Klein's Two Routes

Jacques Klein, the chief of the UN interim administration for Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem is facing a task that no one has managed to fulfill so far. Within a year, ethnically-cleansed territory ought to be transferred from Serb to Croat authority. And the process should be done without war or the mass exodus of Serbs, with the return of Croat refugees and maximum observance of human rights, demilitarization, etc.

"We are some kind of a solicitor between two clients," Klein explained how he saw his role. And he also explained what his starting point was: "I have told Serb leaders the following: Gentlemen, there are two routes - an easier one and a more difficult one. The easier one is mine - if you cooperate, I shall fix things with the Croatian authorities in the best way possible. You rebelled, played your cards and lost. If you do not help me, the other, more difficult route will be there for you. I shall go and the Croats will do the job themselves."

Ivica Vrkic, the chief or the Croatian Government's Office for Eastern Slavonia, has said that the "scenario" of the Serbs leaving Sarajevo will probably be repeated in Eastern Slavonia. He said the Serbs should make a "turn in their heads, in themselves - from the idea that they should have a state of their own, to the idea that they should finally remain in Croatia."

"Some people are taking their possessions to safe places so that they could later play the role of the people who are leaving the area, taking only bundles with them."

Several international mediators and administrators were in the Balkans before Jacques Klein, from Lord Carrington to the ill-fortuned Hans Koschnik who luckily saved his head from the Croat rage in Mostar. Klein should find it worthwhile to study their experiences concerning the problems which he will be facing shortly. Klein's approach to the new job reflects typical American business optimism; he is pushing in the enthusiastic manner, trying to radiate good vibrations and keeps repeating how the North and the South successfully reconciled after the American Civil War.

At the same time, the chief of the interim administration in Sector East believes in the people's rational economic approach. Asked how he intended to make the Serbs accept the Croatian currency, the kuna, he said: "I shall give them a good exchange rate. In the beginning, dinar, kuna and German Mark will co-exist and in late fall we shall replace the dinar by the kuna at the exchange rate 1:1. This means the dinar owners will profit, but in this way we shall introduce the kuna overnight." Considering the drastic difference in the purchasing power of the dinar and kuna (dinar's advantage), there can hardly be any profit.

Klein showed similar optimism concerning demilitarization: As soon as UNTAES forces establish themselves in the field, disarmament of all military and police formations, except the agreed civil police, will begin.

Jacques Klein's guarantees that all Croatian citizens were entitled to remain and live wherever they wanted in the territory of the Republic of Croatia have not impressed anyone. A refugee from another part of Croatia is unlikely to sit and wait for the former house owner to come accompanied by the Croatian Police and take what belongs to him. If we think about operations Flash (Western Slavonia, May 1995) and Tempest (Republic of Serb Krajina, August 1995) - and the memory is a very vivid one - even the native Serb citizens are not very likely to sit and wait for the Croatian authorities and the Croatian refugees to return to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem; too many houses have been demolished in the meantime and one might expect incidents with the returnees.

Klein, however, maintains that the mass exodus of Serbs from Sector East would be "our greatest defeat," unaware of much greater possible defeats such as a Croatian military action as a result of the loss of political patience or political dynamics, or for political-pragmatic reasons, such as elections. What strikes most is that the most important thing is not being mentioned: UNTAES's "greatest defeat" - mass flight of Serbs from the sector - is hardly a defeat from the Croatian point of view; quite the contrary. From Belgrade's point of view it is a defeat, but it is a Belgrade defeat, not a Slavonia or Baranja one: the commanders of rebel Serbs in the area in 1991 are well known, so Belgrade's silence will be just as vociferous. If Klein believes - in the unlikely case the Serbs stay in the sector - that the Republic of Croatia is willing to offer hospitality to all its citizens from Mirkovci to Ilok and from Beli Manastir to Lipovac, he must be an optimist - as we have said.