Quoteint Of Theft

In the early 1980s, a Czech publisher was intent on making big money by publishing Mario Puzzi's novel "The Godfather." If someone asks what is it about, he thought he could say it is about the moral decadence of the West. But, the enterprise was discreetly thwarted: only several hundreds of copies were printed and sent to those initiated and trustworthy. The authorities did not believe the publisher's interpretation of the book's message and concluded that it was actually an implicit description of the Czech Communist Party's modus operandi. Of course, the fact that the writer himself had nothing like that on his mind does not prove that the Czech censor was wrong.

These days in Serbia, the news-making story is a major anti-crime campaign, announced on several occasions by President Milosevic himself. Newspapers, which inform us about what the regime thinks we should know, said that a special police force would be formed - already called "The Untouchable" - to enforce law and order in the republic. With the crime rate on rise, there is really no other way to stop it than to strengthen the police. In a similar situation, any other country would choose this method, along with some pre-emptive measures. The question here is why is it necessary to form a special police force. Don't we already have special squads? In terms of strength and equipment, the regular and reserve police resemble an army, plus SDB (intelligence) and KOS (military intelligence) and army - all to be financed generously from the 1996 budget. Furthermore, police here can always count on righteous citizens and their traditional readiness to serve the regime and force.

A new police force is above all an expression of the closed system's natural need to build concentric safety circles in these troubled and unstable times. To control the controllers. To have a police in police in police... With an ever decreasing number of those whom he can trust unreservedly, the ruler feels that he must personally and directly control the last, inner-most circle of security.

And since there is a plenty of evidence about the police-mafia connection, active policemen cannot be expected to arrest one other once the anti-crime campaign begins. Or as an old saying puts it - before you cut the branch you are sitting on, you must catch the one above. Milosevic's problem is that he has already cut many branches he was sitting on, while those above are becoming thinner and thinner.

"Mafia" here is not mafia in the classical meaning of the word; it is rather what Politika described in its editorial recently as "crime behind upholstered doors." The truth is that from time to time, Politika puts out coded commentaries to be read not by ordinary readers, but by those who can recognise themselves and get the message. In this case, Politika's editorial was used as paper to wrap a dead fish, which the Godfather then sends to everyone involved.

The editorial admits that an operational mistake was made three years ago, when two ministers were arrested and tried for having been uncareful while stealing. It says between the lines that the opposition has made a better use of the case by arguing that the entire regime is made up of thieves, while the regime was unsuccessfully trying to prove that the government was now clean and honest. It further implies that this will no longer be done so publicly and spectacularly, but threatens that all embezzeled money will have to be returned as if it was given to the regime's thieves to keep in banks abroad until the sanctions are on. No one was threatened by name or with a specific punishment, but those involved know. Some of them can even decide to punish themselves, like the director of Majestic hotel did it by killing himself.

The best way to combat the crime involving public servants is to apply regulations about the "conflict of interests." Someone like prime minister Marjanovic must not be in a position to decide that his private company should be the one to get the best export deals.

Judging by the regime's first moves, the anti-crime campaign does not seem to be intended to establish a firm rule of law and prevent fraudelent deals. Instead, those who were carried away by easy, but illicit gains are requested to return the surplus and be moderate in the future. Politika's editorial does not say that it will no longer pay off to be part of the regime, it spells out: you must be familiar with some internal rules of conduct - for instance, how much is a minister allowed to embezzle in a year.

It is true that the war and sanctions had been a fertile soil for a growing crime rate and state-sponsored crime. But the new circumanstances will require a definition of new civil and peace-time quotients of theft. Those valid so far are too high and must be adjusted to the world standards if this country aspires to return to the international community. This might well be one of the conditions Milosevic had to accept before starting the process of normalisation of ties with the outside world. Otherwise, no one would risk to take back a state, whose low level of lawfullness threatens to turn it into a paradise for smugglers, counterfeit and money laundry.

However, the problem is rooted much deeper and goes farther back than war and sanctions. The story at the beginning of this articles illustrates the conspiratorial regime and state model, which in Serbia outlived the Communist ideology. After it was left without ideology, such organisation had no other purpose than to turn power into money. The unchanged nature of this regime has doomed the anti-crime campaign to a limited success. The campaign is not subject to the force of law, but to the regime's will. It is not aimed at stopping the frauds, it is aimed at a fairer distribution of gains inside the system. The conspiratorial model of rule has survived in Serbia and the best proof for this is that nothing can be proved. We have political parties and elections and a few independent news media - but we don't know anything about who is making crucial decision and how are they made. The opposition is transparent, and the activities of the SPS and JUL are only speculated on and rarely deciphered. The inner-most core of the regime is operating from a deep shadow, pulling mysterious threads, sacking and appointing officials with no explanations whatsoever. Now and then, a corpse surfaces from nowhere and it is usually too late to ask any questions.

In circumstances like these, people have learned that posing normal questions can make them look stupid or uninformed. But if Milosevic could fight a war and then fight for peace; if he was standing up against the new world order and then signed whatever he was told to sign - then it is not unnatural that his regime steals first and catches the thieves later. Inconsistency and discrepancies have had their purpose in this system, as the regime's goal is to teach people to be loyal and obedient, not let them think about its policy. Once they realise that a changed policy does not mean a changed regime, they will stop paying attention to the policy and accept that this regime exactly was God-sent. In this context and if only there was not the international image to think about, the ideal commander of "The Untouchable" would certainly be Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan.

All hopes for a better society are based mainly on the fact that now, when the sanctions are suspended, there is a number of things considered "inconvenient because of the world." This means that the regime will bring in order everything that the international community cares about, but will conserve or further neglect everything that can be declared its internal affair - including Kosovo, the freedom of the press, fair elections and the rule of law.

As for the anti-crime campaign, JUL can easily turn it into an ideological issue - unless it proves to be "inconvenient because of the world" - and use it against private entrepreneurs. Many private businessmen are rich but selfish, they are not even members of JUL and they refuse to share some of the profits with the party. It may be the time to teach them a lesson about the rule of law - only, of course, if there is no interference from outside.