The Three Days

On Monday, January 23, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received US assistant Secretary of State for human rights John Shattuck. The state media carried only a short official statement from the presidential cabinet which showed the primary motivation of the visit was to remove the obstacles in Serb-Moslem negotiations on the release of prisoners of war.

Shattuck's mission was linked to the release of the POWs but focused on the cause of the halt in implementing the Dayton agreement which includes the release of all POWs by Friday, January 19: a demand by Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic for the Serbs to provide free access to all the spots that are alleged to be sites of mass graves. One of those places is Konjevic Polje, a village between Zvornik and Srebrenica; the second is the Ljubija mine near Prijedor.

Milosevic, VREME diplomatic sources said, was very cooperative; he organized Shattuck's visits to both places under escort by Serbian police special forces. Shattuck used the opportunity to tour several other sites of interest to the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague: Karakaj near Zvornik, Kravica village, Konjevic Polje and Kakanj. Two Tribunal investigators where with the US diplomat, formally as members of his delegation.

To Bosnian Serb Army Commender General Ratko Mladic that must have been especially difficult since the Tribunal has charged him with war crimes over Srebrenica. Several witnesses alleged that he was at the sites of the alleged killings. There are some 7,000 people on the list of missing after the capture of Srebrenica.

Shattuck told Belgarde-based Nasa Borba daily that what he saw confirms statements on mass executions in eastern Bosnia. He said something similar in Sarajevo later mentioning shocking discoveries about the suffering of the local Moslems. He also confirmed that he talked to Milosevic about Serb cooperation with the Tribunal. Milosevic proved cooperative: a day after the visit Antonio Cassese, president of the Tribunal, started a two day visit to Belgrade. Cassese didn't meet Milosevic but was received by federal Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and Justice Minister Uros Klikovac. That visit got a minimum of publicity. Discussions focused on the opening of permanent Tribunal offices in Belgrade. Klikovac confirmed that institutionalized cooperation with the Tribunal could come soon the next day but refused to provide details.

Along with the softening of the Belgrade regime, Cassese and Tribunal chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone had to work hard at getting another ally: US Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of the NATO forces in Bosnia, who wasn't happy to have his men provide a service for the Tribunal. Smith first said his troops won't arrest suspected war criminals (some 50 people including Karadzic and Mladic) and then said they would (but only if they stumble across them and if they're on duty at the time). Finally, he was forced to adopt Goldstone's demands and sign a joint statement which says NATO will provide adequate assistance to provide security for Tribunal teams and investigate the locations of mass graves. He accepted Goldstone's liaison officers into his force as well. On the same day, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana promised NATO will make sure the evidence of mass executions isn't destroyed.

So in just two days, the Tribunal secured the assistance and cooperation of two important factors: NATO and Serbia. That does not mean there will be no problems in future; for example, Milosevic is expected to decide what to do with FRY citizens the Tribunal has indicted as soon as the Belgrade office is opened ( there are five of them on the list including Veselin Sljivancanin who is an active army officer). Klikovac did say the FRY won't hand over its citizens but indicated that they could be tried in the country.

That will be painful and humiliating for Serbia but not half as much as for the people who ordered and committed the crimes. As for Milosevic, there isn't any proof yet that the Tribunal would put him on the list and Goldstone confirmed that recently. As long as he is cooperative that proof probably won't come to light.

The Secret of the Ljubija Mine

The Ljubija iron ore mine lies half way between Prijedor and Sanski Most. It has been mentioned for a long time as the site of a Moslem massacre soon after the Posavina corridor was broken. The mine was closed before the war started and miners were sent on compulsory leave. Locals say it served as a camp for a short time but less was known about than about Manjaca and Keraterm and other places that were alleged to have been sites of mass killings. For a short while in 1993, there was a failed effort to revive production, not mining but mushroom growing. The people who worked in the mine than were mainly Moslems. They said later they found bloody clothing and shoes in abandoned warehouses.

Ljubija saw activity again early last October when a special forces unit from Pale appeared under the command of Sima Drljaca, former deputy police minister in the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS), who is wanted by the Tribunal. Local villagers said no one was allowed to approach the mine for two weeks and the curfew was extended. In that time, covered railway wagons came to the mine and black smoke rose from its chimneys. Then it all stopped, the special forces disappeared and life went back to normal.

Tribunal investigators claim that was a concerted effort to destroy evidence of crimes by burning bodies exhumed from mass graves. All that was done in a hurry when it seemed Croat and Moslem troops could capture Prijedor.

Since Ljubija is a big mine with 48 pits and a number of warehouses, there is no surprise that the investigation hasn't uncovered anything so far. That doesn't mean there will be no proof: considering the number of bodies (about 7,000 in the Prijedor area) and the haste in disposing of them it's impossible to hide all the evidence. For now RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic is confident enough to allow himself to say that RS exports will include Ljubija ore.