Battle for Sarajevo

In India they catch monkeys in the following way: first a walnut is placed in a box tied to a tree; the opening on the box is big enough for the monkey to insert his hand, but not his fist, which means that when he gets ahold of the nut his hand is trapped in the box. While the monkey is trying to release his hand without dropping the nut, the Hindu hunter approaches and catches him. The walnut which Dr. Radovan Karadzic got ahold of and will not let go is called Sarajevo. Vladimir Stambuk, a high official in the United Left of Yugoslavia (JUL) made this quite clear on Wednesday morning in a statement given to Radio Politika. Mr. Stambuk said that the Bosnian Serbs are likely to ruin their whole state for the sake of the 20 kilometers around Sarajevo. Judging by what happened last week he was right: rather than following the example of the Balkan fox which bites off its own paw to release itself from a trap, Radovan Karadzic followed the example of the Indian monkey. He could have also identified with his boss in the unified negotiating team: Milosevic let Krajina go and thus reduced the length of the front line. However, since the beginning of the conflict, Radovan Karadzic had a pathological fixation about Sarajevo and made an infinite number of statements about how Sarajevo always has been, is and forever will be Serbian. On the other hand, Sarajevo should have been captured in the spring of 1992, when something like that was possible; claims made by officials from Pale how "we could walk into Sarajevo if we wanted to, but we don't" have been rejected as frivolous even by General Dragomir Milosevic, commander of the Bosnian Serb Army's Sarajevo and Romania corps. If Sarajevo could have been taken in 1992, the Bosnian Serbs would have taken it. Instead they have been holding it under siege, in the hope of dividing it eventually ("if it was possible with Berlin, it will be possible with Sarajevo", Dr. Karadzic said) - preferably down the Miljacka river, and if not, in any other way that would enable them to retain Vrace, Grbavica, Ilidza and other territories they currently hold. Sarajevo thus became a collective hostage, a trump card in the endless bargaining by Pale officials, pathologically obsessed with the "exchange of territories". Karadzic's bluffs and gambling approach (I'll give you Knin, you give me an exit to the sea; we'll give you southern Manhattan, you give us Bihac and a pack of cigars each) wore out during the past three years. The Republic of Srpska and its army are now much weaker, the Bosnian Muslim Army strengthened to a dangerous extent, Serbia has been ruined by sanctions; Milosevic realized that Karadzic and Mladic are losing and confronted them with reality, the fall of Krajina signified the bankruptcy of the idea of Greater Serbia, and indicated that Pale should save what can be saved. It appears that General Mladic as a trainer officer understood Milosevic's message and tried to put some sense into Karadzic and his team from Pale; he failed, Karadzic's stubbornness and gambler's mentality won, he played and lost - which led to the London conference (July 21, 1995), when things started getting serious. Sarajevo, the symbol of the Bosnian conflict, also became its key: the jets took off.

General Mladic has to meet three requirements before NATO bombardment is stopped: he must withdraw heavy weapons beyond the 20 kilometer exclusion zone; he must halt all attacks on UN safe areas and ensure safe passage for all UN personnel and humanitarian organizations throughout Serb held territories in Bosnia, which includes the Sarajevo airport. In the meantime, French troops opened the "blue route" for delivering supplies to Sarajevo via Butmir, without seeking permission from the Bosnian Serbs, and convoys traveling down that route have not been attacked at all which is very unusual and interesting. Attempts at shelling Sarajevo were met by a fierce response by the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF): on Tuesday evening, when a Bosnian Serb battery stationed north of the town fired ten grenades at the "Zetra" sports center, French howitzers responded with four grenades and silenced the Serbs (up to now the RRF artillery fired over 1,300 grenades at Bosnian Serb positions). The chances of Bosnian Serbs winning in such duels are pretty slim. Besides, every shell that lands on Sarajevo impairs the negotiating position of Pale authorities.

There has also been a change in the reactions by the Bosnian Serbs: instead of claims that NATO jets missed most of their targets, which were frequent in the past, there is now a serious concern. "Considerable damage", civilian casualties, and - in short - a gradual destruction of military and communicational infrastructure are being spoken of. Radio, TV and low frequency relays have all been destroyed including the one on Majevica which NATO jets missed the first time. The increasingly frequent and nervous statements and letters by Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic indicate that things are getting serious and that the Bosnian Serb leadership is aware of the situation: in an interview to CNN, Dr. Karadzic claims that, afraid of an attack by the Bosnian Muslims, they wanted to withdraw their weapons during the night, but were attacked by NATO instead; the Bosnian Serb leader added that they withdrew "as far away as they could" considering that civilians prevented the withdrawal (a claim which news agencies confirmed on Thursday), called the bombings "terrible, unheard of, savage" and said that their purpose is to take Sarajevo away from the Serbs though - "we will not leave Sarajevo". General Mladic wrote letters in which he tried to switch the attention to less important issues such as who fired the latest shell on the market place (without mentioning the previous four) - as if it matters (the question about who is shelling Sarajevo has become one of creed, and has nothing to do with logic, logistics or criminology). Mladic also complained that NATO uses "radioactive and toxic ammunition" (presumably he had in mind the anti-tank missiles containing impoverished uranium of negligible radioactivity used because of its high specific weight). In Gen. Jeanvier's headquarters in Zagreb they said that General Mladic was "furious" during the all night meeting with Jeanvier organized by Milosevic and the Greek Defence Minister Arsenis which took place in Mali Zvornik earlier this month: Mladic "insulted Jeanvier and his family", left the room several times, slammed the door, screamed, complained about the tragic fate of the Serbs, and finally, refused to withdraw the weaponry outside the exclusion zone, because "it would amount to a surrender"; the presence of a "high official from Belgrade who steadily and argumentatively explained to Mladic what the continuation of NATO attacks could lead to" was to no avail. General Mladic failed even to mention the essence of the whole matter: why, in spite of all the promises given by Pale, he will not withdraw heavy weapons outside the exclusion zone.

General Mladic did not mention the essence of the matter for the simple reason that if he withdraws all heavy weapons (artillery of caliber above 12.7 mm, missile launchers and tanks) beyond the 20 kilometer boundary, he will lose one of his two main advantages in that region (the other being geographical, that is the fact that he is on the hills). Gen. Mladic is in a "you're damned if you do, you're damned if you don't" situation. Once he gets his weapons outside the exclusion zone, he will never be able to bring them back, because the Bosnian Muslim Army will not let him, and NATO will not help him. On the other hand, if he leaves the weapons where they are, NATO will continue with air-strikes until the point described in the old joke is reached: a jet chased a soldier on the ground, and when the pilot got bored with the whole thing he landed, caught up with the soldier on foot and beat him with a crank. That is how the whole thing will end since the countdown for presidential elections has begun, and Bosnia is Clinton's only foreign policy opportunity.