Crucial Defence of Power

"Difficult discussions are ahead of us. Much has happened lately," said President of the Parliament of the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), Momcilo Krajisnik, ahead of the Parliament's 54th session in Banja Luka last weekend. Two days later, he went out of the session hall apparently relieved. "It has been a historical session," he said, adding that "peace and calm have entered the deputies, the people and the general atmosphere in the Bosnian Serb Republic." These words might seem somewhat inappropriate at a time when Croatian and Bosnia-Herzegovina forces were outside Banja Luka which was full of refugees from nearby towns. Nevertheless, one must understand Krajisnik: he thought that he had won the crucial battle in the deep political conflict which has existed between Pale and the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) General Staff for quite some time. According to the Parliament's decision, Generals Milan Gvero, Zdravko Tolimir, Djordje Djukic and Grujo Boric, as well as Lt.Col. Milovan Milutinovic were dismissed and sent to early retirement. The five officers have been passive and failed to carry out their duties and are responsible for the losses VRS has been sustaining in the past month, the parliament said in an explanation. The losses are not exactly insignificant: Kljuc, Sanski Most and Mrkonjic-Grad have been lost, Prijedor is seriously threatened and the fall of Beocac hydro-electric power plant has caused Banja Luka to remain without much water and electricity.

Certainly someone must be held responsible, but even at first sight, it is clear that something is wrong with the explanation. Milan Gvero was Mladic's assistant for moral, political and religious issues; Zdravko Tolimir, as assistant for security, coordinated the work of the military intelligence and counter-intelligence services; Djordje Djukic was in charge of logistics; Grujo Boric - of the center of military academies, while Milutinovic was chief of the General Staff Information Service. Not one of them was directly in charge of the defence of the Banja Luka region. The five dismissed officers, however, had something in common: all of them were Ratko Mladic's close associates. Gen. Tolimir, for example, was the head security officer in Knin while Mladic was the commander of the Knin Corps. His dismissal would leave Mladic without the eyes and ears, Gvero's and Milutinovic's dismissal would leave him without the mouth and Djukic's without logistics. It is still not quite clear why Boric was dismissed: perhaps someone was afraid that cadets of military academies (who have high reputation within VRS) would take to the streets. Considering the general atmosphere in Banja Luka during the Parliamentary session, (Karadzic's snipers are said to have been on the roofs), the presumption is not illogical. Fear has magnifying eyes...

The Parliament, on the other hand, did not question the responsibility of the officers who were directly in charge of the defence of the Banja Luka region, such as Commander of the First Krajina Corps Gen. Momir Talic or of his superior Gen. Manojlo Milovanovic, the Chief of the General Staff. Karadzic sees Milovanovic as Mladic's successor, while Momir Talic has business relations with Krajisnik which make him untouchable.

This proves to be only a continuation of the campaign which was at its peak in August this year when, in the middle of operation "Storm", Karadzic tried to replace Mladic and offer him an undefined advisory position. The attempt failed because almost all of the General Staff (backed by the Belgrade regime propaganda) supported their commander. A two-week propaganda war between the civilian and military authorities followed. It ended when Karadzic withdrew his decision on Mladic's dismissal and the Army stopped accusing the civilian authorities of corruption and undermining combat readiness. Both sides said they had overcome the disagreement and that everything was in order. Actual reconciliation never occurred: the conflicting sides made only a temporary truce. The last Parliamentary session seriously violated the truce and the Army decided to reply: on the night of October 17-18, VRS General Staff issued a statement which said that the Parliament's decisions were rejected as unconstitutional and illegal. "This is a struggle for power by certain ruling party leaders who wrongly believe that officers and generals are an obstacle for the stabilization of authority and the reason which diminishes their chances in elections," the statement said. Without directly mentioning Karadzic and Krajisnik, the generals decided to attack the stronghold of their power: the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) which they also accused of ideological exclusivism, seizure of privileges and belittling of the Army. This is the most interesting part of the statement: "The political leadership and the Parliament have not to the present day determined the borders which the Army is to protect or achieve. On the contrary, they most frequently discussed territorial percentages and concessions. At the Parliamentary session in Sanski Most on April 15, 1995, the General Staff pointed out the Army's essential defence and logistic problems and anticipated the forthcoming developments. We regret to conclude that the Parliament and state bodies failed to devote attention to any of these so the problems got greater and the developments had an unfavorable course."

This quotation conceals a threat that VRS might make public the demands it submitted to the Parliament at the closed-door session in Sanski Most: April 15 is when the conflict between the military and civilian authorities actually began. That was when Mladic complained about the difficult situation in the VRS and submitted, as he said, "25 minimum demands to save the nation and pull together the state." He demanded, among other things, that a state of war be immediately proclaimed; that Bosnian Serb Republic borders be defined; that VRS should have priority in getting fuel and food; that all foreign currency accounts in and out of the Bosnian Serb Republic should be frozen and the money used for new weapons and soldiers' salaries; that the Government let the Army control the housing, social and health-care funds; that negotiations with the Contact Group should cease and all talks with UNPROFOR be carried out by the Army, etc. The MPs saw the demands as an attempted coup and refused to discuss them, after which Mladic left the session enraged. On his way out he gave a short speech: "Gentlemen, I have not entered the Parliament for a year, I let you bring, propose and adopt laws as you liked and you abused this. As the commander of a battalion, I used to be able to promote a soldier and in these conditions, as the General Staff commander, I have no promotion rights. Things cannot go on like this. A line must eventually be drawn. From this moment on, I shall be promoting from privates to colonels and I shall accept nothing else." Four months later, Karadzic tried to replace him.

After all this, one could hardly expect the dispute to temporarily settle down: on the contrary, it seems to be flaring up. Karadzic on Wednesday assessed the General Staff's statement as an "insignificant paper produced to disturb the public" and threatened the generals with "consequences".

Belgrade, like in August, openly took Mladic's side: Milosevic on Tuesday refused to receive a delegation of the Bosnian Serb Parliament and his media resumed attacks on Karadzic's "hazardous" policies. Eleven minor political parties and associations from Banja Luka (including the Socialist Party of Serbia for the Bosnian Serb Republic) formed the "Patriotic League" which in its first statement attacked Karadzic. Although the parties gathered in the League have no deputies in the Parliament, this group ought not to be underestimated. For the first time now, Mladic is backed not only by the army but by a political base within the Bosnian Serb Republic, which was not the case in August. The General Staff's statement mentioned the "forthcoming elections" which the current leadership, resisting the pressures from Belgrade, keeps cancelling until more peaceful times. Karadzic can count on the support of the RS Parliament which, as long as Krajisnik heads it, will be outvoting the scarce opposition. He can also count on a special brigade of the RS Interior Ministry which comprises four to five thousand well trained and experienced fighters, motivated by high salaries provided by the "business" lobby. The lobby, which includes a number of RS MPs and RS officials, has a network of connections in Serbia and this is something Milosevic and Mladic must be aware of.

The reason why Milosevic, more energetically than in the past, has supported Mladic in this conflict is clear: implementation of Parliamentary decisions would strengthen Karadzic's position and this would give Karadzic a chance to complicate the forthcoming peace conference in the U.S. On the other hand, Milosevic is not exactly fond of Mladic, especially after his stubborn refusal to withdraw artillery around Sarajevo. Still, as long as Mladic and Karadzic are clashing, Milosevic remains the undisputed leading figure in the negotiating team and when the talks are over, he will try to get rid of them both.

In the whole dispute, some interested observers are somewhat neglected: the Croats and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, whom the Americans had a hard time dissuading from launching a general offensive on Banja Luka. To do so, in addition to Holbrooke's diplomatic skill, Shalikashvili himself intervened. Hurrying to ensure power ahead of inevitable changes to be brought by the peace conference, RS civilian and military leaderships obviously believe that the Americans will defend their country and that the UNHCR will defend the people. Time will show whether this calculation is correct.