Elections Stake

Once during the late 1970's, it happened that a power cut left almost the whole of Belgrade without electricity for a few hours. It was later explained that what happened was the consequence of a "breakdown in the system". Dusko Radovic, poet and Belgrade's champion of wit wondered at the time: What kind of a "system" was it if it could break down so easily? And what kind of a "breakdown" was it if it could be so easily repaired?

It was the current state of the Serbian opposition that reminded me of this episode from the past: parties are trying to maintain and improve, that is destroy mutual relations, so that united, that is each of them individually, they are ready take part in the oncoming elections, that is can enter them without any hope of winning. When one reads all the statements issued by the opposition parties it is difficult to establish if there ever was a coalition between the Serbian Renewal movement (SPO), Democratic Party (DS) and the Civil Union of Serbia (GSS), if there is such a coalition now, or if it is still to be created. Are quarrels temporary and transitory, are they the only permanent thing in the opposition?

Has anyone got the right to expect more, to wonder what material political figures are made of, if their words carry any weight or if they ever feel under an obligation to something or someone? It seems that the business of opposition leaders is very delicate, perishable, and sensitive to even the mildest breeze, so supporters and voters can only lament if the coalition "Together" breaks up before the elections. The fact that it existed for a while, in the shape of an appearance of some kind of agreement expressed through joined public campaigning by the tree parties, ought to be interpreted as a miracle, or Mercy of God which could not have lasted forever, and which did not happen in the most convenient moment since there were no elections at the time.

However, it ought to be acknowledged that it is not an easy task to reconcile political programs of parties which were until recently bitter political rivals, and the relative political influence of which is changeable, unequal and objectively unmeasurable. On the other hand, the only way of establishing their relative political influence would be for them to take part in the elections individually, and with the recent electoral reforms in mind, probably for the last time. By introducing the legislation on parliamentary constituencies which practically turned the system of proportional representation back into a majority system, Milosevic challenged the opposition leaders to solve a problem which he himself once failed to solve: to find a common interest with others who are different in terms of size, strength and political orientation and overcome these differences. When Milosevic was faced with this problem the stake was the whole country, war, peace, borders, life, death, but all he could say was: either things will be exactly as I want them to be or I will destroy everything a beat everyone up.

If we were discussing a myth about heroes, challenges and defeats instead of banal political reality, it would be possible to find some kind of justice in the whole thing: Milosevic places an obstacle and invites his rivals to demonstrate their skills and try and succeed where he failed. If they prove to be better than him, if they overcome their shortcomings and prove they can rely on each other, if they demonstrate highest democratic qualities, they deserve to be his successors.

I would personally agree with those who argue that such demands and unfair since no one should be required to prove he is better than the current leader, and the opposition should not be required to demonstrate the greatest virtues in order to win a contest against such a rotten regime. Is the worst authority really the most difficult to change? There is little justice in all this but plenty of logic: the worst a state authority is, the less democratic it is, which means its legislation is unfair and inforced only when it suits the regime. Even if such state authority does hold elections of some kind, it is certainly not in order to lose them. It usually threatens war in case of defeat. The paradox of democracy is therefore that the best government is the most easily lost. Citizens spoilt by long democratic tradition can not forgive their leaders even the smallest mistakes, while those who are not used to the freedom of choice allow the worst crooks to sit in government while demanding saintly purity of the opposition. On top of all this, rotten authority spoils and corrupts the people and with it the opposition, which instead of striving towards purity is now trying to catch up with the regime in terms of cynicism and corruption.

Serbia has witnessed on several occasions the inability of the opposition to take advantage of its moral superiority on the issues of war theft and corruption. Instead, the opposition emphasized that only people in power had been in a position to perform all the shameless acts, sometimes creating the impression that they regret not having an opportunity to take part. If there is a public perception that all that is going on is a competition between crooks who are jealous of each other's successes than it is easy to maintain even a very bad regime.

The hidden link between the regime and the opposition becomes apparent if we compare Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegrin government shows greater tolerance, common sense and willingness to compromise, compared to its Serbian counterpart. Similar difference in quality is apparent when one compares the opposition in the two republics. In Montenegro, a strong coalition has been established between the Liberals and the Populists two parties which are diametrically opposed on the fundamental question of sovereignty of Montenegro. In Serbia, not even similarly oriented parties are willing to suspend public insults in order to create strong opposition to a regime which is far worse than the Montenegrin one. Therefore there are greater chances for the better of the two regimes to lose at the next election.

If we ignore Seselj, who to everyone's advantage excluded himself from everything, the main actors on the political stage are still Djindjic, Draskovic and Kostunica. All three are well known and have been tested before and there would have been little hope for success had there not been a possibility that first of all two of them, and then all three, might appear before the electorate together. At the moment, it seems that this, some other, that is no coalition at all will happen but that its existence depends on the three party leaders. It is difficult to determine with precision to what extent each of the three politicians is responsible for the current low level of their mutual relations but it is apparent that grassroots of the three parties are contemplating mutiny. As I do not want to be accused of not performing the civil duty of helping the opposition in this crucial moment when the elections have been called, I am standing by the dissatisfied membership of the three parties. Everyone should exercise pressure on their leadership. On Kostunica for concluding that being offended is the best policy. On Djindjic for not abandoning his habit of stealing. On Draskovic for quarrelsomeness and crudeness.

I find it difficult to believe that no one explained to these people that there is more sense in quarreling in private and choir singing in front of cameras and microphones than vice versa. Former member of parliament Paroski, the cause of the most recent conflict between SPO and DS, is a good example of what none of them should be doing. The democrats should have consulted their partners on the question of Paroski's candidature. If Djindjic intended to use Paroski as a bargaining chip and was ready to renounce him in return for a favour from Draskovic, than this should have been resolved behind the scenes. Us ordinary people would prefer to live under the illusion that they are nice people who are not into that kind of business.

On the other hand, SPO should not have demanded publicly for Democrats to withdraw Paroski, or in any other way blackmail its coalition partners. I also think it is not particularly productive for SPO to write the coalition agreement on its own and then invite others to sign it. There are other, equally serious mistakes on all sides, but it has all gone too far. If in the end opposition parties succumb to the pressure and finally reach an agreement and form a coalition, they should make sure everyone is not already sick of them.