Kinkel's List

The international community's hesitation to tackle Kosovo has brought a lot of disappointment to Kosovo's ethnic Albanians. They feel that the promises to give the Kosovo issue priority in preventative diplomacy were just words. If they did show any understanding for the fact that the Dayton talks focused on stopping the war in Bosnia, the Albanians don't understand why they are being ignored now and new concessions are being made to Serbia and the Milosevic regime.

The outer wall of sanctions, which was allegedly supposed to be an instrument to solve remaining problems, primarily Kosovo, is growing into a formality. The EU states recognized the FRY regardless of the unsolved status of Kosovo as the potential hotbed of a new crisis and war. Europe has given up on demanding even a minimum of guarantees from Belgrade that it will cooperate in resolving the Kosovo issue. On the contrary, the Europeans have practically given Belgrade carte blanche to set conditions for a solution, unlike the Americans who are still insisting on conditions for Belgrade.

The double standard policy of the West isn't promising anything good expect a continuation of the confusion we saw over Bosnia. Although there is agreement in principle that on the need to solve the status of ethnic Albanians as a condition for stability in the region (the most often mentioned solution is a high degree of autonomy for Kosovo), the Western powers can't agree on the instruments and pace of resolving the problem. They constantly urged the Kosovo Albanians to stay calm and be patient to prevent a new war and now they're using their inferior position for agreements with Milosevic. Kosovo can wait.

The illusions of the Albanians were broken after a visit to Belgrade by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of who they expected a lot. Germany seemed not to have agreed to recognize the FRY unconditionally (the only EU condition was recognizing Macedonia), they expected it to take a leading role in political and economic pressure on Belgrade to force it to make concessions and compromise on Kosovo and other issues vital to stability. But, it turned out that Kinkel's priorities were defined more by the German recession and huge expenses for Albanian and other Balkan asylum seekers than the country's long term regional interests. The return of 120,000 Yugoslav citizens, most of them Kosovo Albanians, who weren't given asylum was Kinkel's top priority. After he easily got Milosevic's agreement on that issue, Kinkel relaxed his pressure on other issues.

Some people feel that there is another side to Kinkel's deal. It might not be as unfavorable to the Albanians because it shows indirectly that Belgrade is on its knees in regard to Kosovo and the Albanians. Agreement to return 100,000 ethnic Albanians from Germany (similar demands will come from Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries for another 50-100,000) is the start of the end of Milosevic's Kosovo policy whose main aim was to bring more Serbs there. His agreement to the return of Albanians to Kosovo means he accepts their ethnic dominance there and that means it's just a question of time until their political dominance is accepted. Agreement in principle does not mean all the details on their return have been agreed or that procedural and economic guarantees won't follow.

Those are primarily firm guarantees the asylum seekers will demand along with Pristina. If they don't come and this is just a bilateral Belgrade-Bonn agreement, the operation could add more oil to the fire and not be a turning point in solving the crisis. The flight to Europe in 1990-91 when about 150,000 Albanians lost their jobs was the political valve that prevented an explosion in Kosovo. If 100,000 ethnic Albanians come back to Kosovo now they would be socially endangered along with there families and the peaceful resistance of today would break down and an uprising could happen. Further Belgrade-Bonn talks should be monitored closely to see if the Kosovo Albanians will be included. In any case, the return of the asylum seekers should be linked to a solution.

Even without that threat, the Albanian political scene is overcast with storm clouds. Developments have broken Albanian illusions that a solution is coming from outside and now they're looking for ways to adapt to the new reality in resignation or with anger.

The Kosovo Democratic Alliance (LDK) and its leader Ibrahim Rugova are still counting on US support but with fading optimism. The announced opening of the US information center in Pristina is perhaps the last chance to internationalize the issue. Skeptics warn that an American presence does not mean support for an independent Kosovo. Informed circles said the US asked Rugova to be the first to accept a solution for Kosovo within the FRY because that would allow more effective pressure on Belgrade and would be the first step in Belgrade-Pristina talks with foreign mediation.

Those rumors are true and that is shown by the stand of official Albania and its President Sali Berisha who lent support to Kosovo as part of the FRY. Rugova seems to have grasped that nothing can be done outside that framework but he does not have the courage to tell the Kosovo Albanians.

Instead, Adem Demaqi spoke up with a new, realistic platform which includes the maximum of Albanian demands within the formula of staying in the FRY but as the confederation of Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro. That includes recognizing the republic of Kosovo.

Rugova and some of his associates fiercely attacked Demaqi. They said there can be no links with Belgrade and Serbia, predicting that Demaqi's confederation means a loose alliance of sovereign states. The theoretic model of his Balkania confederation can't include Belgrade's dominance which advocates of independent Kosovo don't like.

The differences between Demaqi and Rugova aren't big. Both see the solution in a republic but Demaqi allows political, economic and military links with Serbia and Montenegro while Rugova advocates the vaguer formula of "independent Kosovo open equally towards Serbia and Albania". How can it be open towards Serbia without special political, economic and military arrangements with Belgrade?

In any case, Demaqi's proposal could ease the way for Rugova to find a softer stand and look for a way to start talking to Belgrade.

In a recent meeting with Rugova, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov clearly told the ethnic Albanian leader that independence for Kosovo does not have support from abroad for now, not even from the US, and that a compromise should be sought with the Serbs.

In any case, the possibilities are growing slimmer for both Rugova and Milosevic.