Purgatory

Serbia has begun the census of refugees. Those are the people who were endangered and Serbia wanted to protect them and then the war broke out. This is why international sanctions were imposed on Serbia and it became poor. One lot of Serbs agreed to be half-hungry so that another lot of Serbs could lose their homes and land. It could be the other way around, but whichever the way, the overall result is the same, double goose eggs on both sides of the Drina river.

This short story can be told in many other ways, it can be longer, more complex and less unpleasant for the Serbs, especially for Milosevic and his party, in case they are forced to address the voters. The problem is that there are too many official versions, which are not always identical because each of them covers only one part, so one finds it difficult to put them together to complete the story. What one gets is something similar to the anecdote about the man who was accused in court of having returned the pitcher he had borrowed from his neighbor, with a hole in it. He defended himself by saying three things: that he had borrowed no pitcher, that the pitcher had a hole in it when he borrowed it and that he had returned the pitcher with no hole in it.

As for the refugees, they were mentioned most at the beginning of the war, when the point was to reply to accusations about aggression, to show that the Serbs, too, were the victims and not only the Croats and Muslims. But when last summer Krajina flowed into Serbia, when the Serbs really were the victims, the disaster was no longer interesting. In this part of the story, the emphasis was placed on Serbia's sacrifice and solidarity and successful care for the wretched ones.

However, for the purpose of obtaining international humanitarian aid, Serbia was willing to prove that they were totally unprovided for and that there were far more refugees than any census could show. This is true, by the way, because the refugees in Serbia had on one occasion been chased and forcibly mobilized and now they are being asked to enlist for the financial aid from the Japanese government. I can imagine how this may seem to them and how they will respond to this call.

Other parts of the more recent official history also do not always fit in. Was the war won or lost, who started and led it, and was there a war at all? An ideal history text-book for Serbian students ought to show that Serbia had never been in the war; that Milosevic first won it; then that Martic and Karadzic lost it and eventually that in Dayton Milosevic saved us again, because he had always been against the war.

The hostile West is to be held responsible for the international sanctions which could do no harm to Serbia. But of course, those same sanctions are to blame for all the poverty and that West is clever and knows what to do when they are negotiating with Milosevic and not with the opposition. And sending the ambassadors to Belgrade, all the best there are.

After all, who says that we are not living well here, that there is no money and that it could be worse? Such things can be read only in the newspapers financed from abroad, which publish the statements by Governor of the National Bank Dragoslav Avramovic. The governor showed up when there was more money than ever before, more than anything else. It was good that he stopped printing bank-notes then, but it is not good that he won't start printing now again and instead wants international loans and asks the ministers what they did with the money from the wheat. How does the governor expect the farmers to vote for this regime, if he keeps reminding them that the state had robbed them?

Governor Avramovic is in the focus of attention right now because he reflects an important part of the story about Milosevic's political balance. This part refers to the questions: where is the money? how to get it? who took and robbed what? must we for once know what belongs to whom? and how to carry out privatization and leave all the power and monopoly intact? One cannot speak about these with any more sense and logic than about the war, sanctions, refugees, without mentioning Milosevic.

Another major topic is Kosovo, where Milosevic started the series of his accomplishments which later so wickedly changed that no one, not even the author himself, can recognize them any more. He is aware that he will have to make sacrifices, perhaps even to meet and talk with Rugova personally, perhaps to bring everything to the previous state, but how will he then later announce it as his great success and victory?

Few people in history have managed to fail so many times in only a few years and to stay in power. There are various explanations for this mystery, from the analysis of national character to television, but none of them seem quite satisfactory. This cannot possibly be a total defeat - somebody must be profiting.

I would say that Milosevic's war and partly post-war policies fulfilled two basic, strong motives: revenge and plunder. Revenge was recognized and invoked in the official propaganda, through all the reminders of the crimes and genocide from the previous war. This impulse was well accepted, also in Croatia and Bosnia, but perhaps it dominated the Belgrade national elite, the people whose relatives had not lived there or suffered from the Ustashi. For them, this was an abstract, historical revenge and they hesitated less than many of the Serbs in Krajina and Bosnia who were expected to fulfill their wish.

At the beginning of the war, these people were so happy that they could not be angry when it came to an end. They do not like the outcome, of course, but the beginning was so powerful that they can now only be disappointed and this is not the kind of energy that can overthrow the regime. This is why Milosevic sees no serious threat from these people who remember being delighted collaborators and know that they have no right to be angry. The measure of their present disappointment is equal to their former revenging enthusiasm. This is why everyone in Serbia is so sleepy.

As for the robbery, it never had been an acknowledged motive, but it is much more stable, permanent and is not liable to changes of mood. This motive outlived the war because the outcome did not matter. This is why Milosevic may forget about the delighted and then the disappointed ones, but must not forget about the cold and cunning robbers. They are the regime's only reliable pillar that has remained.

The trouble is that, in the long run, they undermine and exhaust the society and the resources, including the regime which relies on them. The long run is running out in Serbia right now, and there is no fresh money in sight. This is why there is such a hustle about Governor Avramovic, his refusal to print money and his intention to carry on the privatization process. If he prints money, the robbery cannot be covered up, if he carries out the privatization process, a future robbery will be prevented. To be more precise, these same socialist plunderers would manage in the circumstances of privatization, just like they did throughout Eastern Europe, although they would have to become more modest and the rules of the game would change, and they are too lazy to learn the new rules.

Now I think I understand why Milosevic continues to rely on JUL and is shutting all perspectives of a more normal outcome for himself and Serbia. It is not only because of the duties set out in his marriage agreement, but also because every other way is more dangerous and disastrous for him. There could be no talk about liberalization without mentioning the sad story from the beginning of this text. The refugees, invalids, corpses, sites of fires, camps, detention centers and war criminals would start pouring out through the smallest holes, all equally idle and senseless.

JUL, however, covers up all of this with an ideological magic which advocates forgetfulness and talks about beauty, peace, equality, happiness, love, culture and art. It sounds idiotic and no one who cares to talk believes it. Even the ideologists themselves do not believe it, but they probably think it is something they ought to say, just to break the silence. If this is so, they would do just as well and would be equally useful if they only whistled.