Pulp Fiction

Unlike Borisav Jovic who unintentionally painted a comical picture of the state presidency in his book "The Last Days of the SFRY", the current Slovenian prime minister took care to portray himself as he wasn't remembered by his contemporaries in this election year.

"My Truth" is 294 pages and is a classic example of the traps authors fall into when they recall themselves and events of six years ago. Instead of dull notes, it's more like a diary. The hero is a positive figure of course. Everyone else is negative in nuances; the Serbs, naturally without exception followed by then federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, generals, intelligence officers (federal and Serb), administrative staff, intelligence officers in Slovenia, Kucan's communists and so on. The book is full of hindsight in commenting upon the final sessions of the state presidency or event or people, with numerous remarks and actions selected under post festum criteria; the important thing is what makes us seem wise, everything else should be thrown out.

In the first chapter, Drnovsek warns history that he sees himself as some kind of opponent of the system in the late 1980s. In that context he explains how he was elected to the state presidency; he was exclusive. "I was relatively young, 38, a doctor of economic science and knew languages. My articles were limited but it was clear I was always arguing with the authorities."

Page 14 tells us of a deep dilemma for the future state presidency president: "How do I harmonize the fact that I'm Slovenia's representative in the presidency and also president of the Yugoslav federation. I decided to base myself on healthy reasoning. On one hand, I said a strong economic program would improve the situation in the state, lower discontent and political tension. But, I drew a clear line: I will try to resolve inter-nationality conflicts in the state but Slovenia must not be endangered. I gave myself that goal and there was no debate on it."

Drnovsek's book does not include the moment of weakness Jovic describes through a phone conversation on November 28, 1990 when he discussed the consequences of secession with Drnovsek. Jovic said Drnovsek "does not believe the referendum will work but he's sad about that. He's sorry he didn't resign after the DEMOS election victory in Slovenia. Now it's too late for him."

By comparing the two books, we can only conclude that the truth has two faces. It's good to compare descriptions of the same dates for example. The May 24, 1989 session: Jovic raised the question of Drnovsek's interview to Spiegel weekly. Drnovsek says: "Why was that interview such a problem? The questions were very provocative. My answers were along the lines of pre-election promises with a dose of diplomatic restraint. There was a clearly stated determination for a market economy, democracy, initiative to abolish the state of emergency in Kosovo. I called for reason and dialogue, tolerance. What did Jovic and his people object to? Jovic was not right. It seems my concept was unpleasant. There were extremes in it but it was very consistent and it was hard to oppose with arguments, especially from positions of force, emotional and historic nationalism."

Jovic did not describe that part of the session. But it's no less intriguing to read the part you won't find in Drnovsek's book that Jovic described: "Drnovsek explained that he gave the interview on April 15, before the elections and said Spiegel published it now and asked for understanding. He would not have said all that now. If he said that on April 15, he probably meant and thought it."

Drnovsek, fashionably, did not omit a chapter called Secret Services. But, if you expect the former head of state (and head of the secret services) to disclose some dark secret you'll be disappointed. The essence of it is this: "One of the special federal bodies was the council to protect constitutional order. It was a completely mysterious body with little known of its activities. It was linked to the secret services and for possible use of repression: in short it seemed, especially from Slovenia's perspective, to be a potential threat and danger to the democratization process and processes of establishing the political sovereignty of individual republics."

"Because of the incomplete presidency (the Bosnia and Macedonia representatives weren't there), I felt that it would not be right to elect two new members to that council. I suggested I take over the council personally until the full presidency can meet. That was unexpected and I obviously surprised them. My interest was not to personally head the council and take on that responsibility. But, it seemed like a good opportunity to see what that body was about during that month, how it operates, who's in it. The maneuver worked. I learned later from various remarks that this was a big surprise and in some ways they assessed that it was a good step and surprised the Serbs. That happened several times."

In any case, because of all the traps surrounding the head of state, Drnovsek concludes on page 42 that he can "trust only myself. My individual activities protected me because it was hard to predict. Even when I talked to someone and it was being recorded they couldn't do anything. My conversations were mainly brain-storming, checking various possibilities with others, and in most cases I would decide to do the opposite of what could be concluded in those conversations. That episode shows the price I had to pay for my adventurous choice as head of state."

There is one thing Drnovsek enjoyed; meeting foreign statesmen. To illustrate that he included scores of photos in the book. None of them include the other state presidency members or any rivals. The president stands alone. That says more than anything written in the book about their mutual relations and the break-up of the state. Also there are countless quotes from the foreign and domestic press, quotes that all describe President Drnovsek favorably.

There were moments when he was unselfish: "When I was riding in Tito's big Mercedes with a guest from Belgrade airport towards Dedinje people would stop and wave. I had an unreal feeling that this wasn't happening. As a child I watched Tito ride by like that." (page 45).

The best of all are the comparisons of dates in the Jovic and Drnovsek books. Jovic does not mention that the Serbian leadership would be obliged to him if he appears at the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo and that the Serbian regime would ease up on Kosovo in return. On the other hand, Drnovsek forgot about the abolition of the four men charged in the Ljubljana military court who he lobbied for but did not dare suggest a pardon at a June 21, 1989 session although he issued some threats.

Drnovsek signed the state of emergency decree. He says he did it because it is a novel document better than the others. "As I expected, political opponents in Slovenia later attacked me and criticized me for signing an act that regulates the operations of state bodies in a state of emergency. But without a basis. No repressive measures were imposed because of that document," Drnovsek says now.

Jovic wrote about the same subject but through the rivalry of Drnovsek and Milosevic: "Drnovsek asked what were the chances of lifting the economic blockade (of Slovenia). Sloba linked it to stands on Kosovo and suggested that the state presidency should call Slovenia and Serbia to talk. Serbia would accept. Drnovsek doubted that the Slovenians would dare accept prior to elections but asked if it would be enough for him to support the request for a military intervention and Serbia would take some of the mentioned steps."

In short, nothing new apart from the fact that Gaddafi's bodyguard bit the ear of a security officer at the non-aligned summit. The language is wholesome, as Drnovsek likes to describe his rhetoric: from attributes like "turbulent", to sentences like "alea jacta est" and jogging on the grounds of his residence when a guard almost shot him thinking he was a burglar. There's also Kadijevic's statement that he won't allow a civil war to start. Kadijevic, according to Drnovsek, said: "If that happens we (the JNA generals) should be hanged because we did not prevent it".

Drnovsek's book makes it clear that no one did anything to stop it. Everyone calculated for their own interest, assessed who was more afraid of war which everyone, at least according to notes from the meetings, feared. Unfortunately, "My Truth" didn't get far past its title. A simple pre-election pamphlet and nothing more.