Pre-Election Storm

Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and western Srem have been relatively peripheral problems in the past few years compared to the Knin Krajina and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They have now become major issues and it will be impossible to end the war in the former Yugoslavia unless their status is resolved. This is the situation:

STARTING POSITIONS

Hrvoje Sarinic, chief of the Croatian negotiating team, has specified Zagreb's positions: agreement on reintegration by the end of November, "with no special status, with no autonomy;" no referendum to be held after the expiry of international protectorate which is to last not longer than 18 months; local elections. President of the Council of the Srem-Baranja region Slavko Dokmanovic has formulated the stands of Eastern Slavonija Serbs: "At this time it is impossible to attach the region to F.R. Yugoslavia, but it will by no means be integrated into Croatia's constitutional system;" a five-year interim period under U.N. protection and then a referendum about the status. The international community treats the region as part of Croatia, and Belgrade seems to be doing the same. The essence of the problem is whether Zagreb will get an "autonomous province" within its borders or not.

NEGOTIATIONS

After a promising start in Erdut on October 3, the negotiations between the delegations of the Republic of Croatia and Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and western Srem were suspended at the next round held at the U.S. Embassy in Zagreb on October 9. Namely, after separate talks with international mediators, co-chairman of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia - Thorwald Stoltenberg and U.S. Ambassador - Peter Galbright, the negotiators failed to meet. Zagreb's condition for the resumption of talks was that they be held on the "territory of the internationally recognized and sovereign Croatia," specifically in the Palace Hotel and not on "no one's land" - the U.S. Embassy . The Serb delegation rejected the proposal, so they all went home. Besides, passers-by outside the U.S. Embassy recognized and booed Goran Hadzic, a member of the Serb delegation.

Sarinic later said the talks would resume in Ilok on October 16 and then in Osijek on October 18. He underscored that negotiations could no longer be held at U.N. bases or embassies.

The Serb side rejected the proposal. Sarinic's statement was assessed as "Croatia's attempt to dictate conditions and speed." The Serb side said it had been agreed that the two sides should jointly decide on the terms and places of meetings and invited Stoltenberg and Galbright to a meeting to decide on the resumption of talks. Both mediators appeared in Erdut: Serb authorities suggested that talks be held in Ilok on October 20 and in Osijek on October 23, or in Osijek on October 23 and in Ilok on October 25. Stoltenberg and Galbright then met with Sarinic who, without explanation, announced the talks were cancelled and that the two mediators would hold consultations with Belgrade to see how, or whether the talks would resume at all.

BACKGROUND

Conditioning of the place where talks will be held is assessed as Zagreb's attempt to minimize the role of the international community, which the Eastern Slavonija authorities insist on. It is also assessed that Croatia cares only about their capitulation: Sarinic is surprised that the "Serbs did not learn a lesson" from what had been happening ahead of operations "Flash" and "Storm". In other words, if Croatian conditions are not accepted, an armed action will follow. It is what happened during those actions -torching, plunder, murdered civilians, prevention of return of refugees - that brings into question the desired cooperativeness of the Serbs. Statements by Croatian officials bear no conciliatory tones for the Serbs - quite the contrary.

Eastern Slavonija Serb leaders are yet an additional difficulty: it is impossible to dispute their responsibility for what happened in the region, and the profit and power they draw from it all. Besides, they believe Belgrade has not abandoned them, and the instructions they receive are unknown.

WAR GAMES

In the context of Sarinic's surprise, news appeared about the massing of HV troops on the demarcation line in Eastern Slavonija. The elite brigade "Tigers" and an armored unit with over 30 tanks are said to be stationed there. The firm negotiating stand and Zagreb's conditions are seen as an excuse in front of the international community for a military action: Croatia is for talks, but since the other side rejects them, there is no other option but force, seems to be the impression the Croats want to make. After a possible arrival of NATO forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would come from four directions in Croatia and would permanently be using the roads, railways etc., it would be impossible to reintegrate the region in the way the Croatian leadership wants to do, i.e. with no concessions to the Serbs. Should the Croatian Army opt for an offensive, it could launch one after the October 27 elections but before the arrival of NATO troops (expected in November).

Thus, the race for time has begun. Croatia is trying to get hold of Eastern Slavonija before peace is achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb side keeps prolonging the resolution of the issue. The Yugoslav Army (VJ) seems to have joined in the race, as a possible reply to the Croatian Army's possible accomplished fact according to the "Storm" recipe: The Novi Sad Corps is currently holding maneuvres in Srem and Backa (bordering with Eastern Slavonija). Infantry and armored units are taking part, as well as aviation and the river flotilla... Special attention, it has been said, is devoted to "joint action of units, aspects and branches in a real time and specific area."

PRESSURES

The impatience of Zagreb, which has very successfully made some radical moves in the past few months, has been taken seriously. It is feared that a possible Croatian military action would undermine the American peace initiative, because it is assessed that the official Belgrade could not sit and watch another military defeat of the Serbs. The U.N. Security Council has demanded urgent information on HV moves and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has made a statement.

The question now is how Zagreb will react to these pressures and how strong it believes they are. More precisely: how these pressures may affect the position and power of Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

Pessimists believe that the Croatian leadership would buffer the sanctions which may come in reply to a military action in Eastern Slavonija by national homogenization on the basis of a "final solution" to the Serbian issue. The leadership might even gain additional power because it is aware of the fact that everything will end up with diplomatic fuss which must end sooner or later.

Optimists see Tudjman's proposal to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, John Shalikashvili, to replace U.N. peace-keeping forces in the region by NATO troops and to "disarm Serb paramilitary units" as tangible evidence of retreat. In the context of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, they see belligerent statements and clinking of weapons as the heating-up of "Storm" euphoria. If the Eastern Slavonija Serb authorities (who have been informed that the current situation is unsustainable) in this context accept some Croatian conditions, one could easily imagine that Sarinic, as a high ranking state official, might during the electoral silence make public the agreement on complete peaceful reintegration.