No Riddles, This Time

The Americans believe the war in Bosnia was ended by their leadership and some of them are wondering where that leadership was five years ago. That's how long it's been between two visits by State Secretaries to Belgrade: James Baker was here in June 1991 and Warren Christopher in February 1996. Both men's key meetings were with Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic. But, back in 1991, there was no any Holbrooke to threaten one, break the resistance of another and destroy the warmongering of the third, nor was this acomplished by Baker himself?

These issues are being discussed in the US because elections are near and because the outcome of the elections will determine the answers to certain questions. The more so since the Democratic administration ended the four year war that broke out under the previous administration, a conflict the Republicans could have nipped in the bud.

The difference between the Baker and Christopher visits is drastic even at first glance. Instead of the crystal clear warning of intent, Baker brought a riddle-like message to Belgrade. The message was: "We support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia but do not approve of the use of force to protect that integrity. We oppose unilateral acts and changes of borders but have nothing against changes of borders through an agreement between the republics, peacefully."

All the actors in the Yugoslav drama did the most logical thing from their point of view: they interpreted the ambivalent message from the West in ways that suited them. The army saw the first part of the message as a wish to preserve the country's integrity which the army shared. They want that integrity protected without using force but will accept force if it's unavoidable. Croatia and Slovenia: America isn't pleased with our wish to secede but if we do no one can do anything to us by force.

Just four days after the Baker visit, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) used force.

Unlike Baker, Christopher was not enigmatic at all during his visit to Belgrade. In a fierce talk with Slobodan Milosevic, Christopher made clear and precise demands. He didn't get everything he wanted but no one can accuse him of being ambivalent either in his demands or in what is in store for Milosevic if he doesn't comply.

VREME sources in Washington said Milosevic's agreement to allow the Hague tribunal to open offices in Belgrade and a US information center in Kosovo capital Pristina were secured even before Christopher left the US. The real, hard talking which will continue over the next few weeks have different causes.

Christopher first pressured Milosevic over Karadzic and Mladic. The Serbian President did not take on the obligation of handing those two over to the Hague tribunal but he did formally agree to prevent their "active role in political life". He didn't say how he intends to keep that promise and he hasn't, yet. He didn't guarantee their extradition or promise an arrest and trial in Belgrade.

Christopher also asked Milosevic for guarantees that the agreement on eastern Slavonia will be respected. The Americans are very concerned about that area and Milosevic has them over a slow fire there since Tudjman still hasn't met his obligations in regard to Prevlaka.

Finally, the US State Secretary asked Milosevic to pressure Karadzic and Mladic in terms of respect for the Dayton agreement. That means two things: first, they have to calm their forces and make sure there are no more sniping incidents and second, they have to prevent the exodus of the Sarajevo Serbs. Milosevic has already acted on that second point with his public appeal to the Serbs but he also asked for a more flexible approach by the international community in interpreting Dayton. Last week in Washington, at a briefing for some 40 non-government experts, John Shattuck (assistant State Secretary for human rights) said the US refused the demands of some allies (France) to leave the Serbs in control of Ilidza and Grbavica to the elections. He said there was no question of that happening since the whole agreement could break down if a single letter is changed.

In regard to Kosovo, Christopher avoided saying exactly what the Americans want Milosevic to do in restoring the human and civil rights of the ethnic Albanians there or whether that includes "statehood" for Serbia's southern province. The talk in Washington is that the US want a return to the 1974 constitution of the former Yugoslavia; i.e. autonomy similar to that constitution but that is a vague idea.

As with Karadzic and Mladic, Washington is feeling out Milosevic's lower level of concession-making: they'll ask for a maximum but have to find the right measure.

The Americans know that Christopher's visit to Belgrade, however strict and threatening its intonation, is a gift from heaven for Milosevic in terms of propaganda value. Clinton has to leave the impression that he's making no concessions to Serbia because of his own PR. So the Americans invested great efforts in obstructing the normalization of EU-FRY relations and the renewal of US-FRY relations is always a step away (Milosevic and Christopher said it would be taken step-by-step).

Asked about the differences in the Baker and Christopher visits, Holbrooke said: The Baker visit was a turning point on the road downhill and this is a potential turning point towards peace in the region.

The overall context of the two visits is essentially different. In the summer of 1991, the US was concerned primarily with Gorbachev's reforms and feared that the Soviet Union could fall apart violently. The Bush administration's policy was not to encourage independence for the Baltic republics, the Ukraine and other Soviet republics.

American policy in the Balkans at the time was hesitant and constantly changing, depending on assessments what solution would be best for regional and global stability. American policy in the Balkans was non-existent in fact as the last US ambassador to Belgrade (Warren Zimmerman) recalls frequently.

As for the Serb side, it's hard, based on existing sources, to gauge the anxiety the American stands and Baker's visit caused. In his book the Last Days of the SFRJ, Borisav Jovic says he went to an informal June 24 meeting in Milosevic's cabinet and heard the Serbian president tell his associates that "the US want Yugoslavia to survive but as pro-American" and that the US have no other choice but to accept Yugoslavia with Ante Markovic and that the choice of Mesic as state presidency president is "in the function of that interest".

The Serbian leadership was then preoccupied with the question whose side is America on, since it had valid indications that it does not enjoy even hidden support from Zimmerman and the State Department. In June 1990, Jovic spoke to the US ambassador and stressed that "no one should gain the impression that the US is behind him". IN that regard, Yugoslavia seemed like a banana republic since 1988 with its leaders constantly concerned whether the US is backing political opponents. There was a big fuss in the Moslem-Croat Federation when Haris Silajdzic resigned as prime minister and Washington openly criticized Alija Izetbegovic: conspiracy theories said Silajdzic is a US man, that the Americans told him to resign, that he enjoys their support.

The Americans are now interested in Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic who didn't show up for a meeting with Christopher in Sarajevo. (Silajdzic was invited to a similar meeting). That interest in Radic has stirred up some excitement in the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS).

Informed sources in Washington said the US won't interfere in the elections and won't even dare to back anyone at least not openly. People in the RS are willing to accept a Milosevic clone, preferring anyone to the people in power.

I'm Not Coming Back!

Richard Holbrooke was in top form last week in Belgrade. The Balkan Kissinger returned to the site of his great diplomatic battles in the company of Warren Christopher with all the glory of a peacemaker. American correspondents who know him better said the press conference in the Intercontinental hotel, right after Christopher's meeting with Milosevic, was Holbrooke at his best: he responded to everyone who tried to get his attention, made statements right and left, joked and laughed at other people's humor. Washington Post reporter Michael Dobbs introduced to assistant Secretary of State VREME reporter and instructed Holbrooke to brief VREME next time he's in Belgrade. "I'm glad to meet you but I will never be back in Belgrade again", Holbrooke said with a smile.