Change of Climate

Judging by what happened in August, it could easily happen that by November all Serbs will be gathered around a single plum-tree, as the ancient Serbian prophesy predicts, as a result of narrow-minded "plum tree politics". Krajina Serbs found that tree already, while those from Bosnia are heading in the same direction. Although they only stalled a little bit in the last couple of days, because it is the first time it makes great and unusual news so hopes about the approaching end of war have risen everywhere.

All great dramas, disasters and crimes that preceded this have been overshadowed by the short statement issued on Wednesday evening which was read out, as if 'by the way', to journalists waiting to hear about the talks between Slobodan Milosevic and Richard Holbrook. A few days earlier, in Sarajevo, the number of people that are usually killed in a month were killed in one go. This concentration of deaths pushed NATO air-force into action, so it started pounding Serb positions with a substantial quantity of bombs. The mysterious American plan, supported by the determination of Clinton's administration to hear the last of Bosnia before the beginning of the election campaign in October, had been around for some time. General Mladic already disobeyed Karadzic, who already seemed doomed; Krajina had already been vacated and many Bosnian Serbs started getting their own tractors ready. It was evident that all these events were connected, intertwined and hellishly accelerated and that something big had to come out if it.

It was unclear how drastic the inevitable u-turn will be, even when the Bosnian Serb parliament decided to greet the American proposal and negotiate together with Belgrade in the future. And then, just as NATO jets were taking off, the cream of Pale, six civilians and four generals, hastened to Milosevic eager to sign anything he says.

The wording of the statement is so uncomfortably unambiguous, that it leaves Karadzic and his group of sworn enemies of New World Order minimum dignity. They are obliged to "fully coordinate their approach...", that is to accept everything and do as they are told. Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Mladic thus entered a six-man delegation which is supposed to negotiate and sign the peace plan, and just in case they do not fancy the proposed plan, the best they can hope for is that President Milosevic's voice will decide. That is, therefore, the best, the worst, and the only possible outcome.

On top of everything, the Minister of Information, Ratomir Vico, who read this historic statement, added that mechanisms designed to protect the agreement against obstruction have also been included in the document. This means that this time we have taken necessary precautions, since we are well aware that we are dealing with notorious liars and cheats. What kind of mechanisms have they thought of? I doubt if they consisted of an oath to the Patriarch. It is more likely that the leaders from Pale agreed to be guarded by Belgrade police, or that they pawned all their real estate with Milosevic. Or maybe they left him their children as hostages. In any case the mechanisms consisted of something from the Sicilian repertoire and their reliability should not be doubted. The Patriarch was there to fill in the existing gaps in the national being and to bless the new old master of all Serbian lands.

What does the agreement mean and what will it bring to those who signed it?

First of all, Milosevic gets the Serb Republic in Bosnia on loan, with a receipt but without an obligation to return in the same condition. The Republic was quite a wreck when he took it over. Milosevic has already shown readiness to accept the international peace arrangement, at the price of giving up a crusade against the rest of mankind. If he can still get half of Bosnia, he should be besides himself with joy though the Republic will, no doubt, become a Bosnian "entity".

The Serbian side would cease to be the largest obstacle to peace and agreement, while the hunger for territories would have to be satisfied with hope that the "entity" will be only formally bound to Sarajevo, and unofficially to Belgrade. This would leave some hope for an eventually smaller Greater Serbia. However, all this can be achieved only if there are no more NATO air-strikes, if America is willing and able to prevent the Muslim counteroffensive and if the West gives up the idea of restoring a unified Bosnian state. But, after the Bosnian Serbs threatened and defied the whole world for such a long time, the world might easily underestimate their weakness and continue with the bombardment until everything falls apart and everyone disperses. Haven't we seen something similar recently? We should therefore hope that the world will be able to protect the Serbs from their own stupidity, arrogance and swaggering.

When he decided to surrender his sovereignty and his state to Milosevic, Karadzic knew that this gift will be passed on straight away. From now on, and probably not for very long, he can be only Milosevic's administrator in Pale. Until someone more reliable and less compromised is found. Karadzic's future lies somewhere between The Hague tribunal and retirement in Belgrade, though very soon the matter will be of no importance to the general public.

On the other hand, taking over Karadzic's state is a victory for Milosevic, though it too has its risks. He who has the reputation of being the main culprit, thus accepted the responsibility for the future of the Bosnian Serbs, and must defend their long-lost lawsuit before the whole world which would much rather they never existed. Also all that is gained will appear too little and will amount to treason in the eyes of Serbian nationalists. The lifting of sanctions, which ought to happen pretty soon, will only stand as evidence of the sell-off of national interests. However, Karadzic's capitulation in Patriarch's presence undoubtedly brings an important change in the balance of power in Milosevic's favor. It is now clear how desperately shortsighted were all calculations made by opposition parties which tied themselves to the regime in Pale.

In signing the defeat which is bound to become even greater with time, Karadzic signed also in the name of Seselj, Kostunica, Djindjic, though this is something none of the three will ever admit. In using Karadzic to weaken Milosevic they were guided by party interests rather than the national interest and thus got their priorities wrong and deserved to be defeated. Power in Serbia attracted them so much that they did not mind the war, the genocide, the risk of total breakdown and ruin of Serbs on the other side of the Drina river, or the sanctions and international isolation. They encouraged Karadzic and gave him hope which probably prolonged the life of a policy which now finally failed.

Any changes and improvements in the regime in Serbia can occur only after the war is over and in that respect it is not good that part of the opposition will enter that period seriously weakened. Milosevic could now obtain an incredibly large and unattainable credit. After defeating opponents he himself invented, solving a national problem he himself created and making peace with the world with whom he himself quarreled, he could begin with the restoration and reinforcement of an already tough system of party and ideological monopolies. He could present the fall of Karadzic's state a great victory of the Left over the Right, Partisans over Chetniks, state over private property, and socialism over capitalism.

If the opposition is truly democratic, then the end of the war and the lifting of sanctions should create better conditions for its activity. Even if it had not done so until now, the opposition should support Milosevic in his efforts to make a deal in Bosnia, and stop the race in militant patriotism which it obviously lost. A united voice of peace and reason coming from Serbia could also turn out to be beneficial for Serbs in Bosnia, since a "final solution" to the Serbian question, similar to the one used in Croatia, and the one Serbs themselves used against the Muslims, is now dangerously close. No one should expect Karadzic, his army, or even his people to be forgiven and that everything will be forgotten as soon as Karadzic says that he favors peace. No one should be surprised if they are offered what they call the national minimum. And it would also be beneficial if no one, either in Bosnia or Serbia, interprets the peace negotiations as a capitulation before the enemies of Serbhood, and the signing of a peace deal as charity which Serbs are giving to the Muslims and the world which did not deserve it. Such a stance, even if it comes from the opposition, will mean more Serbian families in exile because over there they will soon depend a lot on charity from the World.