Regime Crisis

A state of nervous indecision is ruling Serbia this spring. The regime is waging a cold war with the democratic opposition which has announced it will: unite in parliament and out of it to oppose the regime, ask where all the money went and who stole last year's wheat crop, and demand the return of Serbia to Europe, speedy privatization, a civil society and the rule of law (Belgrade, March 9, Nis, March 30).

The chameleons in the regime are waging occasional anti-European campaigns (against Vuk Draskovic and the independent media), upsetting Milosevic's deals with the West at times and seem to be forcing him to make a mess of what he deleted, and wait for the elections in Russia to see if Zyuganov will bring something they prefer.

The democratic opposition is forced to submit the bill of guilt for the war in which two centuries of Serb history and honour disappeared. That gives it the excuse to, as Draskovic does, ironically hit back and say we planned the war, we worked with criminals, we chased the Serbs out of Sarajevo, we went to war with the whole world, we tricked the people out of their money.

When the new propaganda produces an adverse effect in the world which Serbia is headed for (and it must all seem anachronous, backward and despotic to the world) then they start lying about the highest, excessive, even dangerous level of media freedom, parties, individuals.

The regime could have, but didn't want to, use the mood and pressure from political parties willing to turn the page in the interest of consolidating Serbia and bringing it closer to Europe, postpone the debates on guilt and defeat and took several steps (stopped live TV coverage of parliament, took over Studio B) which frustrated democratic forces, pushed them away, forced them to use anti-Communist arguments and continued preventing the consolidation of the political scene as it did during the war.

The Socialists and Communists are now attacking only those parties which had a chance of winning European legitimacy or, failing that, exerting pressure for a rapprochement with Europe, before them. Just like they attacked federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic before the war who was seen as "the American man". One of a series of comments against Draskovic even said that - that they are the ones who enjoy international trust not Draskovic.

Amid the overall mood of defeat, the authorities emitted several nervous signals showing fear of possible disturbances. That probably stems from the ruling party's assessment that it does not rank too high with the population, that half the electorate is disappointed and say they won't vote next time. They know Seselj is still fairly strong but they're leaving him alone maybe because they need a conflict to eliminate the competition and give themselves legitimacy as the only factor of stability and the Radicals have been presented as a scarecrow, an export, like Zhirinovsky was to Yeltsin. Seselj seems to be thinking that the latest series of attacks is useful to regime opponents and is saying he's sorry his party hasn't been attacked.

Draskovic is teasing Milosevic now by telling officers and generals to think what they should do. The army is unhappy about the "ruin and abandon" technique but hasn't shown any visible sign of being disloyal, but state employees have. Teachers and metal workers have been protesting and now civil servants are saying they'll strike.

What does Milosevic do in that situation? Changes in the party, promotions in the police, monopolies over the main print and electronic media, an anesthetic in the form of 48 political and non-political, state or private, local or national TV channels in the form of light entertainment and humble loyalty. The opposition is banned from meeting in squares, it's being obstructed with bizarre details at rallies. After the rally in Nis, the opposition is saying the authorities are even faking the weather forecast because of their gatherings (they predicted snow on a sunny day). A large number of policemen are on alert every time the opposition meets but neither the police or demonstrators are showing any visible tendency to clash.

The SPS Congress showed that the party is becoming a collection of the leader's courtiers, and party protégés are being eliminated so they won't resist anything and that spreads insecurity.

After Dayton and before it, he opted for optimistic propaganda to make up for the visible results.

In his address to the SPS Congress Milosevic said the priority is economic development (and economic and cultural development), and added that contemporary economic and technical experience would be used. Political experience in the free democratic world was not mentioned when he spoke of the formula to unite experts, workers, farmers, intellectuals and young people.

Todor Kuljic said in his eloquent historic study Forms of Personal Power that the leader usually needs a high ranking figure to take the responsibility for failures and unpopular measures; the sultan had the grand vizier, Western monarchies had governments, socialism has police chiefs (who loses his head over the need to hide crimes. Stalin executed several police chiefs who protected his charisma). A lot has been written to prove President Milosevic is pushing the police but that story is complicated because of Kosovo.

Milosevic made several public gestures in an effort to show that he's looking to technocracy, i.e. the Serbian government made up of company directors who are supposed to get production and investments moving and keep the economy somewhere between East and West by preserving the system.

Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic was hugged by the president at the congress and received him during a session of the republican parliament.

The government, headed by the experience of socialist directors, has some advantages over the Zelenovic and Bozovic war-time governments and Sainovic's hyper-inflation cabinet, but it faces a possible loss of credibility over the so-called conflict of interest when cabinet ministers are company directors and their companies are working with the government as in the case of last year's wheat harvest which Djindjic is pressing. The authorities tried to cover up the scandal by refusing to start a debate in parliament and by filing a law suit which got a political dimension once Djindjic became a witness. The game is going both ways - Milosevic's spies are hammering the opposition but documents are being leaked to the opposition.

The government will be restructured soon but that probably won't change it too much.

Milosevic's main political capital is the fact that foreigners rely on him because of the promises he made (in English and psychologists say it's harder for him to lie in English) but that support ties his hands because it's conditioned on constructive activities in the region, democratic behaviour at home and normalization of relations with the Albanians. He doesn't even like the "d" in democracy and there probably won't be a dialogue with the Albanians soon, judging from the recent round table on inter-ethnic relations.

Despite all the boasting, there hasn't been any money from the West yet and everything is standing. Milosevic might have judged he can allow some capitalism (as much capitalism as there is capital) and some state control. He also destroyed pro-European political rivals and woke nostalgia for Communism. JUL was promoted by the media as planned and a large part of the nomenclature, civil service and organized journalists were allowed to join it and the president's wife. The opposition pointed out that a large number of the new capitalists with links to the state are there as well.

Besides family reasons, no one can list any reason why the Socialist authorities are turning one body into two. If this continues, they could wonder one day whether the authorities are controlled by the Socialists or Communists who brag of having 100,000 members.

The opposition isn't focusing as much anger on Milosevic as it used to, as much as it's using humour to destroy his charisma and show he's tied with apron strings.

Unlike the time he was climbing to power when he demonstrated decisiveness, Milosevic is hesitating now. There was a lot of calculation in his determination in earlier years but it was wrong, based on the false assumption of a coup in Moscow, the power of force in politics and everything else. His hesitation now is certainly conditioned by the political and theoretic ambitions of his wife, hopes of the return of Communism in the East, the interests of many lackeys and the needs of the poor for social security of any kind. The strongest pressure to resist changes might be coming from the techno-managers in the economy who are still clinging to state subsidies.

The killing of politics by suppressing parliament, silencing the opposition, weakening the independent media and barring political content form state media has strengthened the dull resignation and hopelessness that came with the defeat in war, lack of a catharsis at the end of the war and four months of no visible economic improvement. Emotional, political, material and psychological reserves are way down. Institutions that lost their autonomy are showing no sign of fighting to win it back.

Sociologist Silvano Bolcic defined the situation as a "destroyed society".

The president's environment recalls the Autumn of the Patriarch by Marques. His power is huge but he has few trustworthy associates and he's giving them several jobs at once.

A more detailed analysis would show signs of crisis in every field outside the leader's direct control, a confusion characteristic of declining totalitarian regimes.

That could be dangerous: sustaining controlled chaos to extend rule.