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September 18, 1995
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 207
Refugee Drama at U.N. Base

All for One

by Filip Svarm

U.N. spokesman in former Sector South, Alan Roberts, said in a statement to Croatian weekly magazine Feral Tribune that the names of alleged suspects can not be taken as evidence without any supporting documentation. Only indictment bills issued by a court or any other court documents could be considered evidence, he added.

All efforts by reporters of the Split weekly to find out from the HV commander in Knin, Gen. Ivan Cermak, and his assistant, Marko Gojevic, if charges against the 62 Serbs really exist remained fruitless.

Meanwhile 749 Serb refugees - still stranded at the military barracks turned into the U.N. base - became detainees.

NEGOTIATIONS: The U.N. originally insisted that the interrogation of suspects by the Croatian authorities will be allowed only in the presence of UNCRO. Official Zagreb accepted the terms in principle, but later rejected them without any explanation. Feral Tribune says refugees at the U.N. base in Knin dismissed any possibility of war criminals being among them. They cited an agreement, signed between U.N. special envoy Yasushi Akashi and head of the Croatian president's office Hrvoje Sarinic, which says among other things: "Croatia will allow and guarantee a safe evacuation from these areas for all those who wish to do so, except for those who have breached the international criminal law."

Representatives of a committee, set up by refugees at the U.N. base in Knin, said they were unfamiliar with the names of the alleged war criminals from the Croatian list. (The committee is made up of Velibor Marjanovic, Marica Arula-Mrdjan, Vojislav Simic, Mirjana Novakovic, Milan Pjevalica and Dragomir Nonkovic). Marica Arula-Mrdjan said: "If there are any war criminals in this camp, they should have been handed over to international courts, according to the Akashi-Sarinic Accord."

"It is hard to believe that any of them would be here," said Velibor Marjanovic. "Isn't it logical to assume that all those responsible for atrocities had left the area with the army, they wouldn't have stayed in Knin and turned to the U.N. for help."

Members of the committee said they trusted the U.N. and the Croatian government, which signed the agreement, and also relied on the international law which protects them from an extradition to the Croatian authorities. But are their hopes realistic? Roberts said the Croatian authorities are trying to put off the issue until after the U.N. mandate in Croatia expires. He added that this was the main element that had complicated the situation in the field.

Miso Rogosic, an activitist of the Helsinki Committee (HHO) in Zagreb, expects more trouble "once UNPROFOR withdraws from Knin in two weeks or so." But after the HHO's visit to refugees at the base, Rogosic said: "After we talked to them (U.N. observers), we've got an impression that the U.N. has no intention of leaving these refugees in Knin against their will. U.N. peacekeepers will probably take the Serbs with them, but I dread to think of how will our government react."

When the problem of Serbs detained at the barracks in Knin seemed to have reached a deadlock, Akashi and Sarinic met again. At the end of their meeting on September 9, they said the problem was "solved in principle and everything will be alright in a few days."

The meaning of the statement was clarified three days later by U.N. spokesman Chris Gunness, who said that talks were continuing and that the U.N. was trying to define the "methods of control and supervision" of legal processes against the suspected Serbs. He gave no further details, but his statement implied that the peacekeepers will eventually hand over 62 suspects to the Croatian police so that the others could go to the FR Yugoslavia. They would be joined by 25 more Serbs from Banija, whom Zagreb was ready to release.

REASONS: One of the questions is why does Croatia insist on the extradition? During operation Storm, the HV made corridors for the withdrawal of Krajina Serb troops and a considerable quantity of their weapons. Even allowed to go was Serb leader Milan Martic and his associates, whom the Croatian courts had charged (in Robert's sense of the word) or sentenced in absentia.

Furthermore, over 1,000 Serbs arrested during the Croatian blitz operation in Western Slavonija and operation Storm in Krajina now make a very good "material" for any spectacular trial that Zagreb might want to stage. There are two facts which are casting doubt on Croatia's sincere intention to objectively investigate the war crimes. The first is that the public is not given access to information as to what are the concrete charges against suspects detained in Knin, and the second is that no investigation was ever opened by Zagreb in any of the cases of slaughter, arson or looting in Krajina, committed by the Croatian side.

By all appearances, Zagreb's motives are political in character. Many refugees from Krajina have stated their readiness to either go back or at least protect the property they left behind in Croatia. And this could be done only with the international community's guarantees of legal and personal security - something that would be difficult to trust if 62 Serbs are eventually surrendered to the Croatian police only on the basis of an arbitrary list made in Zagreb. If this happens, the U.N. would violate its agreement with Zagreb of August 6 and lose credibility for any guarantee on its part in the future.

On the other hand, by handing over the suspects, the U.N. troops would secure their safe pull-out from what used to be Sector South. This would eliminate the possibility of incidents with Croatian forces and protect the lives of peacekeepers who, as unofficial sources have told Feral, were threatened with death too often.

But while trying to avoid one trouble, U.N. peacekeepers could easily run into another. If they decide to turn over the suspected war criminals, they would first have to separate them from their families, relatives and friends...The question is whether this can be done peacefully. Will the "blue helmet" troops, who until recently were engaged in the protection of these same people, now have to use their clubs, tear gas and handcuffs? Or will they simply let the Croatian police do the job?

Any of the scenarios will undoubtedly kill the illusion that the international community is capable of fulfilling its obligations and protecting anyone. In this case and at the satisfaction of Zagreb, the Serbs in Croatia will be the ones to pay the highest price of the illusion, by learning from the example of those who wanted to stay on their land and ran into a U.N. base for protection.

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