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February 19, 1996
. Vreme News Digest Agency No 228
War Crimes

The Air Lift To the Hague

by Filip Svarm & Dejan Anastasijevic

General Djordje Djukic, assistant to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) chief of staff for logistics, and his closest associate Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic took off from Sarajevo airport on the evening of February 12. Dressed in NATO uniforms with helmets, flak jackets and goggles they were hustled out of Sarajevo's central prison to the Scheveningen prison in the Hague. Although no formal charges were raised against them, at least that's what assistant US Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke said, those two men became the first who were arrested and extradited from the former Yugoslavia on suspicion of violations of international humanitarian law.

The handing over of Djukic and Krsmanovic to war crimes tribunal chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone ended the two week crisis which was unanimously seen as the biggest challenge to the Dayton agreement. Its consequences will be far reaching.

Everything began on January 30 when the Bosnian police stopped the car Djukic and Krsmanovic were in on one of the blue routes. Reports said the arrests were made between Ilijas and Vogosca suburbs and added that the car and the men inside did not have military insignia. The assumption is that Djukic took a wrong turn somewhere or wanted to avoid the longer but safer route through Serb territory.

Official statements from the Bosnian police said the formal reason why the car was stopped was suspicion the car was stolen which, according to VREME sources might not be too far off the mark since the Mercedes was registered as commandeered. The sources said Federation officials were informed of Djukic's movements by IFOR because he went through their checkpoint earlier. In any case everyone in the car was arrested and taken to Sarajevo's central prison and an investigation was launched

At first, the Serbs did not want to raise a fuss over the arrests probably assuming that they would reach some kind of agreement with Sarajevo. That didn't happen and on February 2 the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) government officially asked IFOR to help with their release invoking the freedom of movement clause in the Dayton agreement and the fact that Djukic and Krsmanovic were on their way to negotiations. IFOR denied that and said it didn't want to get involved.

Then the situation turned into a crisis: since the RS leaders include a few who have reason to fear the same fate as Djukic they decided to play hardball. The RS government announced it was cutting off contacts with the Bosnian Federation on February 6. General Mladic announced he was breaking off cooperation with IFOR and issued orders on February 8 which also banned RS citizens from crossing into Federation territory. RS justice minister Marko Arsic threatened that the Serb side would arrest Federation citizens in retaliation. We didn't have to wait long for that threat to come true: the Serbs arrested Hidajet Delic, a photographer with the BH Press agency in Ilidza and charged him with spying.

All that, especially the break in contacts, disturbed IFOR and the rest of the international community: there were fears that the closing of the routes that cut through the existing demarcation lines could bring the siege back to Sarajevo and annul everything that had been achieved. Concern was voiced from all sides: IFOR spokesman Andrew Cummings called the arrest irresponsible and warned that it could harm the peace process. In Belgrade, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev said Russia "has already taken appropriate steps" to get the BSA officers released and in Washington, White House spokeswoman Glyn Davis said on February 9 that the sides in Bosnia should not just arrest anyone they please. It became obvious that there had to be some sort of rules who can be arrested and how. The State department's clear stand prevailed: Our stand is that the Hague tribunal has to have control of the situation.

Richard Goldstone could hardly wait: On February 7 he asked the Federation to hand over Djukic and Krsmanovic so his investigators could interrogate them. The Bosnian government didn't wait the obligatory 60 days but met the request immediately, knowing that would get it off the hook for the arrests.

In the meantime, tensions rose between the Serbs, IFOR and the Federation but the first signs of a calm appeared.

First, Mladic's ordered break in contacts with IFOR was only partly implemented: contacts between the two supreme commands were broken off but liaison officers were still at work; second Mladic's other order banning RS citizens from crossing into Federation territory was ignored. Despite all the fears, the Serbs and the Moslems did not continue arresting each other's citizens and the people soon lost their fear and continued using the IFOR routes. And no one was impressed by the threats to IFOR by some Serb sources.

US joint chiefs chairman General John Shalikashvili said whoever thinks they can threaten IFOR is wrong and Admiral Leighton Smith reacted just as fiercely recalling that his troops have the right to shoot even if they think someone is threatening them.

The key event in calming the situation was a meeting between Slobodan Milosevic, Karadzic, RS Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic and parliament Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik in Belgrade on February 7. That meeting was short and fierce and hopes of winning support in Belgrade were lost. The turn of events shows just that since everyone but Mladic softened their stands. On February 9, the Kasagic government decided to continue cooperating with IFOR and confirmed its decision a day later. Even Karadzic abandoned Mladic saying the general had exceeded his authority, words used by Kasagic and the Banja Luka opposition as well.

So only General Mladic didn't realize things would end up as they did and his undisputed authority has been damaged in the process. RS vice-president Nikola Koljevic made sure everyone knew the political compactness of the Bosnian Serbs had definitely ended when he said it's good the two officers were taken to the Hague because they would have been treated much worse in Sarajevo. He also voiced hope that they would be released soon.

So the arrest of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic went from situation to crisis to precedent in 12 days setting the stage for the further implementation of the peace agreement articles on hunting down war criminals. The details of that hunt seem to have been the reason why Holbrooke went to Belgrade and Sarajevo. First he got Milosevic to say that individual incidents should not be allowed to obstruct the implementation of the peace plan as a whole but responsibility for dangerous individual incidents can't be disregarded. Holbrooke made that statement clear at a press conference in Sarajevo with Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic. He announced a five point agreement under which the Federation government is obliged to provide a list of suspected war criminals for the Hague tribunal to verify. Their arrest will be permitted only with tribunal approval. Holbrooke said the agreement obliges both sides to protect free movement and resolves the way war criminals will be hunted.

So a compromise solution was found. Milosevic would swallow the arrest and extradition which means he finally succumbed to international pressure to start handing over Serb war criminals. In return, Sarajevo won't do anything on its own. IFOR will have to play a more active role although its command has resisted the unpleasant and risky job from the start. After a report by the Washington Post that Karadzic went through four IFOR checkpoints on his way to Banja Luka, IFOR will be provided photographs of the 12 most wanted people on the war crimes lists including Karadzic and Mladic. Their freedom of movement is definitely over.

Those in the know in the Bosnian army said the Federation authorities and judge Goldstone got a real intelligence pearl when they arrested Djukic. Djukic was in charge of logistics in the BSA general staff and he knows about front line situations and the rear echelon including POW camps. He knows about the arms and ammunition that came in from Yugoslavia and supplies for the POW camps and other things. Tom Warrick, an official of the Coalition for International Justice (an organization very close to the Tribunal) told VREME that the two men are crown witnesses. In other words, we caught Al Capone's book keeper.

VREME sources close to the RS leadership said the arrests were actually abductions. They stressed that there were no Serb or Moslem checkpoints along the route they were using and added that Moslem special forces actually ambushed Djukic. They alleged that IFOR told them who was in the car. Those sources said Djukic and Krsmanovic were interrogated by the Bosnian secret service and NATO experts and had enough time, even without using torture, to find out what they wanted to know. In any case the BSA general staff don't know what Djukic and Krsmanovic could have disclosed and in that context the isolation of the four prisoners the Sarajevo authorities released in the meantime is indicative. What Goldstone will be able to use in court is another matter. Djukic has asked to be represented by Belgrade lawyer Toma Fila.

At the moment, speculation is rife about the arrests. Besides the claims that IFOR orchestrated the whole thing there are two more. Ljubljana daily Delo said the general and colonel surrendered to save their lives because they know too much about both Pale and Belgrade. Informed sources in Belgrade said that's nonsense: they know the men, their families are here. The second rumor is more specific; Djukic was arrested on his way to Vogosca, the site of a large military industrial complex that never stopped working during the war; everyone profited. The Bosnian Serbs can't take it all out especially the huge presses and the rumor is that the two officers were arrested because someone paid to have it all destroyed.

Who is General Djukic?

Informal sources said he was born in 1933 or '34 near Glamoc, Western Bosnia. He is seriously ill; reported to have had a cancer operation recently. in the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) he was commander of a logistics base in Pancevo and chief of the technical services in the 1st army district and defence ministry. He was retired in 1992 as a Major General and joined the BSA at the same time as Milan Gvero in May 1992. People who know him describe him as a modest, intelligent and calm man. But he wasn't insignificant in the BSA and that is shown by Karadzic's efforts to retire him in 1995 when the Bosnian Krajina fell. Karadzic and his associates were fiercely attacked in Banja Luka then for profiteering and embezzlement and Djukic was the man who knew the most by the very nature of his job. Mladic and his staff just rejected Karadzic's orders then.

Colonel Krsmanovic, Djukic's closest associate, was a technical services officer in the JNA Sarajevo corps and later in the 2d army district under General Kukanjac.

Procedure

The arrest and extradition of General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic made many (not just Serb) analysts wonder whether the procedures of the Dayton agreement and international law were violated as well as local law. Article IV of the Bosnian constitution (defined as annex 4 of the Dayton agreement, obliging to both entities) and article 29 and rule 40 of the statute of the Hague tribunal.

Point 8, article IV of the Bosnian constitution: all the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina will cooperate with international observer institutions for human rights and the international war crimes tribunal and will especially submit to orders stemming from article 29 of the tribunal statute.

Article 29 of the tribunal statute: States will, without unnecessary delay, meet every demand for assistance or orders issued by the tribunal council including but not limited to arrests and imprisonment.

Tribunal procedure rule 40: In emergencies, the prosecutor can demand that a state temporarily detain a suspect and take all necessary steps to prevent the escape of the suspect or detained person, harm or intimidation of victims or witnesses or destruction of evidence. The state that this refers to will respond to the demand under statute article 29.

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