Diary of a Mad President

Borisav Jovic, ex-President of the SFRY Presidency, decided not to put off any longer the publishing of his diary excerpts in the May 15, 1989 - June 8, 1992 period, when he was member of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) Presidency; some past assumptions have now come out into the open. Jovic cannot say whether he is smarter now than he was at the time, but he still claims that what happened was unavoidable.

In the book entitled "SFRY's Last Days" (the publisher, Company Politika, is holding its public promotion, but it still has not appeared for sale by the time this issue of Vreme closed), Jovic chronologically gives a series of plastic details on the endless wrangling and quarrelling in the ex-Yugoslav Presidency, the constitutional disputes, interventions in Kosovo, Croatian and Slovene separatism, the Serbia-Slovenia clash, the Spegelj scandal, the army's intention to carry out a putsch, the plans to cut off Slovenia and Croatia, and, when the war erupted, on plans to sever Croatia. From this reader's viewpoint, it is a conglomeration of hysteria and wavering, a gallery of inept Machiavellians, frauds, schemers, denouncers, lost and disoriented old men, strategists and ideologists...

The first thing Dobrica Cosic, former president of Yugoslavia, does upon entering Jovic's cabinet on September 11, 1990 is ask if the cabinet is bugged (he says: "Are we taped?" and Jovic first thinks Cosic wants their talk recorded) and then set forth his ideas of separating from the Croats and ethnic Albanians ("it is realistic that we separate from them and hold on to the coal and some shrines, (monastery) Gracanica, Gazimestan"). Kadijevic, who cannot get over USSR's disintegration, who cannot comprehend why the French could not understand that Yugoslavia cannot be preserved without the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, who is disappointed in the Serbian leadership for setting up the Socialist Party, because the Serbs are not keeping the word "communist", fears revanchism and Milosevic comforts him, tells him not to worry.

 

August 1-2, 1989

I'm on vacation in Kupare (Croatia, near Dubrovnik) with Veljko Kadijevic, Slobodan Milosevic and Bogdan Trifunovic - and their families. I realize from a number of intimate conversations what the Yugoslav People's Army and Veljko Kadijevic think of Yugoslavia's future: 1) they'll defend it at all costs; 2) it must be an efficient federal state; 3) they accept market economy; 4) they condemn dogmatism. Therefore, their views are identical to those of Serbia. This, of course, is what binds us and the Army.

However, the Army must clearly keep a distance, it must try and have equally good relations with each republic; it, however, also clearly relies more on Serbia than on the others. Once, when we were alone, Milosevic warned me: Veljko might try to convince me to extend (ex-Yugoslav Prime Minister) Ante Markovic more support. I should beware. (...)A year later, on August 10, 1990, Jovic writes: "Veljko calls him a "son of a bitch". The epithet, of course, regards Ante Markovic, whom Jovic obviously doesn't stand and describes as a dangerous enemy of Serbia. Jovic writes denunciations that Markovic, like Suvar, is secretly cooperating with Tudjman, and it seems he considers him an American marionette, as he does Drnovsek, who, according to (ex-Yugoslav/Serbian Minister of the Interior) Petar Gracanin, plays tennis with (ex-) US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman all the time. Jovic anonymously wrote about Markovic several articles, such as "The Truth about Ante Markovic", which were carried by the daily Politika under someone else's name. Markovic was blamed for "rigorously cutting down the local firms' privileges for exporting to the USSR, where most of our exports go, and so restricting our market" (June 8, 1989); and, "he said that the Loan for Serbia's Revitalization was plain foolishness". "He did not bother to explain why, nor did Ajga (Slobodan Gligorijevic, Federal Parliament Speaker who conveyed this opinion, later resigned) did not comment his opinion." (June 1, 1989). They were obsessed with the belief that Markovic was trying to make them go "bankrupt". And that's why they disrupted the SFRY payment system.

 

January 8, 1991

Conversation with Serbian Prime Minister Stanko Radmilovic in the Serbian Socialist Party (before the meeting on concrete issues). I criticize him a bit for doing it all, as the issue of money and incomes belong to the Federation. He explains that, without it, they would lose the elections for certain, because more than half of the Republic did not get their salaries and pensions. Ante (Markovic) was very surprised that we hadn't gone "bankrupt" and we outwitted him. That was the essence. Milosevic was obviously avoiding informing me, because, as the SFRY Presidency President, I wouldn't have justified it. At the end of our talk, Milosevic appeared and Stanko told him: "Please protect me from the criticism of the SFRY Presidency President". And Milosevic replied: "I'll protect you for taking the money, but I won't protect you for suggesting the adoption of laws and decisions. All of it could have been done without formal parliamentary decisions. That's how everyone else does it. They have done it a lot, before and after us."

Jovic mentions one name - the name of Kadijevic - as many as 180 times, twenty times more than the name Milosevic, when speaking about the game of admiration and distrust by which Milosevic and Jovic induced Kadijevic to protect them, to carry out a putsch, to save Yugoslavia, to amputate Slovenia and Croatia, and by which he, in turn, urged them to save Socialism and Yugoslavia. Jovic's talks with generals resemble endless conspiracy preparations, actually dreams of conspiracy. He criticizes Kadijevic for yielding to the Slovenes ("The question is how much the Army and Veljko can be believed" (September 25, 1989).

Under the caption "Fatal irresolution in decision-making") on April 6, 1990, he says: "It seemed to me then (at an earlier stage) that the only way to preserve Yugoslavia was to introduce a state of emergency in Slovenia, ban Parliament sessions until the SFRY Constitutional Court gives its opinion... Veljko kept on agreeing with all that until the last moment, and then he backed out..."

Commenting on Kadijevic's proposal to proclaim unconstitutional the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia, Jovic remarks: "That's all my eye!" The exact number of all indications of a military intervention cannot be given: "Veljko tells me, in passing, that only a hundred people should be "done away with" and that everything will be OK. The Army is preparing such plans, if the need arises. He says he'll show them to me. I watch him silently. This is the first time I hear anything about that. I'll take a look at those plans, but I have doubts about the Army's resolution. Judging by its hesitance so far, at least." (October 3, 1990). Internal disintegration and war were a frequent subject at the time.

 

13 February 1990

After today's Presidency session in which Presidents of the Republican and Provincial Presidencies took part (subject - Kosovo), Veljko Kadijevic, Petar Gracanin, Slobodan Milosevic, Dragutin Zelenovic and I are sitting in my office. An unofficial and casual conversation. Milosevic begins:

There'll be a war, by God.

We won't allow it, by God, I reply. We had enough of fighting and war during the two world wars. We'll now definitely avoid a war!

There won't be the kind of war they want, says Veljko - but the kind of war there has to be, and we won't let them beat us.

Gracanin complains that the opponents of Socialism and Yugoslavia are becoming increasingly stronger and systematically pushing us back and seeking revenge. Milosevic comforts him, tells him not to worry.

Veljko says:

Gorbachev is to blame for everything. He sold the idea of Socialism and Communism too cheaply. He disintegrated the Warsaw Pact, destroyed Socialism in East Europe, destabilized the USSR and, for us, the worst thing is that he upset the balance of forces in Europe and put all Communists on the dock. Now we have to defend ourselves, although we have sacrificed our lives for our country's defense and construction.

 

February 20, 1990

At the Presidency session, Veljko reports we are on the verge of a civil war and that we have to prevent it. If a civil war erupts, Yugoslavia will disintegrate.

Drnovsek speaks first. He asks: Who will be responsible for such a massacre which might ensue after such a decision?

But he doesn't wonder who'll be responsible for a civil war.

I let everyone speak (I made the introductory report about the (Federal Executive) Council's yesterday assessment, and Kadijevic and Gracanin gave an update on the current situation).

Stipe (Mesic, Croatian member in Presidency) asks: Will the Army shoot?

Kadijevic replies - It will. It has to. Stipe doesn't want it to.(Macedonian member of the Presidency, Vasil) Tupurkovski says that the problem is that some republics are imposing their stands and policy on others (!?), but he agrees that the Army should be involved. Riza Sapundziu (member of presidency from Kosovo) is for avoiding victims, and accepts all decisions along those lines. (Drnovsek interprets this as his approval of the Army's involvement, but Riza does not respond).

Bogic Bogicevic (member of presidency from Bosnia-Herzegovina) is against a civil war and any victims, but if a war has to erupt, may there be as few victims as possible.

Ante Markovic is against the Army's involvement, he is for a political solution, but "he does not have the right to vote".

Zelenovic and Bucin are explicitly for.

I said that unless we make a decision on the Army's involvement, we will have opted for a civil war, Yugoslavia's disintegration and the dissolution of the SFRY Presidency. That is why there is only one decision to make. So we approved that the Army was allowed to shoot; Drnovsek was reserved.

I believed that the decision would deter the ethnic Albanians, that there would be no need to fire any shots, and that they would get off the streets. The Serbs were satisfied, but they also took wings - the police could do their job better now.

 

June 27, 1990

Conversation with Veljko Kadijevic. We are assessing the current situation in the country (...)

Slovenia and Croatia are intensively working on creating independent states on SFRY territory, for now. In a few days, their Parliaments will begin adopting concrete decisions (...)

I tell Kadijevic I would prefer throwing them out of Yugoslavia by force, by simply drawing the borders and proclaiming that they brought this on to themselves, but that I don't know what to do with the Serbs in Croatia. I'm not for employing force, but for putting them before a fait accompli. I tell him I'm for looking into such an action, with the alternative that a referendum be held to determine where the borders will be drawn before we expel them forever. Kadijevic agrees. We are concerned about how to secure the majority for such a decision in the SFRY Presidency, because the Macedonian and ethnic Albanian will boycott us, they'll be against it. The Bosnian is the key man, he should be "worked on". We decided to think it over during the week and then meet again. Discussion with Petar Gracanin on the same subject. Gracanin informs me of the new developments. Slovenes decided to dissolve the security service. (...)

 

June 28, 1990

Conversation with Milosevic on the situation in the country and in Serbia. He agrees with the idea of "throwing out" Slovenia and Croatia but asks me whether the Army will want to carry out such an order? I tell him it must carry out the order and that this is not what I'm worried about, that I'm worried about the Serbs in Croatia and winning over the majority in the SFRY Presidency for such a decision.

Milosevic gave two ideas: first carry out Croatia's "cut-off" with the Lika-Banija and Kordun municipalities, which had formed a union, on our side, and have the people later vote at a referendum on whether they want to stay or leave; and, second, that the SFRY Presidency members from Slovenia and Croatia be excluded from voting on the decision, because they do not represent the part of Yugoslavia which is reaching the decision. If the Bosnian (member) is for, we have a two-thirds majority. Milosevic urges that we reach the decision within a week at the latest if we want to save the state. Without Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia will have a population of 17 million, which is enough in European proportions.

 

In January 1991, after the Spegelj scandal and the unsuccessful confiscation of weapons, after Mesic told Jovic (January 21) that Croatia and Slovenia would proclaim secession: "I call Kadijevic to come immediately. I tell Milosevic. He's thrilled. Great. As soon as they proclaim secession, we should approve it and hold the Krajina municipalities militarily until the people vote at the referendum on which state they want to live in. He insists that I persuade Kadijevic to back that alternative. I have always been for the alternative that we cut them off from Yugoslavia overnight and let them go join Europe, but the Army was against it."

The Army is making plans for toppling the Slovene and Croatian governments and overcoming the crisis.

 

February 25, 1991

(...)Veljko informs me of the military leadership's decisions:

The West will not intervene militarily in Yugoslavia if we have an army that will counter it, not it will if chaos and civil war erupt here and if our army disintegrates. That is why we must not permit this to happen.

According to the military leadership, this is what the balance of forces in the country looks like:

- Serbia, Montenegro, Army and Serbian parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are for Yugoslavia;

- Slovenia and Croatia are against it;

- Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are hesitating;

politically, they lean more towards Slovenia's and Croatia's concept, but it does not guarantee them either survival or a future. There are still two directions the developments might take:

The first is to continue the silent increasingly rapid disintegration of the country, while our strength is waning and those supporting us are losing confidence. This path is leading the country into disaster, into chaos and civil war.

The other is to immediately make a turning-point and take the initiative based on Law and the Constitution. There is a chance of success. We must opt for the latter solution, have a clear concept and be prepared for rapid action. Then Kadijevic speaks of his idea and concept. The goal to be achieved: to preserve independence, sovereignty and integrity of Yugoslavia and create conditions for a peaceful democratic resolution of the crisis.

The Army's chief idea is to strongly rely on the forces throughout the country which are for Yugoslavia and to combine political and military measures to topple first the Croatian government and then the Slovene authorities. The defense issue should be used for these activities, since this is where the two republics committed serious crimes. In the hesitant republics (Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina), combined political measures - demonstrations and uprising- should be taken to topple the leaderships or turn them in another direction. These activities should be combined with some military activities. The action should be conducted by those SFRY Presidency members who opt for this course, and the Army should be relied on. All Federal institutions approving this course will be involved in the action, while the others will be overthrown. (Doesn't explain how he thinks he'll do that). A state of emergency will be introduced wherever it is necessary, he says. According to the military leadership, two groups of measures and actions should be taken in the civilian and military sectors.

In the civilian sector:

1) Preparing a document for the March 1st session of the Presidency, which is to reach a political decision on the resolution of the crisis.

2) Institutional and political strengthening of the Serbian Krajina in Croatia and support to its secession from Croatia (not publicly but actually).

3) Organizing rallies in Croatia against HDZ, prodding Bosnia-Herzegovina "for Yugoslavia" and, in Macedonia, organizing a rally to topple the pro-Bulgarian leadership. Attending rallies in Serbia and Montenegro. Banning rallies in Kosovo. (Doesn't explain who can carry out all these political actions and how).

Kadijevic includes the following steps in the military measures:

1) Raising charges, against Spegelj, too, tomorrow and publishing them the day after.

2) As it is possible that the Presidency will not make any headway in talks on the country's political future at its March 1st session, a session of the SFRY Presidency in the function of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be held immediately after it, at the request of the military leadership; the Army's combat readiness should be raised, the conscripts drafted and decisive action in Croatia prepared. (Kadijevic says nothing about how he thinks that the Presidency, which is unable to reach a decision on March 1st, can and will reach an even stronger decision immediately afterwards.)

3) Immediately afterwards, submit a request for Spegelj's extradition, for the return of the weapons and the disarmament of the reserve police, and set an ultimatum.

Two alternatives are possible here: that first a request is made for Spegelj's extradition and the return of weapons, and if the request doesn't yield success, that they be taken by force. Or that the Army's combat readiness be raised immediately after the SFRY Presidency decision and that both Spegelj and the weapons are taken by force immediately (because the general belief is that they will not be given up voluntarily).

Slovenia is next.

In Croatia, and later, in Slovenia, the first alternative would be military administration followed by the setting up of institutions of uncompromised figures. This program envisages the opening of an information system which is now totally closed. The subsequent moves (election of bodies, referendum on staying in Yugoslavia or leaving it, et al.) would be based on a SFRY Presidency decision. It is not possible to anticipate all the details now. The goals are clear and will be achieved depending on the situation. Once the military actions begin, they must be rapid and energetic.

We were fooled twice (concerning the Order). We won't let it happen again.

I commented nothing. I listened and wanted to think it over. It was too complicated to decide on it all quickly. The Presidency's decision was necessary. I'm concerned with the Presidency's hesitant behavior - will we be able to secure a majority for the decision on the draft and on raising the combat readiness and for the other decisions.

As regards the Federal Executive Council, I believe it will be against it; this might obstruct our action. I'll try talking to some Presidency members, Milosevic and Bulatovic. But it should all be thought over thoroughly. It's true that there was a lot of agony. We face the danger of losing our reputation among the people, which we had won by hard work, although an even greater problem is losing the state, and that is the first and foremost issue here. (...)

 

February 28, 1991

I consult Milosevic on the Army's plan. I read him my notes word for word. He thinks all of it is OK except that Slovenia should be left alone. Only Croatia should be "given the treatment". Slovenes did not violate the (military) laws to such an extent and there is no formal justification; and, politically, it would all boil down to toppling the elected bodies. When I asked him what we are to do if we don't win the necessary majority in the Presidency for the needed decisions, he thinks we should make the decision together with the members who are for it and that the Army will "obey". He thinks it is logical that we "do away with" anyone who opposes such an action by the Presidency. The differences in Croatia' and Slovenia' violations of the law are very doubtful and so is the idea that a minority in the Presidency makes decisions. That is the situation when the Army makes decisions and this cannot be concealed. And no-one's thinking about the Army being multi-ethnic and that it can hardly remain monolithic without a decision of a political body.

It's true that these are crucial times, but it would not be good to make a mistake. I believe the Army is on the rack because it does not have political "support" for what it should do. It fears action without "support". But a Presidency decision without a sufficient number of votes is not constitutional and it is not support. I think it's better to give the Army room to decide for itself, rather than have be a a little bit of this and a little bit of that. All of this should be thought over.

 

March 6, 1991

We were too busy with Pakrac and other developments in Croatia over the past few days. I ordered the army's involvement without previously holding a Presidency session, because it was Sunday. The Presidency members were not in Belgrade. Janez and Vasil grumbled a bit, but the decision was nevertheless approved. Veljko mentions a new strategy to me. He has the intention of soon arresting some 20 or so HDZ members who were given weapons. We'll see what he'll do. They don't need a Presidency decision for that. They haven't done anything they promised to. The people have begun losing their trust in the Army and in us. It is high time a practical step is made. (...)

Will the desperate situation in the USSR improve?We were told Gorbachev made a "turn" toward stability. This could be of great importance to us. (...)

 

March 9, 1991

The opposition is demonstrating in Belgrade. They are committing unprecedented violence: breaking glass windows, looting the stores, they demolished the whole main street - Terazije and Marsala Tita, the Serbian Parliament and Presidency, even the Government building in Kneza Milosa, entered official buildings, etc. The police were not up to the mark, two people are dead.

I'm spending the weekend in Niksic. Milosevic calls me up and requests the Army's intervention. I talk to Veljko Kadijevic. He is doubtful - he wonders whether it is necessary and politically acceptable, but he isn't opposed to it, he only thinks I should previously get the Presidency's approval. I postpone the decision and we agree to talk later.

Milosevic calls me up again. Very disturbed. Kadijevic calls me, too. He says they are now demonstrating in front of the General Headquarters and want to break in. I consult the Presidency members I can get hold of (except Mesic and Drnovsek) over the phone. I order Veljko to send the Army out into the streets and take position in front of all endangered state institutions. Milosevic will send an official request in writing which we'll approve at the Presidency session tomorrow. (...)

March 13, 1991

After the Presidency session last night, Kadijevic asked approval to go to Moscow overnight and consult with Yazov. He wants to ask him whether the USSR will protect us from a Western intervention if we opt for using the Army to implement the Presidency decisions. I agreed. He went and came back the same night. The Russians said there was not an alternative in which the West was counting on their military intervention. They avoided speaking of Soviet assistance. Kadijevic called me today to consult with him and Slobodan Milosevic about what should be done if the Supreme Command again rejects the proposed decision at its session tomorrow. There were no consultations. Kadijevic literally told us in front of General Adzic: "We'll carry out a coup. Regardless of their acceptance of the proposed decision. If they adopt it, it will be justification for the draft only during the first 48 hours, if they refuse, we'll carry the draft out ourselves. However, in that case, there is the danger that the Presidency convenes and dismisses the military leadership. That is why we need the decision."

I asked what he implied under a coup. He said: Dismissing the Government and Presidency. He won't touch the Parliament, but will not let it convene. He won't touch the Republican authorities or anyone else if they support the coup. If they don't, he'll dismiss them, too. The goal: to set a deadline of six months (or less) for an agreement on the country's future and hold off the chaotic disintegration of the country. Milosevic asked no questions and made no comments. The first day of the session and particularly its outcome made me think of resigning, because I couldn't permit myself to implement the decisions of the majority I didn't agree with, the majority opting for breaking the country up and for civil war. When I heard all Kadijevic had to say, I told him that, tomorrow, after the session, I would turn in my resignation; that the session participants most probably would not approve the requested measures and that this was good enough reason for my resignation. I would give the army room for action. I'll talk with Nenad Bucin and Jugoslav Kostic to do the same. No-one commented anything. We left in silence. Milosevic told me that he would not take my place in the Presidency.