The Sarajevo Shots

Izetbegovic would drastically raise his rating if he issued the statement asking for alliance with "Yugoslavia", offering autonomy to the Serbs, and then, demand from Belgrade, in return, to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not to manage financial resources in a neo-communist manner but professionally and according to international standards As soon as the first bullets began to whiz in Sarajevo, and the trucks started to blockade its streets, a new chapter was opened for Milosevic's "Serbian cause" and for Izetbegovic's presidency. Karadzic will not shoot unless the Belgrade socialists pull his forefinger. Milosevic does not want that. He is scared and confused. For the first time in the five year long history of his policy of force he does not dare to strike. With his sixth sense, he is feeling the threat of a fire in Belgrade, and that Serbia is threatened with an international blow of such intensity that the Kosovo myth could fall even before he does, as the Serbian Messiah. And without the myth he is finished.

Even if some impatient Karadzic's militants start independent machine gun shootouts with their neighbors, Milosevic will soon have to issue a statement condemning their adventurousness and lack of discipline. Karadzic, along with Bozovic, represents the peak of his creative capabilities, and he cannot do anything with him except to convince him, one day or another, that he should accept the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is his as much as it is Izetbegovic's. If the Bosnians engage in fierce fighting, Milosevic will have to mop them up with a gradual recognition of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Presently, he is incapable of doing that, because he doesn't know what he really wants. As soon as he failed in his attempt to become another Tito for the entire Yugoslav territory, and got exposed with the Greater Serbia, he lost his objective.

An honorable way should be left for Karadzic to get out of the whole mess. Amongst the Belgrade observers, it is often stated that Izetbegovic's repudiation of the ideas about autonomies is nothing but the opposite, or extremism, in relation to secessionism of the Serbian and Croatian nationalists. The Moslem nationalism cannot seek a absolute political domination - for it itself provides an inadequate solution to the Bosnian crisis.

Izetbegovic could calm the spirits in Sarajevo by issuing a statement saying that he believes that the monetary and tariffs union with Serbia and Montenegro, the so called Yugoslavia, is the best of all options for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An independent Bosnian currency could not be maintained anyway. Isolationism in terms of customs would destroy Bosnia. He should at least offer personal autonomy to the Serbs, proposing to Serbia to accept to guarantee the national rights of the Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He could propose the same both to the local Croats and to Zagreb.

The internal tripartite participation, with the fourth seat reserved for the "citizens", would probably mitigate the most ardent passions of the nationalists, although it would make everybody accustomed to the fact that the precondition for peace in Bosnia is its inter-ethnic division through a balance of fear.

The Bosnian problem can hardly be resolved without an international monetary intervention in Belgrade. How can Serbia be motivated to recognize Bosnia? To recognize Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia? The international circles certainly count on the following: no fresh money and trade embargo for Belgrade. Milosevic's National Bank of Yugoslavia must be taken over by the International Monetary Fund or must start functioning according to the principles of the Bundesbank of Germany. Belgrade would be more trusted than today if it fulfilled the unavoidable condition, i.e. to allow the central bank to pursue an independent monetary policy. Borisav Jovic is deluding himself before the socialist youth thinking that a mere inheriting of Yugoslavia by "Yugoslavia" will be interpreted by the international institutions as anything more than mere hypocritical political declaration. Jovic will not get a single cent from Washington if an international protectorate over the National Bank of Yugoslavia is not established. The main objective of both Europe and Washington is not to resolve the problem of Bosnia in Sarajevo, but in Belgrade. The socialists haven't got a feeling for the Yugoslav area, and they have got it even less when the global objectives of Washington, Brussels and other influential European capitals are concerned.

Izetbegovic would drastically raise his rating if he issued the statement asking for alliance with "Yugoslavia", offering autonomy to the Serbs, and giving Serbia the right to act as guarantor for it - and then, demand from Belgrade, in return, to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not to manage financial resources in a neo-communist manner but professionally and according to international standards. The problem is not that Izetbegovic has begun his quest for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina slightly too soon, but the fact that he did not secure himself at home by neutralizing Karadzic. The latter should be offered that which he cannot refuse, without risking a quarrel with Milosevic.

The space for Serbian manoeuvres in Bosnia is getting smaller and smaller. During the first two months of his mandate, Bozovic has demonstrated that he is totally incapable of leading a national economy in a crisis. Is it possible that history is repeating itself so quickly and that the years are turning back?! The freezing of wages and prices, the limiting of exports, the obligatory linking of imports with exports, the raising of taxes, - all of that again? The 1945 nationalization again? Bozovic is the one who will not get a single dime! Not even from China, because Jovic has decided to subjugate it by means of huge Serbian exports.

For Bosnia and Herzegovina, that government gives ground to the belief that Serbia is unable to secure a modern development. Any connection with it will, unfortunately, be compulsory, and perhaps insincere. After the loathsome statement of the deputy president of the Serbian Parliament, Pavic Obradovic, made on February 27, concerning the alleged unsettled status of a part of Macedonian territory, the already discredited policy of war is being reinstated, and it reenforces the impression of the Bosnians that Belgrade is hypocritical. If even Macedonia is menaced, how could it be expected from Sarajevo to sleep tightly? Milosevic must restrain his worn-out noisemakers, if he wants his "Yugoslavia" to be accepted by Sarajevo and Europe at least as a convenient transitive illusion.

Izetbegovic is not much ahead of Belgrade. If he gives in a bit to Karadzic, because the latter has already mitigated his radicalism, he puts Milosevic out of the game. Karadzic should be given the opportunity to feel independent. A little pride does no harm to anyone. The Serbs may be stubborn, but they will ultimately realize that Serbia is not their only country, and that the other states in which they live are theirs as well.