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November 13, 1995
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 215
You Haven't Seen It, So Read About It

BBC: The Death of Yugoslavia Mira's advice to Sloba: Support the Serbs in Kosovo

by Roksanda Nincic

VREME will present two parts of the serial covering the period from the first rallies in Serbia and the creation of the cult of Slobodan Milosevic to the decision in Croatia to start the war.

Mira Markovic: "I advised Slobodan to speak in Kosovo Polje, to support the Serbs".

Momir Bulatovic: "My parents were proud that their son was smart."

Warren Zimmerman: "The Croats asked us for weapons to equip their police but we didn't want to arm their police to oppress the Serbs."

Slavko Degoricija: "If we can't import weapons in airplanes, trains and trucks we can import them in passenger cars."

Petar Gracanin: "I taught the people in Knin to build barricades, stand guard at night with hunting rifles if nothing else."

Borisav Jovic: "The army can say since we have no supreme commander we'll act on our own. That was our formula. Without the knowledge of a single state presidency member I agreed with General Kadijevic that he should go to Moscow and ask if we decide to disarm the Croats by force, if the West intervenes militarily, will they protect us. Milosevic felt the army should be deployed around Serb areas of Croatia, then leave the Croats to start the fighting and keep those territories."

"We will win regardless of the fact that Serbia's enemies outside the country are teaming up with the enemies inside the country once again. We tell them that we are not scared, that we enter every battle with the intention of winning." (November 1988)

"Every foundation that is based on national intolerance, on spreading national hatred, cannot be progressive. Long live the brotherhood and unity of the people of Yugoslavia!" (April 1987)

That choice of quotes from speeches by Slobodan Milosevic is featured in the first two installments of the Death of Yugoslavia serial to present the man whose nationalism "is blamed for all the wars in Yugoslavia today". The authors paid special attention to Kosovo Polje in their project which focuses on Milosevic and the Serbs.

"We consulted about how he should speak, whether he should speak and what he should say. I felt that he should speak constructively, offer the Serbs the support that belongs to them," Mira Markovic told the BBC (she was introduced as Mrs. Milosevic) speaking about Milosevic's appearance at the Kosovo Polje rally in April 1987.

"We didn't have time; we had three days to prepare. To meet people, to organize. We told everyone who knew how to fight to come. We brought in two trailer loads of stones to expand the sidewalks. That wasn't for the police, it was for the sidewalks and it was there if we needed it," Miroslav Solevic explained the preparations for that rally and added that the police each got a couple of stones from the demonstrators. Milosevic was told the police were beating the people and he responded with his famous words: "No one has the right to beat you!" and that night the Serbian state TV created the Milosevic legend. "Milosevic was very pleased," Dusan Mitevic told the BBC.

Milosevic started his march on Yugoslavia, the BBC says and showed Ivan Stambolic saying that was "a rallying cry to all Serbs" as well as excerpts from the movie "Battle of Kosovo" and pictures of the remains of Prince Lazar being taken from monastery to monastery. It also describes the coup at the Eighth Session of the Serbian party.

The Montenegrin and Vojvodina leaderships toppled.

Borisav Jovic: "They wanted Slobo, Slobo, Slobo. Milosevic was a saint at the time as he is now."

Milosevic at the rally: "There is no price and no force that can shake the leadership of Serbia and the citizens of Serbia." The mass yelled: "Arrest Vllasi!" Milosevic stood quiet, then said: "I can't hear you but I want to tell you, they will be arrested."

Milosevic got the right to send the army to Kosovo after that.

The BBC went on to Slovenia.

"The little republic of Slovenia turned against the Serbian giant." The Mladina story was recalled and the shock it caused in army circles when it published classified army documents. War games were held in Slovenia as a warning.

An attempt to topple the Slovenian leadership with a rally in Ljubljana failed and Milosevic chose another tool - the 14th LCY congress with everyone knowing he was going to deal with the Slovenians.

Milosevic: "Slovenia's party leaders wanted to impose their vision, their solution for a future Yugoslavia."

Milosevic, the BBC says, chose a man who owes him his career to preside over the congress. That was also the first party congress that man, Momir Bulatovic, ever attended. Bulatovic: "To tell you the truth my parents were very proud that their son was smart enough to take that high post so young."

Mitevic: "At that moment, the most important thing for Milosevic was for the Slovenians not to get Croat support because if the Croats stayed, Yugoslavia would be there."

The Croats left.

Ivica Racan: "I told Milosevic that without the Slovenians there is no LCY."

Milosevic: "That's how it started. The Slovenians opened the door to the Yugoslav crisis, but I wouldn't say they are responsible for everything."

The second part dealt with Croatia, "the rival nationalisms of the Serbs and Croats" but said the first to appear was Serb and Croat nationalism was a reaction. Croatian state TV pictures chosen by the BBC show Franjo Tudjman meeting the masses and a Croat reporter shouting: "Today, Christ has triumphantly entered Jerusalem, greeted by the people as the messiah. The capital of Croatia is like Jerusalem, Franjo Tudjman is before the population."

Knin is next.

Milan Martic tells the BBC that Serb police officers had been forced to accept Independent State of Croatia insignia which the BBC said was "like waving the Nazi swastika in their faces". Tensions rise. Tudjman sends police officials to calm the situation in Knin. Milan Babic explains that he ordered his party activists to get people to rally when those officials met Knin local authorities.

Martic: "After that they had no more authority in Knin." And "I was instructed to prepare weapons. Either get it from Yugoslavia or get the JNA to protect the people."

The BBC notes that Milosevic fanned the flames of dissatisfaction among Serbs in Croatia but that he passed the request for military aid to Borisav Jovic.

Petar Gracanin: "Make barricades. That's what I taught them. Guards at night, with hunting rifles if nothing else. Guards at all times to keep the Ustashi out."

Babic: "There was no specific promise from Jovic but I felt that they could help us in some way."

Barricades were built in and around Knin. The RTS fanned the fears of the Serbs and the Knin crisis hit Croatia at the height of the tourist season. The Serbs blocked roads from Zagreb to the coast. Tudjman faced a dilemma; should he attack Knin?

Tudjman: "I was in Split then. I ordered police officials to take a special police unit to Knin to disarm Martic."

Three police helicopters left Zagreb and informed air traffic control that they were taking equipment to the coast. Actually, they were full of special police who were ordered to join land forces. Military radar registered the helicopters on course for Knin.

General Raseta: "I was told by headquarters to demand their return and if they don't to take them down."

Perica Juric: "They flew low above us to let us know that we are small fry. The pilot said: go back to base or be taken down. We turned around and flew back to Zagreb."

Tudjman: "We were faced with an organized rebellion against the democratic authorities in Croatia."

Jovic: "Tudjman phoned me all excited and said this is a catastrophe, we aren't allowed to perform our legal duties. Are we legally elected authorities or will they topple us. All that is being directed from Belgrade."

Tudjman: "They apologized. They said the army had no orders to stop Croatian helicopters but that it was technical thing, but we knew what it was about."

At that time, the BBC says, the HTV laughed at the "log barricade revolution" and tried to prove that it was just a bunch of Serb drunks. They made a cartoon showing three Serbs drinking on a log with a sing that said "This is Serbia".

But Tudjman knew the army had humiliated him.

Croatian Minister Martin Spegelj: "I went to Tudjman and said we have nothing to wait for any longer. It's obvious that the army won't arm our police although they are obliged to, so we have to do it ourselves. He agreed."

Warren Zimmerman, US Ambassador to Belgrade: "They asked us for weapons for their police, to strengthen their police forces. I recommended without hesitation that Washington refuse. We certainly did not want to arm Croatian police forces so they could oppress the Serbs."

Rejected by the US, Spegelj went to Budapest and "in agreement with Hungarian officials, agreed on arms deliveries. When we guaranteed payments through Eurocheck we sent two trucks."

Two truck loads of Ak-47 assault rifles were at the Yugoslav border at Cakovec in the early morning hours.

Aleksandar Vasiljevic, State Security Service (KOS): "I was at the crossing. We knew there was something covert going on there, with the agreement of police chiefs but we did not know that it was arms smuggling."

Spegelj: "They set up ambushes, asked questions in Budapest, they were very aggressive towards Croatia."

Slavko Degoricija, Croatian Government Minister: "I said, if we can't bring it in by train, ship, plane or truck, can we do it in passenger cars? There was consternation in the room, then they understood. Something was confiscated but a lot of it came in. Enough."

The arms smugglers, the BBC says, were the democratically elected authorities in Croatia. It would be politically dangerous to arrest them. The army was cautious.

Early in 1991, an order was issued, aimed at the Croats, for the surrender of all illegally acquired weapons. Croatia's leaders resisted openly.

Stipe Mesic (archive tape): "Do they think that when police stations, entire communities, refuse loyalty to Croatia that we will buy two truck loads of pens so we can write to them?" Mesic told Martic that "The Croatian flag and coat of arms will come to Knin".

To disarm the Croats, Milosevic needed the army. To get the army he needed the state council. That council included representatives of the republics and provinces - all with equal votes. So to get the council he would need "the skill of Machiavelli".

The March 9th demonstrations for freedom of the press were just right for that goal. Zarko Jokanovic, then student leader, told the BBC that the protest was calm but...

Jovic: "Milosevic called me and said, it's chaos. He said the army might be needed to help."

Jokanovic said tear gas was fired in the middle of Milan Paroski's speech, the crowd started running away, the police had surrounded them and it was logical for police and demonstrators to clash in places.

Now the arguments to bring in the tanks was stronger, the BBC says.

Jovic: "I called the state presidency members and got approval to bring the army into Belgrade and stop vandalism."

State presidency member Vasil Tupurkovski says that he saw Jovic on TV at midnight that night saying that a session of the presidency as supreme commander was scheduled for 4:00 p.m. the next day.

Slovenia's state presidency member was too scared to come, the BBC says and adds that Croatia's representative, although fearing arrest, came to try to turn the others around.

For a decision to impose a state of emergency, Jovic needed five votes. Jugoslav Kostic voted yes, Tupurkovski no, Mesic no. Then Jovic and Nenad Bucin voted yes, Riza Sapundziu yes. The deciding vote was Bogic Bogicevic from Bosnia. "the pressure on him was great," Tupurkovski says. Bogicevic: "Jovic and the others expected me to behave only as a Serb."

Tupurkovski: "Jovic started shouting, vote Bogic, vote, what's the problem. Vote yes or no but vote!"

A dead silence followed his vote. Very quietly he said he felt it would not be productive. Jovic angrily ended the session.

That night, Milosevic announced the withdrawal of Serbia's representative to the presidency, calling it a step forward because "the bitter truth is better than illusion". He tried to destroy the supreme command, the BBC concludes.

Jovic: "The army can say, since there's no supreme commander we are forced to decide for ourselves and suppress para-military formations. That was our formula."

The BBC concludes that Milosevic and Jovic wanted to give the army a free hand to start a war with Croatia but they feared the West's reactions.

Jovic: "I think this was never published. We consulted, Kadijevic and I, and decided to consult with Moscow. Kadijevic was to ask them: if we disarm the Croats by force, if Western countries intervene militarily, will they protect us?"

The BBC says Kadijevic was shown details of intelligence reports by the Russian defence minister which made it clear that the army could ignore the warnings of the West.

Although the serial shows part of the tapes of the state presidency session which rejected a state of emergency with Kadijevic standing over Mesic and saying "the army will move", the BBC concludes that "the plotters were in for a shock" because Kadijevic faltered. Jovic interprets Kadijevic's reasons: "That would be seen as a military coup which no one in the international community would accept and it would not lead to a solution for Yugoslavia."

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