All Milosevic's Men

United States Information Agency (USIA) has not yet published the results of its public opinion poll conducted in the Bosnian Serb Republic in April, but the processing of the data has been completed. The poll covered three thousand citizens of the Bosnian Serb Republic who, among other things, said what they thought about leading Serbian politicians. Vice-president of the Bosnian Serb Republic Biljana Plavsic, to whom Radovan Karadzic transferred part of his authority last weekend, was not on the list of the persons whose popularity the Americans were interested in (unlike Ratko Mladic, Nikola Koljevic, Radovan Karadzic, Slobodan Milosevic and Momcilo Krajisnik). Nikola Koljevic, the vice-president of the Bosnian Serb Republic to whom Radovan Karadzic had transferred no authority, ranks high on the list. VREME has learned that he has the support of as many as 80 percent of the interviewed citizens (39 percent have a "very favorable" opinion of him while 41 percent consider him "favorable to an extent"). The credibility of Karadzic himself is some ten percent lower (31 percent "very favorable" and 37 percent "favorable to an extent") while Momcilo Krajisnik's position is even worse - only half of the interviewees had a positive opinion of him (20 percent in the superlative and 29 "to an extent").

If we are to trust the Americans, however, only the popularity of Ratko Mladic in the Bosnian Serb Republic exceeds that of Slobodan Milosevic (66 percent think all the best to him, as compared to Milosevic's 52 percent, while on the whole Milosevic is supported by 81 and Mladic by 93 percent of the people). The latest developments in the Bosnian Serb Republic, however, show that it is wiser to take the American results "cum grano salis": Karl Bildt's encouragement seems to have led to Rajko Kasagic's dismissal. Bildt had quoted American analyses, according to which Karadzic was losing popularity in the state and in the party while Kasagic was becoming more popular. The same poll shows that Silajdzic would simply "erase" Izetbegovic in elections and in the polls carried out six years ago similar interviewees said they would vote for Markovic's reformists and reformed Communists.

Pale does not take these parameters into consideration when making political steps, but one should wonder why not Nikola Koljevic instead of Biljana Plavsic? If they were looking for someone who could speak with Karl Bildt and John Kornblum, was Koljevic not the right man? He had been in Dayton and he had not been in Bijeljina and he was not embracing Arkan: according to the criteria of clean hands, which are in effect in the Bosnian Serb Republic, he perfectly fits in the image of clean-hand personnel, whom the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) requires in order to regain reputation ahead of elections. Throughout the war he was on the spot, he made major decisions and there are no rumors about him being a war-profiteer.

The latest political solution has proved that Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic has no power in Pale. If Slobodan Milosevic had been asked, Nikola Koljevic would have been the "acting president." Not because Koljevic is "Milosevic's man," since he is not. Three years of Milosevic's efforts to remove Karadzic in Pale, or to find him a credible alternative in Banja Luka, have yielded no results. There are many people across the Drina who would, if they found it personally profitable, betray Karadzic and follow Milosevic, but there is no other fairly relevant "Milosevic's man" in the Bosnian Serb leadership. The difference between Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic is not in the faithfulness to Serbia's leader or his "peaceful policy". From Milosevic's point of view, Koljevic would simply be the "lesser of two evils," a fabric which might, in due course, be made into a better and more permanent Rajko Kasagic. But the president was not offered to choose between the "two evils."

This, of course, does not mean that Bosnian Serb leadership will have to obey Belgrade. Karadzic's and Krajisnik's choice is similar to Milosevic's. They, too, have to choose between "two evils," between Sarajevo and Belgrade, between re-integration and allegiance. After all, they can choose only between a slow and a fast political death. Bosnian Serb leadership became a hostage of Milosevic's politics and its turns six years ago, when they joined in Milosevic's dance. Having broken off with Milosevic, Bosnian Serbs could not divorce the fateful consequences of his politics. This led them to Dayton, and now they have to live with Dayton. It is in Milosevic's nature to produce an illusion that he has his men across the Drina, who are faithful to him and who will, at a required moment, implement his will.

At this point, however, Milosevic still cannot remove Karadzic. What beats Serbia's president is that his powerlessness is not a result of Karadzic's power, but vice versa. Something lively and tough has remained of Karadzic's charisma; he still arouses some strong emotions among the Serbs across the Drina, even if these are the kind of emotions one feels at funerals. Karadzic and Mladic still arouse pathos, tragedy of defeat, unfairness of history. Before the war, Milosevic's charismatic personality reigned in Serbia and he communicated with his brothers across the Drina by telepathy. He produced Bosnian Serb leaders by single moves or blessings. He had created Karadzic by giving him two looks of approval: now, it requires more than lying press, NATO army and support of the world community to replace him. The secret is not in Radovan Karadzic's alleged political prestige, nor in the nationalist madness of Bosnian Serbs, but in Slobodan Milosevic and the nature of his reign in Serbia and over the Serbs. He is now relying on the ruling apparatus and repression levers: these methods are not an inspiration for new followers and cannot generate new political energy. It is no longer a matter of a political idea or a political product. That is why Belgrade has no other political follower to offer but Dragutin Ilic, the president of the Socialist Party of the Bosnian Serb Republic, who on Tuesday explained on channel one of Radio Television Serbia that Karadzic was politically dead when the not-so-well-informed media throughout the world were telling the viewers that the Sunday news on Karadzic's political death had been somewhat hasty.