Serbian Elite

Political destruction of ethos in leadership as well as in a nation as a whole is the main cause of the division within the community or state between a unlawful, dishonest and powerful minority, and the large minority which is left homeless and desolate.

These lines were written by Milan Matic, professor at the Faculty of politics in Belgrade, in the essay "On the destruction of ethos in political paganism", published in the current issue of the journal "Serbian political thought" (4\95) entitled "Serbia today". The essay suggests that Serbian political life predominantly consists of undemocratic and authoritarian political elites, which instead of trying to strengthen democratic institutions, are doing everything to undermine them and use them to their own financial advantage. Consequences: deterioration of public services, civil rights, social norms, governmental and non-governmental institutions.

According to Milan Matic, in the sea of convincing evidence of a polluted political environment and rotting public spirit, particular attention should be paid to the conjugation of interest between the expanding private and monopolized public ownership. Many widely publicized financial and business scandals, bankruptcies etc., and a passive response from the authorities which followed, clearly reveal a link between public figures and influential individuals on one side and unscrupulous owners of public companies and banks on the other.

In the article "Democracy and political elite in Serbia", Slobodan Antonic of the Institute for political studies in Belgrade published the results of a survey conducted on a sample of 200 politicians of various political orientations (with the exception of the Serbian Radical Party whose members refused to cooperate). The sample included most prominent parliamentary representatives, some regional party leaders, and several governmental and trades union officials. In the article, the author compares the findings with those of other studies which deal with the consciousness of the ordinary Serbian man in the street, as well as with findings of studies on political elite conducted in Poland, Hungary and Russia.

Comparison reveals interesting and surprising results which Antonic stated with some reservation.

Like in most countries where post-communist transition is taking place, we are seeing an end to gerontocratic rule. Serbian political elite is getting younger- 48.5% of its members is between 36 and 45, while 19.5% are between 26 and 35 years of age. Only 3% are older than 56. In terms of age, Serbian political elite is closer to Hungarian and Polish than to Russian elite. Russian elite is older although the overall number of members of the oldest age group has been halved in recent years...

According to a study in 1993, members of the Serbian business elite show a similar distribution across age groups- Silvano Bolcic (1993) for example, found that two thirds of private entrepreneurs are under 45.

In Serbia however, key figures of the old regime managed to retain power in the new system or transform themselves into prominent businessmen either in private or public sector.

Children of our elite are far more interested in elite positions in business than in politics. According to a study by Mladen Lazic, 17 % of our business elite has fathers who were members of the state/business elite, of whom 5% were minor government officials. If we add to this figure the 10 % of private entrepreneurs who are married to someone in the political establishment, the overall percentage of businessmen with direct links with political elite is above one third.

Political elite in Serbia is undergoing a period of self renewal. Self renewal of political elite is also taking place in Russia where the proportion of politicians who survived the breakup of communism exceeds 40 %. On the other hand, in Hungary or Poland, where political elite tends to circulate, the rate of self renewal is around 33% and 24%, respectively.

Around 60% of the current political elite used to be members of the Yugoslav Union of Communists (SKJ), while 39.5% have been members for more than 10 years. Out of 122 opposition MPs elected in 1990, 97 were former members of SKJ of which one in three held some prominent position in the party hierarchy.

In the first Serbian parliament formed after the 1990 elections, 91% of opposition MPs, and 87.2% of all MPs received higher education.

25% of members of our political elite were sons of workers, 14% of peasants, 17.5% of clerks, 23% of experts in some academic field.

What is the political profile of our elite? Researchers were surprised to find that the elite is less authoritarian than the average citizen of Serbia. As an illustration of anti-authoritarianism, let us mention that compared to 47.6% of all citizens, only 17.5% of the elite agreed with the statement that "without a leader, a nation is like a headless man". Also, only 5% of the elite agreed with the statement that "every society must have a political authority which its members will trust completely", compared to 37.5% of ordinary citizens. In Andric's work, the slogan "will of the people is above all legal and moral norms" is treated as the key populist slogan which regularly throughout history lead to the bloodiest tyrannies. Members of the Serbian political elite were somewhat confused by the statement. According to the survey, it appears that only a third of our politicians truly abandoned populist illusions, while most others show the remains of antidemocratic, anti-individualistic ideologies and express readiness to place the "will of the people" above law and morality. On the other hand, Serbian public opinion does not respect the rule of law, but the rule of an individual.

The researchers asked the respondents to imagine the circumstances under which, for example, the majority of the people might decide that the parliament failed to meet their expectations and that it should be substituted with a system in which one individual (e.g. president of the republic) would have the greatest authority. Just under half of respondents (48%) passed the test in democracy by stating that even under such conditions they would continue to insist that democracy and its institutions are respected. Political parties with the highest proportion of people who passed the test were the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS; 90%) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO; 88.6%).

23% of our elite argued that the "will of the people" should be respected even if that means giving up the parliamentary system, most of whom came from the Serbian Radical Party (71.4%) and the Socialist Party (SPS; 37%).

Many advocated some kind of compromise (28%), mainly respondents from the New democracy (40%), SPS (37%) and the Democratic Party (34,7%).

The same elite which, according to the survey, would be classified as democratic, in practice shows extreme authoritarianism and intolerance. It is readily destroys parliamentarism thus causing a division in parliament. For example, by dismissing most influential members from parliamentary committees, without even a vote on the matter, the elite breeches some of the most basic rules of democracy. The elite is not only as undemocratic as the average citizen but ads both volume breadth to the prevailing authoritarianism and intolerance.

The researcher noted that members of our political elite, irrespective of whether they belong to the ruling party or the opposition, are much more similar to one another than the responses would suggest.

Antonic found that the elite is less xenophobic, less nationalistic, traditionalistic and collectivist and more modernistic and individualistic than the average citizen, though he treats these results with some reservation: if they wanted to create a false image of themselves, they would do it in the same direction-they would try to portray themselves as democrats. The fact that members of our political elite are preaching democratic values without practicing them (or even understanding them), shows that in any case they seem to be going through a period of democratic specialization. Our political elite, Antonic suggests, still sees politics as a war where the enemy must be destroyed by whatever means (including weakening or even destroying the order!)

In order to be able to reach agreement on democratic rules of play, which would lead to "restrained partisanship", the opposition elite ought to be allowed, not to participate in government, but to possess some institutional power. Opposition elite need not be allowed in the cabinet, but must be given access to the media, boards of directors of public companies and banks, sources of economic and financial power. Antonic also notes that 38.5% of business elite claimed that they are members of some executive board.

Antonic questions whether the ruling political elite holds all the strings simply because it is selfish and greedy (which, to some extent, can not be denied). Could it also be the case that the elite from the ruling party is not the real sovereign power holder in Serbia, but a relay of another will and another power, power of one man on whom the order in Serbia depends? The Cesarean president.

In the above mentioned essay on the destruction of ethos in political paganism, Milan Matic states that one of the greatest arenas but also the greatest scaffolds of our political ethos is the arena of party politics and struggle for power. Mediocre measures of loyalty which guide the choice of officials and distribution of public roles is not related to actual capabilities and virtues of those chosen, not only in party leadership but also in state hierarchy. Most parties are shaped on the principle of a single leader who is their first and foremost asset, and are used by its members and leaders for personal financial gains.

Matic also mentions that around a hundred political parties coexist in our political life, and concludes somewhat pessimistically, that more parties usually means less opposition.

Finally, Matic suggested that in a democracy a true and honest opposition is more important than a good government, since it can only improve it, while a bad opposition can only spoil the existing government.

Milosevic's Political Successes

What is the origin of the political obedience towards Milosevic? Explanations starting from the premise that people vote for Milosevic because he is for example a nationalist or a communist are false, says Dusan Pavlovic of the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade in the study "A hypothesis about political obedience". It would be difficult to state with precision how faithful Milosevic himself is to any particular ideology, although it is true that he could not have won the 1990 and 1992 elections had he not been a nationalist or a communist. Popular faith in Milosevic does not depend on the actual consequences of his rule. The fact that Serbia's position today is worse than at any other time in modern history or that nothing is functioning properly is not important for people who vote for Milosevic. Pavlovic holds the opinion that the reason for obedience lies in the fact that Milosevic never explicitly tried to do something and failed. "Milosevic's successes include for example: Dragisa Pavlovic, Ivan Stambolic, leaderships of Vojvodina and Kosovo, imprisoned Azem Vlasi, embargo on Slovenian goods, Ante Markovic, elections of 1990, Milan Babic, Milan Panic, elections of 1992, Dobrica Cosic, Draskovic in jail, Seselj in jail, dissolution of Serbian parliament in 1993, embargo on River Drina, reasoning with Karadzic, lifting of sanctions in November 1995, Borisav Jovic and Mihajlo Markovic who were sacked from the leadership of the Socialist party in 17 minutes... All that could be interpreted as his defeat (sanctions for example) is either covered up or treated as insignificant. Consequently, there is no such thing as a defeat in Milosevic's political duels".