The Chance for Serbs

Nobody changed their mind unexpectedly; nobody was late for their planes; nobody became ill; all concerned safely landed in Dayton and the official opening ceremony was conducted as planned. Which means that we can surmise that the peace negotiations on Bosnia have been successfully completed.

If a single serious possibility of any conflicts or complications still existed, if the deal had not practically been concluded, the Americans wouldn't have wasted their money on organizing a conference. Warren Christopher wouldn't have had his picture taken with those who could disappoint him. Neither would Mira Markovic have let her husband face so many foreign influences on his own, if she didn't know it was for the last time. If there was anything that could have fallen through, Radovan Karadzic would have been there, and the final word would have been given to the Parliament in Pale. Finally, the truce in Bosnia wouldn't have lasted for three weeks if the agreement hadn't actually already been made. It is highly improbable that there will be significant differences between the things that are written on Richard Holbrooke's paper, which talk of ten items, and the text of the future final document. All the major issues have already been renegotiated, which can be seen by the fact that Milosevic and Tudjman have signed an agreement on Eastern Slavonia on the first day. Therefore, they only waited for their arrival in Ohio to announce that success. They have renounced the use of force, which was more difficult for Tudjman to swallow, which is why Milosevic, by all accounts, has promised not to drag things out and agreed to a shorter reintegration period.

I wouldn't be surprised if, from now on, instead of a long and tense wait, they start announcing another successful piece of agreement every day, of all Holbrooke's ten items, one by one. Namely, when an event is announced in such a spectacular way, it is practically impossible, especially in America, not to succumb to the pressures of the media which could become so nervous and aggressive as to finally turn on Holbrooke, Christopher and Clinton. If they have to negotiate without the presence of the cameras, I don't believe that the organizers will dare to starve that beast for a week or two, regardless of the feast they would present at the end. Because, if the negotiators would really completely isolate themselves, when there would be no news from Dayton for days, that would mean that the negotiations and the actual war were more important than television and pictures of them. And since it is quite the opposite, I believe we shall have a pretty and mellow diplomatic production, with possible dramatic accents, but certainly without any unpleasant surprises at the end.

Life in Bosnia, at least that is what is expected, should shortly unwind in accordance with the scenario from Dayton. We should not be surprised if the Bosnians seem a bit confused and suspicious to begin with, but that is why the NATO soldiers will arrive to discourage any other visions of the future, and afterwards, probably, money shall start rolling in as well as credits for reconstruction. At the end, Bosnia could come out looking like Ohio. Of course, it is easy to envisage huge obstacles on such a road, but despite everything, it is slowly becoming possible and more probable than other, worse and less fortunate results.

As far as Serbia and Montenegro are concerned, they shall not have such priority as to have foreign powers organize their state for them and prepare them for life. We shall have to accomplish all that on our own, and we have already shown how much we can do. But, these peace negotiations might be hiding a certain small chance for us, and maybe Milosevic will not miss out on it completely. Namely, in this remainder of Yugoslavia there are no more internal forces, impulses nor reasons to change something or attune it, and no inducement could have come from outside either, since the regime had impudently turned its back to the world. On its own, the lifting of the sanctions will not change anything, if that attitude towards the world is not changed as well. After all, Milosevic personally was the biggest sanction, since, after successfully leading the movement which triggered a local war, he also had the best of intentions to teach Europe, America and Russia a lesson and to lead them to the right path. His wife has not totally given up on that ambition, but we should say that there are certain signs that the president has become aware that his country has collapsed, that his people have started hissing and that, finally, he is the one who should be learning from others.

Since everyone in the world still remembers Serbia as the country which has sent out messages a number of times that it is not interested in anyone else, that the Serbs have their truth and will never admit and succumb to the world's injustice, nor will they be a part of such a world; since a larger part of the opposition kept repeating the same thing in an even louder voice than Milosevic; it would only be natural that the current negotiations do not predict anything else for Serbia apart from the lifting of the sanctions, pacification and leaving them to their own resorts. Why would they offer them some closer connections and impose on them something that they do not want?

Well, Milosevic has now evidently deduced that the people have paid him an enormous price which can only grow and is ready to offer all sorts of concessions. It would be good if it is true that he shall be the one to introduce the Kosovo issue himself, and it would be even better if he would be honest and serious about that and everything else. Because, if international mediators and major powers can agree not to punish him, none of them are really prepared to reward him. Therefore, he must come across not only as peace-loving, but also as very interested in opening up and cooperation, and as prepared to bring his country in line with international standards. He should not have the appearance of a deceitful opponent who is making concessions under pressure, nor should he try to prove that he was unjustly accused from the beginning, but should only do everything in his power to change. If his conduct is such, and if he meets with any success, Milosevic will, finally, truly appear patriotic, and not only power hungry. He will do something for his country, even if the price has to be a limitation of his powers. Because, from the standpoint of his comprehension of power, greater recognition of any and anybody's rights, acceptance of the principles of legality, democratization or economic opening up, all that can only weaken the rulers might.

Milosevic can, even partially, agree to such changes only under outside pressure. As for internal resistance, it appears that he could rule in the same way, infinitely.

Therefore, these first Milosevic's gestures of cooperation with the world and the West, should make the so-called democratic opposition jump with glee, since that is the only way to create a climate in which even that opposition can get a word in. Instead of that, during those unpleasant preliminary negotiations with Holbrooke, the opposition was worrying about the fate of Radovan Karadzic and was organizing protest meetings to their disadvantage.

Whatever Milosevic manages to achieve, however he presents himself to the world at large during the negotiations on Bosnia, it is difficult to imagine how Serbia could, with him as a leader, manage to extricate itself from this web woven out of shame, poverty, rage, the tragedy of the refugees and lies about what caused it all. It would be ideal if he should decide to, after the completion of the negotiations, gradually disappear, providing a certain kind of peaceful transition of power. But, things like that never happen here, and besides, in public and political life people who were not accomplices, at least at the beginning, at least until Gazimestan, are extremely scarce.

It is obvious that Seselj has selected for himself the fate of a marginal player and political delinquent who, just like Zhirinovski, can await his chance only in case of total collapse and chaos, and even then, only under the condition that he isn't the first victim. It is also evident that the former nationalistic elite has in most cases retreated, fallen silent or is trying to prove that everything was not as it was and that they didn't do and say what they did. Even worse then they are and even more disconsolate are Djindjic and Kostunica who aren't that different from Seselj and should represent serious political parties. Who do these people hope to lead when they are the last ones to realize what is going on? They still fail to see that the genuine peace activists could become rich if, for a small fee, they start issuing certificates of anti-war principles prior to August 1994.