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October 9, 1995
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 210
Reactions on Stambolic's Book: Franc Setinc

Between a Genius and a Madman

by by prepared by Svetlana Vasovic-Mekina

"Even in those days, I used to claim that Milosevic was a man who swayed between a genius and a madman. Because of the way he was acting. For example, sometimes his discussions were brilliant. Pleasant, intellectually strong. At other times he would stare at you as if he did not know you and as if he would most like to kill you, without saying a single word. The best example was when Gorbachov sent his regrets for the second time and, due to pressing business in the Soviet Union, again postponed his visit to Yugoslavia... When that was mentioned at a session, Milosevic flew into a rage: he demanded we send a dispatch in which we were to inform Gorbachov that in that case we did not need him, that he should never come! The rest of us looked scornfully at Sloba and tried to reason with him that he could not talk to Gorbachov in such a manner, a man who the rest of the world looked up to... We explained to him that such matters should be resolved diplomatically, but he did not seem to comprehend. He was simply furious."

During the Eighth Session, (of the League of Communists of Serbia, when Milosevic assumed power from Stambolic), Franc Setinc was the Slovenian representative at the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CK SKJ). At first, his responsibilities were Serbia which later extended to Kosovo at times of the most tumultuous "peoples awakening", of the Memorandum, embargo against Slovenian products and anti-bureaucratic campaigns in that part of the former Yugoslavia.

ABOUT STAMBOLIC: Ivan Stambolic was different to Sloba in respect that he was much more democratic and humane, therefore less pre-calculated as a politician. When he, shortly after he was replaced, published a book containing his articles, I wrote the preface. At the time I was still a member of the Presidency of the CK SKJ. Milosevic most certainly held that against me although he never mentioned neither the book nor the preface to me.

THE EIGHTH SESSION: At the time when the Eighth Session was held I was in Stockholm, where I was representing Yugoslavia's colors at a Social-Democratic Convention. When I returned, Vidoje Zarkovic at a session of the Presidency inquired: "Why did the member of the Presidency responsible for Serbia not attend the Eighth Session?" It was evident that he was only venting his anger out on me so I hurried to check him" "They hid preparations for the session from me because they did not want me to attend... If I had known that that session was to be held, I would have stayed home and most certainly would have asked to speak. Unfortunately, I found out what was going on in Belgrade in Stockholm. I waited in vain for a telegram instructing me to quit the Convention, to summon me back to Belgrade..."

I had the good will to meet with Slobodan and to openly give him my opinion on all that was happening in Serbia. We had already arranged a day and hour, but at the last minute Sloba called me on the phone: "Comrade Franc, I'm so sorry, something came up therefore our meeting is off. We'll have that meeting some other time." That "other time" never came about, even though later he was very pleased to pose in front of the TV cameras with some Slovenians.

DRAZA'S WARNING: At Sajmiste's exit, coming out of the Book Fair, I met Draza Markovic who is, by the way, Milosevic's wife's relative. Disgusted, he asked me: "What are you all doing, what are you afraid of? Why, he (Milosevic) will destroy Yugoslavia!"

And really, the Presidency of the CK SKJ was divided: half of its members supported Milosevic, the other half did not. I was feeling gloomy, especially when I would think of the "roulette" which the generals were playing with their guns pointed at Yugoslavia's temple. At the beginning the generals thought: 'Let him scare them a bit, that will only make the people count on us even more as their only hope!' One day, General Buncic stopped me in the corridor of the Parliament building: "I'll tell you something, just like I would tell Kucan. I'll tell it you straight, off the record - we in the Yugoslav Federal Army (JNA) are not for Milosevic!" It is interesting to note that at that time, at the very beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the JNA authorities did not back Milosevic, primarily owing to the fact that the generals still preferred Yugoslavia, normally a Yugoslavia by their standards, which means - with as little change as possible. JNA put it into their heads that they personally were the Marshall's (Tito's) replacement and were responsible for the realization of his 'testament'. Therefore, at the time of the military maneuvers at Bloki, following an initiative of the military ruling circles, a secret meeting was held between Kadijevic, Mamula, Kucan and Popit. On that occasion, both generals stated that they did not approve of Milosevic's politics. I think that, by that move, the JNA was trying to fawn over the Slovenians a bit; in other words, it was an obvious attempt to dissuade the Slovenians from 'separatism'.

I asked Sloba once why he was playing a major role in Greater Serbian politics when he was not even Serbian and was actually a Montenegrin by birth. 'Well, that's not true, it is a Serbian village in Montenegro', he claimed. 'But how come your brother is Montenegrin', I asked in astonishment (namely, his brother was an ambassador on the Montenegrin list). He waved his hand: 'Now that's a different story.'

The last time I spoke to Sloba was on the 17th session of the

CK SKJ, at which time I handed in my resignation as a member of the Presidency of the CK SKJ. We met in the corridor. I recounted the joke printed in Pavliha (Slovenian satirical magazine) based on the fact that both of us had had a car accident - Milosevic first, followed by me, the difference being that I did not continue the race, but had quit. 'You're smarter than I am, yet I'm more determined...' he noted sarcastically.

'You're smart enough', I answered. 'True, you are determined, as well. You also have some other good characteristics, but I won't tell you which.' He insisted upon hearing, so I gave in: 'You're more cunning than I am...'

'Now, that's an insult', he snapped.

'No it isn't, cunningness is a politician's best virtue', I answered.

This mentioned trait often surfaced during sessions when he even exhibited a certain sympathy towards Slovenia. For instance, a few times Kucan spoke explaining his stand after which, unlike anything anyone would have expected, Milosevic got up and stated: 'I agree with Kucan! I have nothing more to add!' Even though they were on completely opposite standpoints, he wanted to leave the impression that he personally had nothing against Slovenia, and that all that was going on outside - 'was the people'. I remember, during a congress held at Sava Center, he purposefully grabbed Kucan's and my arm and walked about with us for a while so that everybody could see how we had no quarrels. He then invited us to the Belgrade Intercontinental Hotel for a royal feast, during which he off-handedly remarked how he had never as a high official anywhere in Yugoslavia allowed to be treated to a free luncheon. That he had always paid for everything. Yet Kucan and I were witnesses to the fact that he did not pay for this lunch. At the same time, he boasted of the brilliancy of all his deeds, including the hotel in which we were seated. He summoned the general manager and inquired: 'What is your profit?' As I recall, the answer was a 'million German Marks'.

'There, see. That is my doing. As general manager of the bank, I pushed and finalized that deal', boasted Sloba on and on. Persistently trying to leave the impression that we were all on good terms. While we were not. The differences were too great. Besides, we did not believe that he was not the driving force of those meetings and all the rest. Finally, we had information that he was behind all of it, directly. As inspirator and organizer, through his emissaries.

Unfortunately, even Stambolic never saw through Milosevic until the Eighth Session, into the other side of him, into that fury in him. Even we did not uncover that fury straight off.'

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