Foreigners Down South

Last Wednesday, the President of Yugoslavia on duty informed the public that following considerable deliberation and after taking into account all facts and arguments, he personally decided that the federal elections will take place on 3rd November. That is how it is going to be, whatever one may think of this president, such a country and these elections. On the following day everyone received further evidence that the elections will be consistent with the reputation of the state and its president.

There was still no mention of the opposition, the media or campaigning rules. Only a statement from one of the leaders of the Democratic Union of Kosovo (DSK) arrived, claiming that Albanians from Kosovo will not take part in the elections since these elections have nothing to do with them. By refusing to vote, the Albanians are once again saying that the state in which they live is none of their business, a position shared by many Serbs who themselves show little enthusiasm at the prospect of exercising their democratic right. Although the statement from the Albanian leadership had been expected, the state hurried to emphasize -to be on the safe side- that they, that the affairs of the Albanian minority, is none of its business either. Not long after Lilic called the elections, Radmilo Bogdanovic, former Serbian first policeman, accused Rugova and his DSK of being behind the recent terrorist attacks in Kosovo. With the authority of someone who is not exactly at the bottom of police hierarchy, Bogdanovic threatened that Kosovo Albanians might end up being treated as foreigners. Albanians might be able to interpret this as a promise of receiving better status and treatment, but for the time being, that is not the main topic of this article.

What is important is that the state and the Kosovo Albanians, or at least Bogdanovic and Rugova, are unanimous in the opinion that they will not meet at the next election. It appears that such interpretation of Bogdanovic's statement escaped many, so attacks on Bogdanovic came not only from those who are concerned about democracy and human rights. Probably many who are part of the regime also thought that such an undiplomatic incident is doing harm to the state which aspires to improve its image, and once again seems respectable.

That is why Bogdanovic subsequently had to explain that, according to his expert opinion, Albanians are seriously considering taking part in the elections. That, therefore is the bottom line. That is also why, after first accusing, insulting and threatening them (and after police one again demonstrated its might), Bogdanovic invited the Albanians, as well as the Muslims from Sandzak, to be so kind as to vote.

It is quite likely that the Kosovo Albanians are still far from being willing to vote, but the very possibility of Albanians turning out to vote -which can not be excluded- is frightening to Belgrade. These are federal elections, which means that if Albanians do take part, in doing so they will be recognizing the legitimacy of the unstable and slightly problematic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Rugova of course would rather avoid this, but since the last election the position of the Albanians, the status of Milosevic's regime, and the approach to the problem by the international community have all changed considerably. While the outcome of the Bosnian war was still uncertain, and when no one was sure if and where new borders will be drawn, Kosovo Albanians had their reasons for pinning their hopes on the affinity and support of world powers who were eager to stop Milosevic. After Dayton, the interest in the problems of Kosovo also began to subside. It is true that Washington has not recognized Belgrade yet, but European Union countries have, and it appears that everyone agrees that the solution to the problem lies within rather than outside Serbia or Yugoslavia.

Therefore, this time it will not be that easy for the Albanians to justify their boycott of the elections. In fact, it is quite likely that they will be pressured to take part, thus making the whole thing comically absurd. Neither Milosevic nor Rugova want to see Albanians voting at the election. It appears therefore that any international pressure on the Albanians to vote only creates a problem for both parties: It suggests to the Albanians that they can not ignore the state they are living in, and to Serbia, of Yugoslavia that it can not pretend not to notice almost two million of its inhabitants.

The police regime and the Albanian boycott have been going on for far too long. Everyone is exhausted; both Albanian and Serbian population, and Serbia itself. In such situations, the state is obliged to make the first move, to recognize the problem and attempt to solve it. For Milosevic however, the interests of the state and those of his own rule stand in a ratio characteristic of dictatorships and this is clearly illustrated by the present example.

He never had a better opportunity to, in the interest of his people and with strong international support, start mending what, to a large extent, he himself destroyed in Kosovo. However, the Albanian vote would increase the chances of Milosevic's party and Family ending up in the minority, and such a prospect fills him with so much grief that he would rather help Rugova by providing him with convincing reasons for boycotting the elections.

This is the main purpose behind Bogdanovic's threats and accusations.

If compelled to deal with the problem of Kosovo, Milosevic is likely to do so after the elections. This however, should worry those who believe and think that Kosovo is and should remain part of Yugoslavia, that is, that the solution lies in autonomy rather than secession. It is very important for Albanians to take part in these elections, both federal and local, because they might turn out to be the last chance for such a solution; for stabilization, peace, and for averting the spiral of violence -the glimpses of which are already discernible.

The naked force of inertia, as well as the power-retention instinct will guide Milosevic towards the risky and dangerous enterprise of partition and demarcation, which seems impossible without weapons, terror, ethnic cleansing and crime. The relations between the two people are beyond hatred. This is worse than inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia ever were. In such a situation partition seems logical and natural, but impossible even with the help of potential international arbitration. Even the beginning of negotiations on the issue, which implies an "exchange of population", would itself provoke an outburst of fear and violence.

There is no doubt that after all these years of terror, the Albanians find it difficult to accept these elections and indulge in any kind of cooperation with Belgrade. Probably even Washington and all Kosovo leaders together would not be able to persuade the Albanians to do any such thing, although their non-violent boycott is no longer an efficient tool of resistance. They are facing a uncontrolled and unstoppable slippage towards desperate and hopeless terrorism, and the loss of all international support.

On the Serbian side, at least the opposition, (that is the better, more responsible and democratic part of the opposition), should demonstrate their awareness of the importance and extent of the problem. Here the responsibility is not only that of the regime, and there is not much point in relying on the omnipotence of external forces. No one around here will feel any better if in the end Milosevic, Rugova or America are blamed for the disaster. The issue goes beyond that of the elections and calculations about who profits or loses from the Albanian boycott.

From the perspective of Belgrade, Kosovo is such an unpleasant problem that few want even to think about it. However, whoever has any influence on public or political affairs should look in that direction and realize the danger of the terrible dead-end in which the Kosovo Albanians have found themselves. If pushed towards terrorism, there will be little peace even outside Kosovo. In such a situation no one can look forward to the blooming of democracy in Belgrade. No one will be able to regret the absence of room for free press of the opposition. Neither "Together" or apart. I can easily imagine a future in which many of the things which we now find unpleasant and unbearable will seem like luxury. Five years ago we also did not live very comfortably, while in fact we were doing great.