Agreement Upon Agreement

The Serbian authorities in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem have refused the draft agreement of a lasting solution for the status of that region that was offered to them by Galbraight and the co-president of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia, Thorwald Stoltenberg. The refusal aroused astonishment since it followed the joint announcement in Dayton, Ohio of the Presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic and Dr. Franjo Tudjman on the concord that the problem of the status is to be resolved without the use of force. In return, the Serbian negotiating team from Eastern Slavonia has proposed its version of the agreement named "The Basic Principles of an Agreement for the Srem-Baranje Region". The mediators, as predicted, have not come out with their views on the above mentioned document, so that negotiations concerning the status of Eastern Slavonia are once again retraced to Dayton. At the same time, tension has again risen at the separation lines.

Both documents - of the international mediators and the Serbian authorities in Eastern Slavonia - start off with the eleven items of the Erdut agreement of October 3. This document, again, is based on, according to Stoltenberg's statement, the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia. Therefore, the prevailing estimates are that the mediators could not have made their proposal without taking Zagreb's claims into account. Following the differences in these two documents that have been proclaimed (Stoltenberg's and Galbraight's draft is not known to the public) it is possible, to a certain extent, to get an insight into the ulterior motives of the Croatian ruling circles and the Serbs of Eastern Slavonia. Especially taking into account that Zagreb, following the Erdut agreement, did not hide its satisfaction, while Milanovic had "serious misgivings".

In the first place, besides the duration of the international protectorate, the problem that emerges concerns the character of the actual transitional authorities. In the Erdut agreement, it is stated that it will encompass the "mechanisms which will represent the interests of the Croatian government and local Serbs...", while the Serbian proposal talks of a "UN administration which will govern the region during the transitional period". Interpretations exist that Zagreb sees the transitional authorities as composed of the representatives of both sides where the UN role would mostly be reduced to control. In that manner, the sovereignty of Croatia would be unquestionable, and reintegration certain. In the same spirit is the placement of Croatian policemen and customs officials at the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since its control is under the authority of the central government.

On the other hand, Serbian authorities are backing an administration of UN officials as achieved in Mostar. Therefore, while the Erdut agreement says that the temporary government shall "re-establish Croatian services (post office, telephones, banks, passports...)", the Serbian proposal anticipates that the UN administration shall "take steps towards a normal functioning of all public services". Following that are a number of diverse drafts on the return of the refugees and displaced people. The Erdut agreement stresses the rights of all people, regardless of nationalities, to return to the region. The Serbian draft for the agreement expands that right to "all persons who have come from the Republic of Croatia" - thinking, primarily, of the refugees from Krajina. In other words, a sufficiently long transitional period, with the UN administration, would enable the Serbs in that region to become a compact majority. According to the census from 1991, in the territory of the Beli Manastir municipality 54,160 citizens were registered, of which 41.7 % were Croats, 16.5 % were Hungarians and 7.9 % Yugoslavs, and in the Vukovar municipality 84,024 citizens were registered - 43.7 % Croat and 7.3 % Yugoslav. A large amount of this non-Serbian population was forced to abandon their homes, just like the more than 150,000 Serbs from the former Krajina. The first could, therefore, take up residence in Lika, Banija, Kordun, while the others could populate Baranje and Eastern Slavonia. If the Serbian authorities manage to pull it off, following the transitional period, the autonomy of which Zagreb does not even want to hear could become a reality.

In such a context, the views on forming a temporary police force are interesting. The Erdut agreement predicts that in its structure Serbs, Croats and local minorities shall be included, while the Serbian proposal states that it shall be composed of the "residents of all nationalities". The question crops up whether the temporary policemen shall be chosen in accordance with the 1991 census, or on the basis of the actual situation. If the criterion will be the above mentioned census - plainly negative for the Serbian side - will it demand that the Croatian policemen belong to the region by origin? That the Serbian authorities are primarily interested in creating a predisposition for a future autonomy is also seen by the treatment of the human rights and freedom issues. The Erdut agreement anticipates that they be respected on the Croatian territory in its entirety, while the Serbian peace proposal deals exclusively with the Region.

From all the aforementioned, it is clear that the negotiating goals of Zagreb and of the Eastern Slavonian Serbs are totally different. The Croatian arguments lie in their internationally recognized borders, but even more so in their armed forces. Tudjman and the head of the Croatian Army (HV), Zvonimir Cervenko, have, numerous times, let it be known that they shall not hesitate to use military force if the negotiations are not concluded as they believe they should be.

Regardless of the heroic stand of the military authorities of Eastern Slavonia, it is evident that they cannot stand up military-wise to HV without the intervention of the Yugoslav Army (VJ). In case the negotiations fall through, and a Croatian offensive is launched, a question arises as to whether the VJ shall step in. Certain diplomatic estimates believe that there is no chance that an eventual conflict could spread beyond the Croatian borders. Which is why the main arguments of the Eastern Slavonian Serbs are based on the human rights violations of the Serbs in Croatia and a hope that following pressures from the international community, Zagreb shall ease up. In a letter to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Stoltenberg and Galbraight, Milanovic states that the proposed agreement was refused due to events in former Krajina "where civilians are killed, houses are burned". It further stresses that, "that is the reason why we are striving for a complete UN administration during the transitional period, since we are absolutely certain that the Croatian authorities shall not respect human rights".

In the same letter he also states that the region which he represents "was never a part of the Republic of Croatia", but indirectly he also gives Milosevic a mandate to represent them in Dayton, where the whole issue shall again be discussed with Tudjman. How much the actual state of the human rights of the Serbs in Croatia shall enable the Serbian president to make some of their demands a reality is difficult to assess. However, the indictment of the former Yugoslav National Army officers Veselin Sljivancanin, Mileta Mrksic and Miroslav Radic at the Hague Tribunal for war crimes during the Vukovar operation makes the whole thing rather relative.

As the spokesman for Tudjman, Natasa Rajkovic has announced that further negotiations concerning the status of Eastern Slavonia shall be closed to the public, therefore it can be concluded that the final agreement - if there is one at all - exclusively depends on the interests of the two national leaders. It is also possible that, as part of their agreement, the Eastern Slavonian Serb leaders have played out their roles, and that, henceforth, nobody shall ask them anything anymore.