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February 5, 1996
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 226
Stojan Cerovic's Diary

Descending Path

This week, we failed to recognize Macedonia in our first fairly serious attempt. Our running start seems to have been a little too short, so we got only as far as the Draft Agreement on normalization, which was not enough for the European Union ministers to decide to recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At least we did not stab the knife in the back of our Greek brothers, or dig up an open wound, or pour salt in the eyes, or torment them... We only insulted the Macedonians who are no relatives of ours. They did not even fight with us, they were the only ones who did not - of all the former Yugoslavia.

Perhaps it will soon be made public, but right now, the name of the state which we are to recognize is Slobodan Milosevic's top secret. Since he had been doing whatever he wanted for a long time, now he must put up with many things he hates. The recognition of Macedonia is one of these things. This case clearly shows the style of a man on a descending path, who wishes everything would stop, who wants to do nothing more and would gladly freeze everything, or put it off forever.

Since he cannot avoid recognition, at least he can complicate and drag the matter, even at his own cost. He wants a compensation from the Greeks for the attributes "former Yugoslav," such as special rates for the usage of the Thessaloniki harbour, or he will recognize the Republic of Macedonia right now when the Greeks are almost at war with Turkey over a few reefs with sea-gulls. In the meantime, the European Union keeps postponing the recognition of Yugoslavia, so the bargaining does not seem to be worthwhile, but the important thing is that time is passing, or in fact, that it is being wasted. If nothing is happening, the president thinks he will last longer, like a suit which is not being worn. It does not matter if it gets out of style, because if it lasts long enough, the fashion will come back. All right, we can agree that most things in politics have their price, that services are charged and principles often abandoned, but why must Slobodan Milosevic always exaggerate? At first he was not willing to compromise with anyone about anything. He did not care who thought what in the former Yugoslavia, Europe and the world. Everything was sacred, nothing was for sale, even if this meant war with the entire world. Now, everything is on the market.

I do not see why this country could not have a sovereign and clear opinion about the name of a neighbouring state which she intends to recognize. Why are the Federal Government and the foreign minister turning the issue into a mystery and a riddle, like school-children? If an agreement was once reached with the Macedonians, why is Milosevic now offering it to foreign influences and taking it to an auction. And this issue might help to restore the respect for this country, especially since it might enrage the Greeks who have not managed to convince anyone that they have the copyright for the name Macedonia.

We do not think it is a good idea to disrupt our relations with Greece, but it is also not good to accept all of her conditions. However, the Greeks might have some proofs which the public here knows nothing about. Since the state policy was privatized here before anything else was, the recognition of Macedonia, and therefore Europe's recognition of Yugoslavia, might have been cancelled because they might harm some private business interests of the ruling clan.

This state is like a clan and due to the circumstances its business was limited and directed mainly toward Greece and Cyprus, so our national interests and state dignity have become dependent on only a few narrow channels, personal contacts and secret arrangements. Perhaps someone in Athens threatened and someone in Belgrade figured out what it would cost him and it turned out to be more expensive than Yugoslavia's recognition by the European Union. No one in Brussels, for example, has thought of offering to buy wheat from Prime Minister Marjanovic, so their recognition turned out to be worthless.

This is how things gradually become their own opposites. Just for the sake of nostalgia, think of the times when everything was spontaneous, when people went out in the streets, wrote newspapers, cheered, dismissed, arrested, were the cleverest, were always right and made decisions on everything. The people chose and the band played. The band is now playing for one ear only, and those who trusted what used to be, should not be surprised now.

Speaking about nostalgia: young readers will not believe, but in the beginning, Milosevic was accused of "promising speed too easily" concerning Kosovo. He was really quick then, but it was all about destroying and demolishing at the time, which he did radically and in an incredibly short time. He is no longer in a hurry. All that is waiting for him are recognitions, concessions, tolerance and retreats. No one thinks that he would ever do anything positive of his own free will, because he moves as quickly as he is pulled and pushed.

He decided to act like someone who is perfectly satisfied with the situation, he would not change anything and he has no problems. As far as he is concerned, everything is fine in Kosovo and if America and Europe think it is not, that is their problem and he might help them solve it, but first they must pull his sleeve and say what they have to offer. Just like the Greeks said they did not like the mutual recognition of Belgrade and Skoplje, so Minister Milutinovic went to see how to charge it.

Apart from not having any principles or its own aims, this bargaining logic of ours has another unusual feature. Because Milosevic is so slow and likely to drag any intiative, it seems that he first lowers the price and then sells. From the trading point of view, all the prices have been dropping here for years - the price of the country and the people and the state affairs and politics. At one time it was possible to obtain decent loans under no special conditions, now we are asked to be very courteous and some of our mischiefs might be forgotten one day.

Kosovo is certainly the most severe case of the growing problem which is being put off and whose price is dropping, in fact, what is even worse, there is no price and no trade can be done. The fact that the world is interested in Kosovo has aroused the feeling that Serbia possesses something valuable that someone else very much needs, and the greater the problem, the more expensive it will be in the end. This does not refer only to Milosevic but also to the whole opposition. Everyone thinks that the Albanians want something and that something is bothering them, while nothing is bothering Serbia and there is no reason to change anything. No one dares mention Kosovo, fearing that all of Serbia would rise to their feet and cry "we'll give our heads, we won't give Kosovo." I believe, however, that most Serbs today are aware that this is not only the Albanian, but also the Serbian problem. I believe it would be quite harmless and surprisingly easy to explain that something must urgently be done about Kosovo. This would prove not to be so unpopular and would show that the people are wiser than the politicians think and that there is a widespread feeling that Serbia might soon lose Kosovo forever.

I am afraid that Milosevic, however slow he may be, will be ahead of the opposition with Kosovo, just like he managed to get out of Bosnia before Seselj, Kostunica and Djindjic. Perhaps he will wait till the elections and perhaps he will not. What if the opening of the dialogue with Rugova is his secret trump card for the elections? Of course, we would all complain that he had cooked the broth; we would be quoting his speeches and promises; we would be saying that he was arresting, beating and opened shooting Albanians. But the television would explain to the people that he had always advocated equality, dialogue, autonomy and rights of the minorities. That story would be easier to swallow than the one about the Bosnian war and persistent peace-loving, and even that was not difficult. The opposition parties would, naturally, be accused of being against human rights, of spreading inter-ethnic hatred in order to arrest, beat and shoot the Albanians.

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