the rest of the Krajina Republic. Also the Army of the Krajina Republic (SVK), together with the forces loyal to Fikret Abdic and the Bosnian Serbs, engaged in the strangulation of the Bihac pocket. It appears that it was supposed to be an attempt at improving the military and strategic position as well as a revenge for the defeat suffered in Western Slavonija. The Croatian Army (HV) took Glamoc and Bosansko Grahovo and thus severed that most important communication route between Knin and Banja Luka and further on with Serbia, and also surrounded the whole of Kninska Krajina. Besides, according to UN estimates, over 100,000 very well armed Croatian troops are currently stationed at the cease-fire lines.

The leaders of Krajina Serbs, who since they inaugurated their state spent most of the time fighting each other for power and, cynics would say prospered on the suffering and misery of their people, suddenly found themselves in a position when they will finally have to decide what to do next and how to do it. They are running out of time. They have only two alternatives: to declare Knin literally the fort of Serbianhood, receive communion, and prepare for the decisive battle, or, since Zagreb is not showing willingness to negotiate, surrender and accept the reintegration into Croatia as proposed by the Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman.

If they choose the besieged fort option, the Krajina leaders will probably have the following view from it. They will not be able to rely on any help from outside: the Bosnian Serbs can hardly help themselves, and as far as FR Yugoslavia is concerned there are no indications what so ever that a military intervention could take place. Martic's spokesman, Petar Damjanic, had to deny the reports by the Krajina media which stated that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic promised military help in case of an all out attack on Krajina. Krajina leadership will also be unable to rely on their own military strength. The balance of power has been disturbed in Croatia's favor, especially in terms of the number of soldiers available: SVK can hardly gather more than 50,000 soldiers to face several times more numerous and better trained HV troops. No time needs to be wasted on discussing logistics: there has been no industrial activity in Krajina for the past four years, the reserves have been used up long time ago, and many, such as the American ambassador in Croatia Peter Galbraith, estimated the overall living standards of people in that region to be by far the most primitive in Europe. The threats made by some Krajina generals that they will destroy Croatian cities hardly have the same weight as in the past. Most cities, Zagreb being the exception, were already destroyed in 1991 so new shelling would present nothing new especially now that the HV is also capable of destroying little towns in Krajina (Knin especially, with particular lust) and neutralizing the Serbian artillery. Potential firing of "ground to ground" missiles on Zagreb and other Croatian cities would thus present nothing but a desperate move which would only further enrage the enemy, without having any military significance.

Finally, according to a Napoleonic maxim, the commander of a fort has no right to make the decision to surrender but must defend it to the last soldier in order not to jeopardize global interests. It is unlikely that the Knin leadership or their soldiers know what those higher interests are. It is more likely that they realize that they are left with the role of border guards who will fight as long as they can, and will lose every significance when they can not fight any longer. According to some analysts, the western part of Krajina, in terms of Milosevic's needs, presents no more than a stone in Croatia's kidney pending a necessary operation.

After months and years of refusing to negotiate with Zagreb, the Knin leadership, led by Milan Martic suddenly agreed to negotiate. The besieged fort option does not seem very appealing at the moment so they are willing to offer things they did not even want to hear of in the past. In the midst of the Croatian offensive in Livanjsko Polje, legalized by the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement signed in Split, Martic reached a six point agreement with the UN envoy Yasushi Akashi. It was agreed that if Zagreb agrees to a similar arrangement, Krajina will not engage in any more offensive actions in the Bihac pocket and that it will ensure free movement for humanitarian convoys heading for Bihac. It was also agreed that the highest military officials from both warring parties will meet immediately, that Krajina will take part in direct negotiations which are to be held Geneva, and that UN monitors will be allowed on Mt Dinara and on the dividing line between the Serbian forces and the Fifth Corps of the B-H Army. The last, and probably the most interesting point of the agreement was that Akashi promised to procure "free movement of goods between the eastern and western part of the Krajina Republic".

The agreement between Akashi and Martic was rejected more promptly than ever by Croatia. President Tudjman outlined four conditions which must be met prior to any further negotiations: no talks with Martic or those who represent him, opening of the oil pipeline within 24 hours, serious negotiations about the opening of communication routes through Krajina (first of all the Zagreb-Split railway track which passes through Knin) and the "urgent application of the Croatian Constitution on the occupied territories and the application of all constitutional directives regarding the rights of the Serbian ethnic community".

In other words, President Tudjman demands unconditional surrender of Krajina. Zagreb considers itself to be in an ideal position to reintegrate Krajina "willy- nilly". After the Bosnian Serb Army entered Srebrenica and Zepa, and the Serbian offensive in the Bihac pocket which led to the frustration of the relevant international factors, there is a feeling among Croatian authorities that they finally received a green light for military action, whatever the consequences.

Quite unexpectedly, on August 2, a meeting took place between Dr. Babic and ambassador Galbraith. The location and subject of this meeting is unknown. What is known is that, on the following day, while negotiations were still being held, Dr. Babic told "Fonet" news agency that he expects a successful continuation of negotiations in Geneva and expressed readiness to "enter negotiations about a political settlement with Zagreb. A modified version of the Z-4 plan which would treat the eastern and western part of Krajina equally would provide a good basis for political negotiations".

It could be concluded from the above that Dr. Babic practically responded to the appeal by the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) Vuk Draskovic to accept the Z-4 plan as a starting point for some future status of Krajina. That, as well as the readiness to open the communication lines and the oil pipe line, means the acceptance of proposals which Knin officials did not even want to hear of in the past. It appears after all that Dr. Babic, as one of the commanders of the besieged fort Knin, chose to negotiate rather than rely on the "pillars of Serbianhood".

However, two problems exist: first of all whether the prime minister of Krajina will succeed in bringing his ideas to life in Krajina, and secondly whether the Croatian authorities will accept them.

The international factor will undoubtedly exercise pressure on both Zagreb and Knin. It can be assumed with equal certainty that official Belgrade will support Dr. Babic's current initiative. Although it presents the eventual end of Krajina's statehood, it presents an alternative to all out war. In spite of the fact that Krajina could have accepted all these things long time ago and thus avoid numerous casualties, in still might not be too late. On the other hand, if things take a different turn two things are certain: war and prayers.

Addressee - Unknown

After the unified forces of the Croatian Army (HV) and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) captured Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc, a series of protests, letters and appeals ensued from Serbian officials from both sides of the Drina river. They addressed each other, the domestic and foreign public. It is evident from this correspondence that most of the senders worry about things outside their jurisdiction and that few addressed their correspondence to the right people.

It all began with the President of Krajina Milan Martic. He filed a protest with the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali about the Croatian seizure of Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc. It is true that the event left the region of Kninska Krajina totally surrounded, but the two towns are on the territory of the Srpska Republic (RS): it would have been logical if such a complaint was filed by its president Radovan Karadzic. The motive behind Martic's reaction could be sought in another attempt to prove to Pale that his determination in terms of all-Serbian unification is as strong as ever, and can not be undermined by anyone, not even Slobodan Milosevic. In other words, the protest was filed in order to make it impossible for Karadzic to change his mind and opt for a smaller but less risky gain (the Contact Group plan) rather than a larger and riskier one (unification with Krajina).

The Pale leadership also made no distinction between the two Serbian states on west of the Drina. After the defeat in Livanjsko Polje which from a military perspective is both greater and more serious than the one in Western Slavonija, they expressed a peculiar interest in the agreement Krajina reached under supervision of the international community. President of the Bosnian Serb parliament Momcilo Krajisnik, invited FR Yugoslavia to use all available means to protect Krajina, on the basis of the Vance plan. Like Martic, Krajisnik forgot that the leadership of which he is a member is not a signatory of the above mentioned plan, and is thus not affected by it and has no obligations towards it. Therefore if any one ought to have requested military intervention by the Army of FR Yugoslavia it should have been the leaders from Knin. Krajisnik's invitation can thus be interpreted as a shift of responsibility from Pale to Belgrade in case of a total defeat in Krajina. The only real help that Knin can expect from outside is from the Bosnian Serbs (help which has been promised many times), but the Bosnian Serbs are now in a position when they find it more and more difficult to help themselves. Karadzic nonetheless tried to halt the Croatian offensive in Livanjsko Polje and as the supreme commander ordered General Manojlo Milovanovic to begin a counter offensive and recapture Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc. General Milovanovic confirmed that this order has above all a "great political weight"; or more precisely a great psychological importance. However it appears that Karadzic chose the wrong addressee, or as soldiers would say "broke the holy chain of command". He should have ordered the Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Ratko Mladic, to order general Milovanovic the same thing that he ordered him. There are two speculations about why General Mladic was skipped. According to one of them, Dr. Karadzic did not want to undermine the authority of General Milovanovic, but on the contrary wanted to strengthen it with this personal address since all the events in Livanjsko Polje and the Bihac pocket were within Milovanovic's jurisdiction. According to the other speculation, he did not want to "burden" General Mladic with this matter while he was showing off in Srebrenica and Zepa.

However President Milosevic was the one to reveal that matters were a bit more serious than the "holy chain of command". Milosevic sent one of his last two open letters to the wrong addressee, and failed to send at least another two, equally public, letters. Milosevic addressed, in writing, Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Republic of B-H, and instead of doing the same with Radovan Karadzic, he addressed General Mladic. He asked of both to stop the "absurd civil war" and conclude a lasting peace. If we exclude the fact that Milosevic addressed General Mladic instead of Karadzic who is authorized to close political deals and agreements and who excluded his military commander from the negotiating process, it is clear that the Serbian President, in the case of Bosnian Serbs, has someone to write to. It appears that there are still no addressees in Zagreb and Knin over which the shadow of all out war is looming. Does this mean that Milosevic gave up on Karadzic as a politician and on the existence of Krajina in its present form, and left them to their fate?

A Letter From Zagreb

by Darko Mazuran

According to estimates which UN spokesman Chris Ganes brought out on Wednesday, August 2, the Croatian side mobilized and placed on full alert as many as one hundred thousand troops.

Mobilization began in the evening, a day after the victory at Grahovo and Glamoc. Many embassies began the evacuation of their staff as early as Tuesday, August 1. Estimating the possible development of events, foreign diplomats in Croatia agree in the evaluation that the most realistic expectation is the military option. Massive concentration of Croatian forces on separation lines, especially towards Lika and Kordun, long lines of cars full of troops, tanks and armored personnel carriers with special police units and Croatian professional army on the road from Zagreb to the south- indicate that Croatia could launch an attack on Knin at any time.

Young men were dragged from the beaches, from night clubs, military police even chased people in the streets. People are cancelling their holidays, or returning from the seaside. Zagreb is full of soldiers and military police. People are silent and walk briskly without responding to anybody's

calls.

Opinion polls show that people are reconciled to a potentially large new war and the escalation of conflict. The weekly magazine "Globus" recently published the results of one such poll. To the question: "Do you expect the Croatian Army to begin military action directed at liberating the occupied territories in the next couple of days?", 56% of the sample answered "yes", while as much as 71.3% on the sample approved of such action.